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Foreword 
 
 
Palestinian Non-Governmental Organizations (PNGOs) 
play a central role in the social and economic life of the 
Palestinian Territories, far more than is the case in 
neighboring states and countries with comparable levels 
of development. One of the primary reasons for this is 
undoubtedly the prolonged period of occupation 
experienced by the Palestinian population. Of equal 
significance was the absence of central governing 
institutions capable of providing basic services to the 
population. However, even after the establishment of the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the emergence of an 
infant form of central administration, the role of PNGOs 
did not diminish. Indeed, the number of PNGOs has 
actually increased from approximately 930 in the year 
2000 to about 1,500 in 2007. It is clear, therefore, that 
the development of a centralized Palestinian 
administrative structure has not negated or even reduced 
the need for the services supplied by civil associations. 
Another reason for this persistence is that a considerable 
portion of the international aid to the Palestinian 
Territories is channeled through these civil society 
institutions. Our estimate suggests that, at present, about 
10 per cent of international aid to the Palestinian 
Territories is channeled through the PNGO sector.  
 
MAS has paid particular attention to the role that PNGOs 
play in Palestinian economic and social life. We have 
undertaken two major surveys, in 2000 and 2007, 
covering the general features of PNGOs (their legal 
status, year of establishment, recruitment, beneficiaries, 
funding and internal structure), their geographic and 
sectoral distribution and their capabilities and needs. 
Additionally, in 2007 MAS published a study evaluating 
the effectiveness of PNGOs in the fields of democracy, 
governance and human rights.  
 
The present study takes our research programme 
regarding PNGOs one step further. The study’s central 
aim is to track funding of international donors to PNGOs 
during a ten-year period (1999-2008). Two surveys were 
undertaken for this purpose; one from the side of PNGOs 
and the other from the side of the donors. Data regarding 
the amounts and sources of external funds as well as the 
way these funds were allocated to the various sectors, 
regions and governorates in the West Bank and Gaza is 
provided in the study. Furthermore, in order to put the 
external funding received by PNGOs into perspective, 
this study includes a comprehensive review of the 
external aid directed to the Palestinian Territories along 
with a detailed map of the structures that coordinate the 
relationship between donors and Palestinian institutions.  
 
Analysis of external aid to PNGOs provides an important 
contribution to the understanding of the development 
process in Palestine. For successful development to be 
achieved in the Palestinian Territories it is essential that 
there should be a complementary relationship between 
PNGOs and Palestinian governmental institutions. The 
objective of the current study is to shed light on the 
sources of external finance and the way external funds 
are deployed by PNGOs. It is hoped that this will 
contribute towards the wider goal of improving the 
effectiveness of the PNGOs and enhancing cooperation 
and coordination between Palestinian civil society 
organizations and central administrative bodies.   
 
 
 
 
 
Numan Kanafani 
Director General  
MAS 
 
 ii 
Preface 
 
 
Palestinian NGOs (PNGOs) comprise a vital part of the 
Palestinian community, in terms of their role in service 
delivery and the socio-economic development process.  
They exist as a major pillar of Palestinian civil society on 
which the responsibility of protecting citizens’ interests, 
providing them with platforms for self expression, and 
reaching out with their services to the poor and 
marginalized falls. According to statistics on Palestinian 
NGOs for the year 2007 provided by the Palestinian 
Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) and by the Palestine 
Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS), there are 
almost 1,500 Palestinian NGOs active in the West Bank 
and Gaza, in addition to tens of NGOs that are registered 
at the Ministry of Interior and have yet to commence 
operations. NGOs cover a wide range of social services 
including health and specialized health, education, 
agriculture, environment, rehabilitation services to 
people with special needs, care for the elderly, among a 
number of other services and activities. In the fields of 
human rights, good governance and democracy,  NGOs 
are leaders in empowering and defending the rights of 
women and children, enhancing youth participation in 
public life and protecting and promoting human rights 
principles. 
 
In the same context, the NGO sector suffers financial 
deficits, reaching  an estimated USD 22 million in 2006, 
as compared to USD 9 million in  1999 (according to a 
2007 statistical report on the Palestinian non-
governmental sector). This indicates the existence of 
great dependency on external funding, in general, and the 
inability of the local community to mobilize the needed 
funds in particular.  The issue of funding Palestinian 
NGOs is of great importance to ensure the sustainability 
of these organizations and to enhance and sustain their 
vital societal role.  
 
NDC conducted a thorough analysis of the funding 
directed to NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza and 
reviewed the literature available on this matter. There are 
significant gaps in the information available on the 
amounts of support, funding mechanisms types and 
sources of funds; and a lack of information on the 
distribution of funds sectorally and geographically. This 
lack of information impacts the ability of Palestinian 
NGOs to benefit from the available funding 
opportunities, and adversely influences the effectiveness 
of donor funding. To ensure adequate and successful 
planning at the national level, information on donor 
funding becomes crucial and allows the Palestinian 
Authority and the Palestinian NGOs to better coordinate 
interventions and planning of service delivery. It also 
allows the advancement of the policy dialogue on 
improving the complimentary roles between the 
Palestinian Authority and PNGOs and the creation of 
accountable mechanisms and controls. 
 
Given the essential and continued role which NGOs play 
in providing vital services to the Palestinian society, 
there is a need to track, monitor and analyze information 
related to financing coming from the donor community. 
With funding from the World Bank, and in coordination 
with the Ministry of Planning, NDC has therefore 
initiated this research on “Tracking Donor Funds to 
Palestinian NGOs”. The research was undertaken by the 
Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS). 
The preliminary assessment study on this research, 
which included a literature review and interviews with 
different stakeholders, informed the scope of the 
research. Two surveys were undertaken to track donor 
funding over a ten-year period (1998-2008); one from 
the side of PNGOs and the other from the side of the 
donors.. The collected information was also compared 
with data available on the Palestinian Aid Monitoring 
System (PAMS) of the Palestinian Ministry of Planning 
and Administrative Development. Data regarding the 
amounts and sources of external funds as well as the way 
these funds were allocated to the various sectors, regions 
and governorates in the West Bank and Gaza is provided 
in the study. Furthermore, in order to put the external 
funding received by PNGOs into perspective, this study 
includes a comprehensive review of the external aid 
directed to the Palestinian Territories along with a 
detailed map of the structures that coordinate the 
relationship between donors and Palestinian institutions.  
 
We take this opportunity to thank all organizations and 
individuals who supported and participated in making 
this research a reality. We hope that the information 
made available through it will help various parties in 
formulating their development plans according to 
reliable information. We also hope that it will help 
influence policy makers for better planning the 
involvement of the NGO sector in future strategies, 
interventions and plans. This will for sure support 
coordination mechanisms among Palestinian NGOs, the 
Palestinian Authority and the donor community. 
 
Ghassan Kasabreh 
Director 
NGO Development Center 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
Between 1999 and 2008, external aid to the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip increased by over 600% to 3.25 billion 
US Dollars per year. During the same time period, 
external aid to Palestinian Nongovernmental 
Organizations (PNGOs) increased by over 500% from 48 
million US Dollars in 1999 to 257 million in 2008. 
Throughout this period the level of external aid received 
by PNGOs fluctuated, however, it averaged around 10% 
over the 10 year period.  
 
According to our findings, not only the amount, but also 
the type of external aid entering the WB&GS varied 
according to political conditions. During times of 
political upheaval, we identified shifts in the destination 
of external aid, usually moving away from development 
or the Palestinian Authority and towards emergency 
relief programs, as well as a shift in the conduits of 
external aid, away from bilateral donors and towards 
multilateral agencies. According to our findings, PNGOs 
are engaged in development activities on a nearly 2:1 
basis to Relief, changing only slightly during the 
Intifada. Whereas we had expected a higher percentage 
of PNGO activities during the Second Intifada, we 
learned that much of the external aid to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories during this period was channeled 
through International Nongovernmental Organizations 
(INGOs) and multilateral agencies engaged in direct 
implementation.  
 
Amongst donor groupings, it is clear that Europe, both as 
an institution and as individual states, is by far the largest 
donor to both the Palestinian Authority and the PNGO 
sector, providing nearly 70% of the total funding to the 
latter. Aid from the Arab countries to Palestine has 
decreased steadily in comparison to Western donors and 
primarily contributes to the Palestinian Authority’s 
budget. Unlike European and American aid to Palestine 
and PNGOs, during times of Political crisis the amount 
and impact of Arab aid increases. Aid from the United 
States has decreased steadily throughout the period 
studied, from around 12% of the total external aid to 
PNGOs in 1999 to only 5% in 2008. According to our 
findings, nongovernmental donors surpass governmental 
sources in external aid to PNGOs, though most of the aid 
granted through INGOs comes from national 
governments. Prior to the Second Intifada, the opposite 
had been true, in which bilateral contributions to the 
PNGO sector outmatched those of the INGO sector.  
 
According to our findings, external aid is critical to both 
the health of the PA and PNGO sectors. According to 
MAS’s estimates, external aid comprises over 60% of the 
GNI of the WB&GS. For PNGOs, the dependency is 
even more pronounced with around 78% of PNGO 
revenues come from external aid. The increase in aid 
dependence has occurred along side a decrease in PNGO 
funding from the local community in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip.  
 
The primary conclusion of our analysis of externally 
funded PNGO activities by sector was the seemingly 
clear correlation between political realities and the 
sectors receiving external aid. According to our findings 
in 2008, PNGOs engaged in Rights-based activities 
received the highest proportion of external aid (30%), 
followed by PNGOs engaged in the Social Services 
sector (26%), Economic Sector (22%), Education (14%) 
and Charity and Relief (9%).  
 
According to our survey, external aid to PNGOs engaged 
in urban areas increased between 1999 and 2008 from 
25% to just under 40%. We also found that PNGOs tend 
to focus their efforts in rural areas, spending 40% of their 
resources there, despite urban inhabitants making up 
only 31% of the Palestinian population. Due to the scale 
and importance of UNRWA in providing aid to 
Palestinian refugees, PNGOs are less represented in the 
refugee target area. 
 
While PNGOs are regionally distributed somewhat close 
to the Palestinian population, those who partner with 
international agencies are overwhelmingly located in the 
Central West Bank, along with the vast majority of 
external donors. Though project implementation is more 
evenly spread throughout the WB&GS, it is still 
disproportionately targeting the Central West Bank in 
comparison to the number of people or PNGOs. 
 
 1 
1. Introduction and Methodology 
 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
This analysis of external aid to PNGOs provides an 
important contribution to the collective understanding of 
the process of development in Palestine. In 2008, 
PNGOs received over a quarter of a billion US dollars to 
meet their objectives. Yet, until now, there is only a 
limited knowledge of what was happening with this 
money and why. 
 
After this introductory chapter the study begins with a 
historical and statistical account of external aid to the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to provide the context 
needed to understand external aid to the PNGO sector. 
Having done so, chapter three of the study presents and 
analyses the results of out surveys of external donors and 
PNGOs. In this chapter the study reviews the importance 
of external aid to PNGOs, as well as the types of aid and 
donors involved. The chapter also reviews external aid to 
PNGOs by the sectors of their activities, as well as the 
target area and geography of externally funded PNGO 
project implementation. The final chapter offers policy 
recommendations aimed at improving the coordination 
and transparency in the PNGO sector.   
 
Following the body of the study, an expanded appendix 
is compiled, including the statistical breakdown of our 
findings, reviews of previous and ongoing efforts at 
tracking external aid and the surveys of Palestinian 
perceptions of external aid. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Though external donor funding to Palestinian NGOs 
(PNGOs) is critical to a sector so heavily reliant upon it, 
there is little data about this phenomenon. Given the 
essential role which NGOs play in providing basic 
services to Palestinian society, there is a need to track 
and analyze information related to the finances coming 
from the donor community in a more comprehensive 
way than is being done by the Palestinian Ministry of 
Planning’s (MoP) Palestinian Assistance Monitoring 
System (PAMS) Database. 
 
To say there is no literature on the topic would be 
misleading. However, reviews of existing research 
highlighted three gaps that this study aims to fill: 
 
1. Inaccurate data regarding geographic and sectoral 
distribution of aid 
2. Narrow focus on either donors or PNGOs 
3. Recent data is only cross-sectional as opposed to 
time series making it difficult to capture trends. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
 
The research aims to track and document external donor 
funding to Palestinian NGOs in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip over the last 10 years (1999-2008) by surveying 
both sides of the equation: PNGOs and external donors. 
The research provides data on funding patterns focusing 
on the amount of aid, as well as the geography, sector 
and target of its distribution over time1.   
 
1. The study will be made available to help various 
parties formulate development plans with reliable 
figures. By setting a frame of reference concerning 
development, development actors can begin to look 
at 'where they have been' and 'where they are' within 
the broader picture of development in Palestine.  
2. The study serves as a reference guide for researchers 
in the field of development and NGOs – Palestinian 
or otherwise. Existing literature on PNGOs and 
donors has tended to be weighted heavily toward the 
theoretical – largely due to the information shortfall 
that this study aims to address.  
3. Finally, the study concludes with policy 
recommendations and observations that aim to 
systemize the data collection of PNGOs and INGOs 
in a way that makes further research of this type 
unnecessary.  
4. Though our research does aim to identify trends in 
external aid to PNGOs, it is not our aim to pass 
judgment on the allocation or misallocation of this 
aid, as this would require further targeted studies 
aimed at capturing real needs. 
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
1.4.1 Primary Data Collection 
 
MAS researchers conducted two surveys of the two 
different sides of the equation being analyzed: external 
donors and their PNGO partners. However, our surveys 
of the two different targets did not attempt to capture the 
same picture from two different perspectives. Instead we 
utilized the survey of one side to look at the 
characteristics and activities of the other. As the 
following figure shows, the nature of the PNGO donor 
relationship in Palestine means that an individual donor 
can be questioned on his relationship with a number of 
PNGOs and vice versa. For this reason, a limited survey 
of one side of the equation returns a large sample of the 
other. 
                                                 
1  For definitions of these terms, see appendix II: Glossary of 
Terms. 
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Due to the fact that the donors sampled each had a 
number of PNGO partners, ranging from 2 to 25, the 
survey of 41 donor institutions may have yielded a 
sample of as many as 800 PNGOs, much higher than our 
PNGO survey sample of 80 organizations. Like our 
donor survey, the survey of PNGOs was an opportunity 
to look more closely at the activities of the other side of 
the equation. Because PNGOs, especially larger ones, 
have a number of donors ranging anywhere from 1 to 20 
according to our data, the PNGOs survey have returned a 
donor sample in the hundreds (around 540), allowing us 
to look more closely at the trend in external funding in 
terms of the source and type of aid, as well as the level of 
aid dependency experienced by PNGOs. 
 
 
Figure1:  Donor – PNGO Survey Rationale 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Donor Survey2 
Our donor survey aims to track external aid into the 
PNGO sector over a ten year period according to the 
sector, geography and target population of its 
distribution. Donor Survey fieldwork was conducted 
between April and July of 2009. 
 
Sample and Approach  
A total 41 institutions were surveyed directly and each 
returned completed data for at least one year. Donors 
were chosen primarily on a basis of perceived scale, the 
findings of previous MAS studies and through 
consultations with stakeholders. As our study sought to 
cover a specific percentage of funding to PNGOs in 
2008, projects and programs from any available source 
were compiled indirectly in order to help meet that goal3. 
Indirect data gathering included the use of the websites 
and financial reports of organizations. 
 
Efforts were also made to differentiate our sample along 
other lines, such as the type, the region of the aid's 
origin, the sector of the donor's work and their estimated 
contributions to the PNGO sector. Especially in the case 
of INGOs, only those who utilized the majority of their 
funding in direct partnerships with PNGOs were 
approached; while those INGOs who directly implement 
most of their own projects were not.  
 
The primary division within our sample is between 
Governmental (bi-lateral and multilateral aid) and 
Nongovernmental (INGO, Private and Religious) 
                                                 
2  Donor questionnaire available in Appendix VI. 
3  We originally set out to reach 70% of the total external funding to 
PNGOs in 2006 according to previous MAS mappings of the 
PNGO sector. As the following section shows, we were able to 
capture much more than that in both of our surveys.  
sources. The 25 nongovernmental agencies surveyed 
provided up to 55% of the external aid captured in our 
survey, while the 16 governmental agencies provided the 
remaining 45%. Though it is largely true that INGOs act 
as intermediary channels of Government funding to 
PNGOs, we worked to analyze whether the behaviors of 
the two groups differed. In other words, are INGOs able 
to assert their own agendas, not necessarily those of the 
government financing them? We also wanted to look at 
how the channels of funding to PNGOs are affected by 
political upheaval and whether governments prefer 
bilateral, multilateral or indirect (INGO) partnerships 
with PNGOS. 
 
The expansion of our donor sample beyond governments 
and into the INGO sector is crucial to capturing the real 
picture. The MoP, from the MoPIC system to the current 
PAMS database, has not been given the legal mandate to 
capture external aid to PNGOs channeled through 
INGOs. As Hanafi’s 1998 study for Welfare shows in the 
table 1, the failure to incorporate INGO funding into the 
picture dramatically underestimates the amount of 
external funding allocated to PNGOs. According to 
Hanafi’s findings, when INGOs funding to PNGOs is 
included, the amount of total external aid to the WB&GS 
captured by the PNGO sector moves from 11% to 18%.  
 
Table 2 shows the results of the donor survey against the 
official time series estimates of the MoP, as well as the 
two cross-sectional estimates of MAS in 1999 and 2006. 
The success of our survey fluctuated according to the 
year, as well as the estimate of total aid entering the 
PNGO sector. If the official estimates of the MoP are 
used, the survey managed to cover nearly 64% of the 
total estimated aid to PNGOs in 2008. However, if 
MAS’s 2006 estimate is assumed to be closer to reality, 
our survey managed to capture 76% of the external aid to 
PNGOs in 2006.   
Don DonDon Don
PNG PNG PNG PNG
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Table 1: Hanafi’s Illustration of the Significance of INGO Inclusion  
in Surveys of the PNGO Sector 
 
1997 USD 
MoPIC: Donor aid to the PA and PNGOs from Government Agencies.  432,259,000 
MoPIC: Aid to PNGOs from Governmental Agencies 45,995,000 
MoPIC: Percentage of total donor aid to Palestine captured PNGOs 11% 
Welfare 1998: Donor aid to PNGOs from Governmental Agencies and INGOs 76,897,000 
Welfare Survey: % of total aid to Palestine captured by PNGOs 18% 
Source: Hanafi, Tabar, 2005: 73. 
 
 
Table 2: Donor Survey Results versus Estimated Aid to PNGOs 
 
Year 
# of Orgs 
Returning 
Data 
% of 
Total 
Surveyed 
Total Amount 
Surveyed 
(USD) Donors 
Est’d total 
Int’l Aid to 
PNGOs (MoP)
Total % of 
MoP estimate 
surveyed 
Est’d total 
Int’l Aid to 
PNGOs (MAS)
Total % of 
MAS estimate 
surveyed 
1999 8 20 8,000,000 48,000,000 17 53,000,000 15 
2000 9 22 14,000,000 55,000,000 26   
2001 11 27 20,000,000 93,000,000 22   
2002 23 56 46,000,000 103,000,000 45   
2003 26 63 49,000,000 65,000,000 76   
2004 29 71 68,000,000 57,000,000 119   
2005 34 83 97,000,000 218,000,000 44   
2006 38 93 104,000,000 196,000,000 53 136,000,000 76 
2007 40 98 148,000,000 213,000,000 69   
2008 41 100 165,000,000 258,000,000 64   
Total Funding Captured 719,000,000      
Note: Total Amounts Surveyed are rounded to the nearest Million USD and percentages are rounded to the nearest 
whole number. For a review of the differences between MoP and previous MAS estimates of external aid to 
PNGOs, see section 3.1.1 
 
 
Implementation 
The 25 INGO donor respondents were questioned on 
whether or not they also implement their own projects, as 
opposed to partnering directly with a local PNGO. 
According to the survey, 15 of the INGO donors 
implemented their own projects without PNGO partners, 
representing 60% of those surveyed. Eight of the INGOs 
(32%) claimed to only work through local 
implementation partners and two organizations did not 
provide any answer. 
 
PNGO Survey 
Ten fieldworkers (seven in the WB and three in the GS) 
began their survey of 80 PNGOs on August 1st and 
completed it on September 15th, 2009.  
 
Sample and Approach 
Similar to the donor survey, our survey of PNGOs 
attempted to capture as much external funding as 
possible by focusing on the institutions who receive the 
highest proportion of aid. Only when these  larger  NGOs 
 
had been selected did we begin looking to differentiate 
our sample based upon sector, geography and the target 
population of their work.   
 
The PNGOs with total annual budgets of less than 
30,000 USD were excluded, as they typically receive 
external aid via the larger PNGOs, if they receive much 
at all. Therefore the survey of the larger PNGOs covers 
much of the external aid that filters down to the vast 
majority of smaller ones. After selecting the 46 largest 
PNGOs (based on the organizations with annual external 
revenues of over 500,000 USD in MAS’s 2006 Census 
of PNGOs), the remaining 34 were distributed as widely 
as possible in terms of geography and primary sectors of 
activity. Researchers also worked to include a number of 
newer organizations in order to look at some of the more 
recent trends in the PNGO sector. Table 3 illustrates the 
results of our PNGO survey. It should be noted that two 
of the surveyed PNGOs reported to have not received 
external funding in 2007 or 2008. 
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Table 3: PNGO Survey Results versus Estimated Aid to PNGOs 
 
Year 
# of NGOs 
Returning 
data 
% of Total 
NGOs 
Surveyed 
Total Amount 
Surveyed (USD) 
PNGOs 
MoP Estimate 
of Total Aid to 
PNGOs 
% MoP 
Estimate 
Surveyed 
Est’d total 
Ext’l Aid to 
PNGOs (MAS) 
% of MAS 
Estimates 
Surveyed 
1999 41 51 39,000,000 48,000,000 82 53,000,000 74 
2000 24 30 20,000,000 55,000,000 37   
2001 27 34 28,000,000 93,000,000 31   
2002 31 39 36,000,000 103,000,000 35   
2003 37 46 31,000,000 65,000,000 47   
2004 44 55 42,000,000 57,000,000 74   
2005 61 76 55,000,000 218,000,000 27   
2006 80 100 121,000,000  196,000,000 62 136,000,000 89 
2007 78 98 147,000,000 213,000,000 69   
2008 78 98 126,000,000 258,000,000 49   
Total Funding Captured 645,000,000     
Note: Estimates to the nearest million and percentages to the nearest whole number.  
 
 
PNGO Survey Sample Analysis 
A key point discussed in our PNGO survey Focus 
Group4, was the fact that our PNGO sample does not 
offer a representative picture of PNGO activities in terms 
of sector, geography and target population. However, the 
survey of less than five percent of the estimated number 
of PNGOs did not aim to map these institutions. Instead 
we aimed to track the activities of donors and primarily 
the activities of the largest PNGOs, who are also the 
largest recipients of external aid, in terms of the sector, 
geography and target of their work. The following 
sections highlight some of the characteristics of our 
sample. 
 
Scope of Work 
33 of the 80 PNGOs we surveyed (41%) work at the 
national level and provide services throughout both the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. 19 respondent PNGOs (24%) 
claimed to work throughout the West Bank only and 16 
(20%) claimed to work throughout the Gaza Strip only. 
Finally, 11 PNGOs claimed to work at the district or 
governorate level and only one PNGO’s activities 
remained at the individual community level. 54 of the 80 
PNGOs surveyed (68%) had established branch offices 
to extend the scope of their services. 
 
Besides the actual budgets of those sampled, this is the 
best indication that our survey is weighted heavily 
towards large PNGOs. According to the 2007 MAS 
Mappings, only 11% of PNGOs worked at the national 
level, 8.1% at the level of the West Bank and 12.4% 
throughout all of the Gaza Strip. Whereas only one 
                                                 
4  The PNGO Survey workshop was held at MAS on October 26th, 
2009, 
surveyed PNGO worked at the local level, in 2007 31.9% 
of all PNGOs did so.  
 
Sector Groupings of PNGO Sample 
As the limited PNGO survey sample worked to track 
trends in external aid as opposed to PNGO activities, the 
19 sectors were divided into 5 groups, in order to have a 
broader picture of international donor activities. Table 4 
shows the distribution of sectors into groupings. 
 
Table 5 shows the distribution of our sample by sector, 
grouping and region. As our intention was to capture as 
much of the external aid as possible within the scope of 
our sample, some figures stands out clearly.  
 
18 of the 80 PNGOs surveyed were focused on rights-
based development and located in the Central West Bank 
(C WB). 10 of the Economic based PNGOs and 5 of the 
Education-based PNGOs were also from the C WB. The 
reason for this over representation will become clear 
throughout the study, but it is worth mentioning now. 
When tracking external donor funding to PNGOs, as 
opposed to mapping PNGO activity, a small targeted 
sample is capable of capturing the bigger picture; but 
only if one is to recognize the existing geographic and 
sectoral inequalities of aid to PNGOs, rather than attempt 
to build a sample representative of PNGOs themselves. 
While our survey of 1,388 PNGOs in 2006 yielded an 
estimate of nearly 136 million USD in external aid to the 
sector; our sample shows that almost 90% of it is 
captured by only 80 organizations.  
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Table 4: Sector Groupings and Sectors 
 
Group Sectors 
Charity & Relief Charity & Relief 
Economic Rural Development , Water and the Environment, Vocational Training, Other 
Rights-based Development Human Rights, Enhancing Democracy, Good Governance, Women’s Affairs 
Education Research, Scientific Education, Liberal Arts Education, Religious Activities 
Social services  Health Services, Elderly Care, Disabled Care, Children’s Activities, Youth and Sports 
 
 
Table 5: PNGO Sample Distribution  
by Region and Sector Grouping 
 
Region 
Activity 
N WB C WB S WB G S 
Total 
WB&GS 
Charity & Relief 4 0 2 7 13 
Economic 0 10 3 3 16 
Rights-based Development  1 18 3 4 26 
Education 0 5 3 0 8 
Social services  2 6 3 7 17 
 
 
Though the table 5 illustrates an effort to spread our 
sample somewhat beyond the large PNGOs working in 
only a few sectors, we did not aim to carry out another 
mapping of PNGOs similar to 1999 and 2006. Our 
sample included a higher percentage of Economic 
PNGOs than their percentage of the total PNGO sector 
because these infrastructure intensive programs receive 
high levels of external aid. The same is true to an even 
greater degree concerning the Rights-Based PNGOs who 
make up 32% of our sample while only making up 12% 
of PNGOs. Both the education and social services sector 
groupings are underrepresented in our sample. Though 
these PNGOs make up the vast majority in terms of 
population, only a few sectors within them receive large 
amounts of external aid. So while there are a number of 
PNGOs engaged in the Youth and Sports and Children 
Activities Social sub-sectors, the largest portion of 
funding within the social sector grouping is captured by a 
small number of Health NGOs.   
 
1.4.2 Secondary Data Collection 
 
Analysis on the topic of Palestinian civil society and 
external aid is abundant, perhaps due to the unique 
situation of Palestine. The sheer amount and duration of 
aid that has entered the WB&GS make it an ideal case 
study to measure the impact of aid and its sensitivity to 
political events. Whenever necessary, we have 
referenced these other studies throughout the text. More 
often though, a footnote is provided to readers describing 
where they can find elaborated work on the topic at hand. 
 
The MAS Institute has already published two studies on 
the development of the NGO sector in 2001 and 2007, 
both of which assisted us greatly in our efforts to track 
the development of external aid. 
 
The 1998 study by Sari Hanafi, commissioned by the 
Welfare Association, is perhaps the most important 
starting point of our review as the aim, methodology and 
scope of the study is very similar to our own. Prior to the 
release of this study, Hanafi’s tracking of donor funding 
from 1995 to 1998 is the only available time series data. 
As our study begins in 1999, we are in a sense picking up 
where he left. A brief overview of the study and its 
results are available in the appendix.  
 
Another crucial secondary resource to the study has been 
the MoP's PAMS database. Though the database 
provides only limited information concerning primarily 
donor government activities, the nature of our research 
allowed us to take full advantage of the information that 
PAMS does possess, without being harmed by the 
information that it does not. A review of the evolution, 
weaknesses and importance of PAMS is available in the 
appendix. 
 
Beyond numerous studies and databases, we scoured 
through websites and annual reports of organizations in 
search of data that would be compatible to our survey.  
 
In addition to tracking donor funding, MAS also sought 
to track the location of donors themselves. Rather than 
relying on the relatively small sample of surveyed 
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institutions, we looked to the annual diaries of PASSIA 
and its listing of approximately 120 to 130 international 
organizations and donors according to the locations of 
their HQs and Field Offices.  
 
World Bank and OECD data is referenced throughout the 
study or offered as a comparison, and the PCBS was 
used for most demographic statistics. 
 
1.4.3 Survey Limitations 
 
Our research aimed to track the trends in external 
funding to PNGOs over a ten year period. In doing so, 
we faced a number of obstacles and difficulties. 
 
Data Availability of Donors and PNGOs 
During our primary data collection, we found that many 
local and international organizations, especially the 
smaller ones, lacked proper data concerning the sector, 
geography and target populations of their work over 
time, typically for one of the following reasons: 
 
 They do not keep such data, or have only recently 
begun to do so 
 Publicly available data is most often given in broad 
aggregate programs in annual financial and activities 
reports. 
 In the case of donors, existing data was sometimes 
not available in either English or Arabic, rather only 
the language of the donor country.  
 
Institutional Knowledge of Donors and PNGOs 
Often the lack of data required researchers to depend 
heavily upon the staff and their memories to provide 
educated estimates during our primary data collection. In 
doing so, our fieldworkers found that the level of 
experience in many NGO offices was noticeably low. In 
many cases, the majority of the staff had been working 
for the same organization for a short time; and in a few 
instances, the same was true of the management. 
 
Transparency, Participation and Bias 
There was a palpable, if not widespread, sense of 
mistrust amongst a number of donors and PNGO 
institutions we approached for primary data. A small 
number of organizations refused outright to take part in 
the survey, while a larger proportion agreed initially, but 
then refused to release the data within the time limit.  
 
In either of these cases, the most likely cause for not 
participating was the lack of available manpower to fill 
our lengthy survey. However, on several occasions, 
donors or PNGOs cited an unwillingness to disclose the 
data. We believe that the reasons unwillingness to share 
data revolves around:  
 
 Organizations’ fears of being associated with 
agencies that carry a political stigma, such as 
USAID.  
 The previous 'turf war' between the PA and NGO 
sector (culminating in the late 1990's attempts by the 
PA to levy greater regulations on civil society) left 
many NGOs mistrustful of attempts to gather 
information. 
 The current state of division between Hamas/Fatah 
and the West Bank/Gaza Strip has created an 
atmosphere in which openness and transparency is 
not encouraged. This was more evident for 
fieldworkers in the Gaza Strip.  
 
From the organizations who did return data, there was 
the additional danger of accuracy and credibility. We 
believe that it is possible for respondents to have painted 
an idealized picture of the organization's activities, rather 
than a real one.  
 
Terminology and Allocation 
The detailed information required to fill out this survey, 
in terms of sectors, geographic distribution and even 
target populations served, is largely unavailable on the 
websites of PNGOs or their donors, making secondary 
data collection difficult. This is also true of Annual or 
Financial Reports - the former providing only summaries 
or ‘success stories’ of their work, and the latter giving 
numbers in aggregates that are not useful. When data is 
actually available on a project by project basis, a major 
disadvantage for researchers is the use of project titles in 
deciphering sectors or target groups. Yet this is often the 
most one can find. Project titles are sometimes sculpted 
in a manner that market their proposals rather than 
describe them.  
 
If a ‘good’ project title for the purpose of this research 
and the understanding of external aid were to look like 
this: Drama Therapy for Refugee Youth in Jenin. A 
‘marketed’ project title would look something like: 
Reversing the Culture of Pain. A ‘fashionable’ title 
adopting the international jargon would be more like: 
Empowering Refugee Youth through Sustainable, 
Cultural Interventions5. The risk of ambiguous project 
titles for researchers is the possible misallocation of aid 
to a particular sector or target group during the secondary 
data collection.  
                                                 
5  These examples come from one of the authors’ experiences in 
fundraising. Each of these titles was used for the same project 
proposal but then sent to different donors.  
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2. Overview of Aid to Palestine 
 
 
The primary contribution of our research, tracking 
external aid to PNGOs between 1999 and 2008, is in 
chapter three of this study. Before delving into our 
findings however, the following section works to lay a 
framework for understanding the bigger picture, of 
which PNGOs are only a part. The first section of the 
chapter will look into the political history of the 
WB&GS, before going into a statistical analysis of the 
trends in aid to the WB&GS. The chapter closes by 
looking at how the local and international structures of 
aid coordination have changed over time.  
 
2.1 The Political Evolution of Aid to the 
WB&GS 
 
Since the War of 1948 and the Palestinian dispossession 
of what would eventually become the State of Israel, the 
Palestinian people, both inside the WB&GS and 
throughout the region, have been heavily dependant upon 
external aid. It is often said that Palestinians are among 
the highest recipients of external aid per capita in the 
world6. Whether Palestine is indeed the first, second, or 
even in the top ten of aid recipients, the importance of 
this money to the ongoing political and humanitarian 
crisis cannot be discounted. 
 
Though external aid has acted as a constant buttress to 
Palestinians since the War of 1948, the manner, type and 
conduits have changed significantly over time. Certainly 
changes should be expected as a recipient country moves 
from different stages of crisis and development, but we 
have found that these shifts coincide closely with 
political realities here in Palestine and around the world, 
rather than local development needs. 
 
This introduction to aid in Palestine aims to give a 
broader understanding of the history and context of our 
study, not solely by looking at our subjects (international 
donors and NGOs) but the ‘very political economy’ in 
which they operate7.  
 
2.1.1 The 1967 Occupation to the Second Intifada 
 
Researchers have dated the emergence of NGOs in 
Palestine back to the 1920s, largely in the form of 
                                                 
6  This statistic has been disputed by a number of studies by the 
Alternative Information Center (AIC). According to Hever 
(2008), 2002 represented the highest ranking per capita in 
international aid in the WB&GS, when Palestine was ranked third 
in the world. Ironically, 2006 represents the second highest 
ranking for Palestinians (fifth), despite the fact that the elections 
of Hamas are largely blamed for the drying up of aid.  
7  Phase coined by Dr Rex Brynen in the late 1990s, to describe 
peace building and foreign aid to the WB&GS.   
charitable societies8. These may have grown in parallel, 
or in response, to the emergent Jewish Zionist movement 
(Sullivan 1996). As it became more and more evident 
that the British Mandate would come to an end, both the 
Jews and Palestinians began preparing institutions which 
would replace those of the leaving colonial power.  
 
Despite the parallel efforts, some argue that Palestinian 
institution-building lagged behind that of their Israeli 
counterparts due to the divisions remaining from the 
1936 ‘Arab Revolt’ that sat in sharp contrast to the 
unifying nationalist fervor of the Zionist movement.  
 
It was the war of 1967, and the beginning of the 
occupation, which sparked a real and vibrant NGO 
movement in the WB&GS. In the absence of a 
centralized state and under occupation, NGOs stepped 
into fill critical gaps in service provision by looking 
inward to the formation of quasi-governmental 
structures. Building rival, democratic institutions (such 
as) nonprofit, independent research centers acquired 
great popular prestige and a large number of them 
emerged as a result (Sullivan, 1996).  
 
In 1987, the First Palestinian Intifada was launched from 
the Jabalya Refugee Camp in the Gaza Strip. The 
initiative quickly caught throughout the rest of the 
Occupied Territories. Within days, the entire world was 
aware of the unfolding crisis in the Middle East. Up to 
this point, external aid to the WB&GS came primarily 
from Arab countries through the Palestinian Liberation 
Organization (PLO) in exile. The Palestine National 
Fund, fueled by Gulf countries placing a 5% tax on their 
Palestinian immigrant workforce, was given to the PLO 
to distribute between various factions operating within 
the WB&GS. Through regional foundations, such as the 
Islamic Development Bank or the AGFUND, private 
philanthropists from the Arab world were also influential 
in the funding of PNGOs (Challand, 2009:79)9. 
 
                                                 
8  In 1922 under the British Mandate, the new law on private and 
non-profit making companies laid 'the groundwork for the 
formation of many new organizations that were willing to escape' 
the control of the Ottoman law (Challand, 2009:60). Prior to 
1922, the Ottoman Law of Associations of 1907 guaranteed the 
right of association, but in a limited manner. The groups first had 
to report to the authorities concerning their intentions, before then 
receiving licensing. This stipulation allowed Ottoman authorities 
to keep a check on the formation of nationalist associations within 
its sphere of influence (ibid). 
9  According to Rex Brynen, Aid increased dramatically in the late 
1970s, due to the Baghdad Summit commitments, and declined 
later. Aid was also affected by both intra-Palestinian and 
Palestinian-Jordanian rivalries (including that funneled through 
the Joint Committee), with support for NGOs being a prime 
mechanism of political competition. 
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Western support to the PNGO sector, much less at the 
time, came primarily through Consulates and 
Representative Offices. It was not until the outbreak of 
the First Intifada that many more Western INGOs arrived 
to channel more money into the PNGO sector (Challand, 
2009:80)10. Whether the sudden Western interest in and 
funding to the Palestinian people responded to the crisis 
of the Intifada represented an increased solidarity with 
the Palestinian cause, or suggested an increase in 
awareness of the geopolitical importance of the conflict, 
can only be guessed. Whatever the reasons, Western 
donors soon supplanted their Arab counterparts in 
assistance to the WB&GS, reducing the ‘financial 
influence’ of the latter to a mere fraction of total external 
aid.  
 
In 1991 the United States launched a war against Iraq 
following the latter’s invasion of neighboring Kuwait. 
The perception that the PLO supported Iraq during this 
period backfired on Palestinians in two important ways: 
First, the financial support from the Arab world to the 
WB&GS dried up immediately11. This was compounded 
by the expulsion from many Gulf Countries of their 
Palestinian migrant workers (Challand, 2009:79), quickly 
drying up the National Fund. Whereas the Intifada had 
brought crucial international attention and sympathy to 
the cause of Palestinians around the world, the decision 
to support Iraq left Palestinians with both fewer and 
different friends. A second consequence was Israel’s 
imposition of stricter rules on Palestinian labor and 
movement that severely undermined the economy. 
Though Palestine was already suffering from military 
and civil occupation, Israel’s control over and isolation 
of the oPT intensified dramatically from the Gulf War 
onward. In consequence, while Palestine has been so 
heavily dependent upon international aid, the attendant 
gains have not overcome the economic losses caused by 
the closure of the Israeli economy to Palestinian 
workers12.  
 
It was at this time, when Palestinians were facing new 
harder challenges on the march to Oslo, that Western 
donors took the reins of financing Palestinian 
development (Challand, 2009:59).  
 
The different nature of the aid offered to Palestinians 
from Arab and Western donors is important, especially 
when one considers funding to NGOs. ‘The noteworthy 
influence of this time is not only the increase in funding 
                                                 
10  This reflected a shift in donor policy, and not merely the “arrival” 
of INGOs who, after all, get most of their money from donors. 
For donors, of course, NGOs and UN agencies were the only 
available channels prior to the establishment of the PA (Brynen, 
2009 Referee Comment).  
11  To learn more about Arab aid to the WB&GS see Section 3.9. 
12  In the World Bank’s report on aid effectiveness (2000), the 
economic closures had cost the Palestinian economy 15-20% of 
GNP between 1995 and 1997, far more than the positive impact 
of external aid. 
from the West, but their insistence upon prepackaged 
programs with pre-defined thematic concerns and 
sectors’ (Hanafi, 2005:54). Core funding, or the 
institutional support once offered to local institutions, 
changed to project funding – short term and quick impact 
based development. Project funding has carried with it 
many downsides for the development of the NGO sector. 
Organizations competing for funding can become 
encouraged to follow annual funding fashions, more 
often flowing from donor countries and international best 
practices than from PNGO needs. Furthermore, the need 
to constantly look forward and be prepared to change the 
core strategy year by year encourages PNGOs to ‘not 
look back’, or follow up. The other clear danger comes 
when the prepackaged idea meets reality, and donors, 
realizing the project does not fit, insist on portraying the 
situation in a manner that would sell the project anyway13 
(Hanafi, 2005:55). 
 
The local services vacuum, under which Palestinian 
NGOs had formed and flourished, slowly vanished 
following the Oslo Accords and the establishment of the 
PA. As these institutions had had to minister to the 
WB&GS in the absence of an Authority, the PA's 
emergence “almost immediately overwhelmed the NGO 
sector” through the competition or cooptation  that 
accompanied the state-building process (Kamrava, 
1999:4, Challand, 2009:63).  
 
According the World Bank (2008), there were an 
estimated 1,400 PNGOs existing in 1994. In only two 
years the number dropped to “little less than 1,000, with 
more than a third of those organizations having been 
established after the coming of the PA” (MAS, 2007:12). 
Depending on exactly how much is meant by ‘more than 
a third’, the number of PNGOs decreases dramatically 
over the two year period. If, for example, 40% of the 
PNGOs in 1996 were founded after the establishment of 
the PA, then as many as 800 PNGOs may have 
disappeared following the establishment of the PA in 
1994. 
 
Part of the reason for this decline in the number of 
PNGOs was the PA’s invitation to incorporate them into 
its structures.  The Health Services Council, for example, 
which ran as many as sixty-two clinics throughout the 
WB&GS, merged its resources into the structure of the 
PA (Sullivan 1996:95). All of the PNGOs close to Fatah 
merged into the the PA, while many others refused 
(Challand, 2009: 64). For these remaining NGOs, this 
meant an uncomfortable transition into new fields, as 
many of their prior activities were now undertaken by the 
                                                 
13  This trend is especially true when INGOs are classified as donors. 
While they play a role in choosing the over all direction of 
development in the WB&GS, much like their PNGO 
counterparts, they in turn are locked into the same cycle and 
competition for international governmental aid. 
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PA14. A wide variety of institutions once operating in a 
number of fields were pushed into a more limited range 
of activities and into competitive relationships over 
funding.  
 
Throughout the years leading up to the Oslo Accords and 
immediately following them, the decline in the number 
of PNGOs in the WB&GS ran parallel to the growth in 
international NGOs and IGOs. While relatively few 
INGOs worked in the WB&GS prior to the Intifada 
(Challand, 2009:80), by 1993 there were an estimated 
200. During this same time, the number of UN agencies 
jumped from three to 29 (ibid:81).  
 
These new actors brought more funding and partnership 
opportunities along with them,  and by 1999, the number 
of PNGOs had almost recovered to 982 (from an 
estimated 1000 in 1994) with a full 46.8% of their 
funding now coming from abroad (MAS, 2001) - the vast 
majority of this from the West. Due to the cut off of Arab 
funding to Palestine during the First Gulf War and the 
subsequent return of Arab aid in the form of PA 
Budgetary Support, their contributions to the PNGO 
sector during the late 1990’s was nearly non-existent15.  
 
2.1.2 The Second Intifada to the 2006 
Parliamentary Elections to Present 
 
The 2001 onset of the Second ‘Al Aqsa’ Intifada 
dramatically changed the face of external aid and the 
work of NGOs16. Though the Second Intifada improved 
                                                 
14  The PA began imposing various forms of controls over some in 
the NGO sector. “It required that they supply detailed information 
regarding the personal and professional lives of their members; in 
some cases, it asked for past and present political affiliations; the 
names of members’ fathers and wives and past convictions for 
spying - NGOs soon found themselves closely monitored by the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA), the Ministry of Interior (MoI) 
and the intelligence services” (Kamrava, 1999:3). For more about 
the relationship between the PA and civil society, see: Al-Zeben 
1998, 1999; Challand 2003; Khan et al. 2004, 2009; Ladadweh et 
al. 2001; and Sullivan 2002. 
The first draft NGO law was presented to the Palestinian 
Legislative Council in 1997, but was reminiscent of the very strict 
Egyptian law on NGOs (Sullivan, 1996). A major point of 
contention involved the government being able to license NGOs, 
rather than just registering them, signaling a move backwards to 
the Ottoman era of control. The second point of contention was 
which ministry should have power to do the licensing. Arafat, 
then in control of the Ministry of the Interior, chose this body, 
which is also linked to the Palestinian intelligence services. The 
law finally came into effect in 2000 as the Law on Charitable 
Associations and Community Organizations (Challand, 2009:64-
65), but not without first finding striking compromise with NGOs 
and foreign governments that would preserve a degree of 
autonomy in the sector (Hanafi, 2005:49).  
15  According to Malhis (2007), between 1994 and 2000, Arab 
funding only comprised 7.3% of the total aid entering the 
WB&GS, with the vast majority of it avoiding the PNGO sector. 
16  For an extended account of external aid to PNGOs during the 
Second Intifada, see: Bocco et al. 2001. 
relations between the PA and NGOs as the latter shifted 
back to relief and advocacy against the occupation 
(Challand, 2009:66), the shift in donor focus from 
development back to emergency assistance changed 
PNGO strategies. Overall external aid to the WB&GS 
increased dramatically between 2000 and 2002 – by over 
250% according to the World Bank. However, due to the 
crisis, the majority of this aid was shifted out of the 
PNGO sector and into INGO and IGO agencies engaged 
in emergency relief. Yet despite the shift from PNGO-
based development toward INGO-based relief, the 
dramatic increase in overall aid to the WB&GS meant 
that there was still a slight increase of external aid 
captured by PNGOs. 
 
As the Second Intifada began to wind down, aid began to 
shift back from meeting the immediate humanitarian 
needs of Palestinians to long-term development. The 
MoP (2008) describes the years of 2004 and 2005 the 
‘most stable in terms of governmental planning processes 
and donor relations (from a) from a humanitarian to a 
state-building and development paradigm’ (MoP, 2008). 
According to PAMS, the PNGO sector also saw a 
dramatic increase in external funding between 2004 and 
2005, much of it to the sectors of governance, democracy 
and human rights.  
 
In January 2006, the second Palestinian Legislative 
Elections resulted in a victory for the Hamas Party17. The 
international response to Hamas’ victory was to put a 
halt to state-building efforts as donor governments 
instituted financial sanctions against the PA. The 
immediate ‘drying up’ of funding was accompanied by 
the loss of VAT and trade clearance revenue transfers 
from Israel, decreased loan availability to the PA and the 
economic and social carnage wrought by intensified 
Israeli attacks18.  
 
Following the arrest of a majority of Hamas MPs by 
Israel, President Abbas disbanded the Parliament in June 
of 2006. According to the MoP: ‘in response to the year-
long fiscal crisis and the resulting inability of the 
government to provide essential services to its citizens, a 
National Unity Government was formed between 
February and March of 2007. However, many donors 
continued to bypass the PA’ (MoP, 2008), meaning that 
public salaries continued to go unpaid and development 
projects ground to a halt. 
 
In June of 2007, fighting erupted between the two main 
rival political factions in the Gaza, resulting in the deaths 
of 118 Palestinians and Hamas 19control over the Gaza 
                                                 
17  Hamas gained 74 out of 132 (56%) seats in the Legislative 
Council, far more than the 45 earned by the closest rival party, 
Fatah.  (34%) 
18  For more information about external funding during the time of 
the Hamas-led PA, see: Le More 2006. 
19  ICRC, 2007 – Humanitarian Bulletin 22. 
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Strip. In the West Bank, President Abbas appointed an 
emergency ‘technocratic’ government, who after 
exceeding its 60 day became known as the ‘caretaker 
government’. 
 
According to the MoP, ‘the Caretaker Government is 
favorably viewed by the international community, and 
(its appointment) led to an immediate reversal of donor 
financial sanctions and no-contact policies (with the PA). 
Donors reengaged with the PA in the West Bank on a 
development agenda (…) However, this donor-PA 
engagement is limited to the West Bank – in the Gaza 
Strip, aid remains purely humanitarian’ (ibid). 
‘Donor re-engagement’ in the West Bank, as described 
by the MoP, is an understatement when one looks at the 
trends in external aid to both the WB&GS in general and 
PNGOs in particular. Through frameworks such as 
Temporary International Mechanism (TIM) and INGOs, 
aid to Palestine as a whole and the PNGO sector in 
particular, actually increased dramatically between 2006 
and 2008 despite the embargo.  
 
 
 
 
2.1.3 In Focus: From TIMS to PEGASE  
 
Following the 2006 elections, the EU established a mechanism that tried to meet the basic needs of the Palestinians while by 
passing the coffers of the Hamas-led PA. The expenditures to be covered were limited to three Windows: 
 
Window I: 
Essential supplies and approved recurrent non-wage expenditures for the health sector, and basic allowances to health care 
service providers who had not been receiving salaries20;  
 
Window II: 
Support for uninterrupted supply of utilities, including fuel; and 
 
Window III: 
Basic needs allowances to meet the essential needs of the poorest segments of the population. 
 
The aid that did come through these windows came attached with important preconditions. Contact with the PA was to only 
take place at the ‘lowest possible levels’, with the Office of the President acting as the only interface for the management 
unit of the TIM and charged with signing and ratifying all legal agreements. Furthermore, international banks were selected 
to pay eligible expenditures directly to Palestinians within an agreed-upon process for validation, certification and 
oversight21. 
 
In February 2008, seven months after the formation of the Emergency Government, the TIM was replaced by the PEGASE, a 
new aid channeling mechanism that aligned to the key priorities of the Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (PRDP)22.  
 
In the words of the European Commission,  
 
‘The European Union is strongly committed to support the Palestinian Authority’s reform and development priorities 
aiming at boosting the economy and improving the life of all Palestinians. PEGASE will provide greater stability and 
predictability to our action as the largest donors to the Palestinians and emphasize the ownership of the Palestinian 
Authority in the process of reform and development.’
 23 
 
Unlike the annual TIM, the PEGASE has a schedule of three years, the same length as the PRDP. A second difference is that 
rather than flowing through the OoP, the PEGASE shifted toward the Ministry of Finance and the PMO, both headed by Dr 
Salaam Fayyad.  
 
Distribution 
Since June 2006, the European Commission has contributed €455.5 million to the TIM, with further contributions coming 
from individual EU Member States, Norway and Switzerland (€157.5 million). Since its establishment in February of 2008, 
PEGASE has disbursed €409 million out of the €550 million pledged. The mechanism has channeled a further €131 million 
from other donors and EU Member States. 
 
 
                                                 
20  By 2006, the salaries of 172,000 public employees constituted 60% of the PA’s budget (Aronson, 2006) 
21  Critics of the TIM mechanism, such as Oxfam (2007), have pointed to the fact that 'more than a million Euros of European aid for Palestinians is 
being paid to the HSBC bank each month in bank charges for transferring allowances to over 140,000 Palestinians'. 
22   PEGASE channels aid through five different payment systems, tailored to match the nature of each activity. Donors can contribute to any of these, 
depending on their priorities and their specific requirements.  
23  EC Press Release (2007). Commission launches PEGASE – a new mechanism to support the Palestinian people. 
 11 
2.2 Statistical Overview of Aid to the 
WB&GS 
 
Having looked briefly at the political evolution of aid, 
the following section provides a statistical overview of 
external aid to the WB&GS. Following the trends in 
overall aid and understanding the environment in which 
they have occurred better enables us to understand the 
results of our tracking of aid to the PNGO sector.    
 
2.2.1 External Aid to the WB&GS 
 
The estimates of the World Bank and the MoP differ 
significantly in some years (2002 and 2004) while 
closely aligning in others. As Figure 2 shows, the total 
amount of external aid to the WB&GS has been on a 
general incline over  the last ten years. According to 
 
 
 
World Bank estimates, the amount of aid to the WB&GS 
has increased six-fold over the last decade alone (607 
million in 1999 to 3.25 billion in 2008). The most 
noticeable ‘spikes’ in aid appear to occur in response to 
the Second Intifada and the emergence of the 12th 
Palestinian government. The difference between these 
two periods of rapid increase in aid is in the type of aid 
provided. Whereas the 2001 Intifada sparked a dramatic 
increase in emergency assistance at the expense of 
development spending, the 12th government and the 
launching of the PRDP has shifted external aid toward 
longer term development (Figure 2).  
 
 
Figure 2: Total Donor Disbursements to the WB&GS (1999 – 2008) 
World Bank and Palestinian MoP (Millions USD) 
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Source: MoP PAMS database and World Bank/OECD Databases  
Note: According to some in the MoP, the differences between the World Bank and 
MoP, in terms of disbursements, revolve around the donor’s reporting 
disbursements that may have never have reached the WB&GS 
 
 
2.2.2 Commitments versus Disbursement 
 
Though Palestine is unique in the level of external 
assistance received, the differences between donor 
commitments and donor disbursements are significant, 
not least of which to policy planners. A key component  
 
 
of the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness is 
predictability, and as the following Figures 3 and 4 show, 
this is still an area of concern 
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Figure 3: Commitments versus Disbursements of External Aid 
 (1998 – 2008) Ministry of Planning  
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Source(s): 1998 – 2004 – MoP, World Bank Staff calculations (MoP, 2005:5) 2005 – 
2007 - MoP, 2008:9; 2008 – MoP PAMS database online (accessed July 1, 
2009). 
Note: Figures are given in Thousands USD. 
Note: Data from prior to 2004 does not include UNRWA or Humanitarian Relief, only 
budget and development support. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Commitments versus Disbursements of External  
Aid (1998 – 2008) World Bank/OECD 
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Source: World Bank, OECD DAC Databases 
Note: 2008 figures are estimates. All figures are given in Thousands USD. 
 
 
2.2.3 Type of Aid 
 
Much in the same way that the amount of aid fluctuates 
from year to year, the type of aid given varies as well. 
The following Figure 5 show the shifts between the three 
main   types  of  aid  entering  the  WB&GS  (Emergency  
 
 
 
Relief, Development and Budget Support) over the last 
seven years.  
 
 13 
The Second Intifada and the shift in donor funding is the 
most illustrative example of politics altering 
development plans in Palestine. According to the World 
Bank (2003), in 2000 the ratio of donors’ commitment to 
development aid and emergency assistance was 7:1 in 
favor of development. By 2002 it had shifted to 5:1 in 
favor of emergency assistance. The shift back towards 
development assistance during 2003 and the winding 
down of the worst of the Intifada is nearly as dramatic as 
the change in 2002 away from development. 
 
2007 also represents a low point in development funding 
as most external donors refused to directly support the 
PA, and instead funded only those PA budget items 
covered by the TIM. As we have seen, the creation and 
acceptance of the PRDP in 2007 led to a shift from the 
TIM to the PEGASE in 2008. Under the new structure of 
aid delivery specifically designed to align with the 
PRDP, the percentage of funding to development 
increased even more rapidly than in the previous three 
years. 
 
Figure 5: Type of External Aid Disbursed  
to the WB&GS (2002 – 2008) 
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Source: Palestinian MoP PAMS Database 
 
 
2006 Elections and External Funding to the WB&GS 
 
'The political upheavals within Palestine between 
2005 and 2007 resulted in shifts in the type of aid 
donors sought to give. Development aid was most 
harshly affected. It dropped from constituting just 
under a third of all disbursements in 2005 to less 
than 10% in 2007. Due to the Emergency Services 
Support Project (ESSP), the Temporary 
International Mechanism (TIM) and increased 
support from Arab countries, the percentage of 
budget support rose (from approximately 33%) in 
2005 to nearly 70% of 2007 disbursements to the 
PA’ (MoP, 2008:10).  
 
Though the Figure 5 shows a decrease in emergency and 
development aid to the PA, during this time PNGOs 
received higher levels of external funds between 2005 
and 2008, growing by over 100 Million USD.  
 
 
 
 
The two Figures 5 and 6 focused on the percentage of 
funding apportioned to the different aid types can be 
misleading if we forget to look at the changes in the 
amount of external aid entering the WB&GS. The 
dramatic growth in aid over the last few years means that 
a decline in the percentage aid captured by any category 
between years does not imply a decrease in the amount. 
The previous Figure 6 is charted below in amounts for 
the years 2005 to 2007. According in Figure 7, budget 
support grows throughout the three years, nearly 
doubling between 2006 and 2007. Emergency Relief 
increases slightly between 2005 and 2006, before 
decreasing to only 385.2 million USD in 2007. 
Development Aid decreases steadily throughout the three 
years from 313 million USD in 2005 to 128 in 2007. 
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Figure 6:  Percentage of the External Aid Disbursed to  
the WB&GS by Aid Type (2005-2007) 
 
 
Source: MoP, 2008:11. 
 
 
Figure 7: Amount of the External Aid Disbursed to the  
WB&GS by Aid Type (2005-2007) 
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Note: Amounts are given in millions USD 
Source: MoP, 2008:11. 
 
2.2.4 External Aid to the WB&GS by Donor 
Groupings 
  
Figure 8 illustrates the differences in the type of aid 
given by different donor country groupings between 
2005 and 2007, and the different ways in which they 
have reacted to the 2006 elections.  
 
According to the MoP's estimates, the trend in Arab 
country donations away from both Development and 
Emergency  Relief, the two areas  where they  would 
presumably support the Palestinian NGO sector, explains 
 
 
 
in large part why we know so little about their 
contributions – there is not so much to know. Arab 
country support following the 2006 elections was critical 
to the health of the PA as they chose not to divert their 
money into PNGOs or International Agencies, as did 
their Western counterparts prior to the establishment of 
the TIM. However, Figure 8 does not measure the 
contributions of multilateral agencies, such as the 
AGFUND, that fund both PNGOs and international 
agencies. 
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Figure 8: Type of External Aid Disbursed  
by Donor Grouping (2005-2007) 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Planning, 2008:12. 
 
Asian countries disbursed no money to PA budget 
support in any of the years measured below24. Asian 
disbursements were relatively evenly divided between 
humanitarian and development aid in 2005. 
Humanitarian projects were favored in 2006 and focus 
shifted to development projects in 2007. 
 
In 2005, European disbursements were relatively evenly 
split between the three categories. In 2006, development 
disbursements dropped in favor of increases to 
emergency aid and lesser increases to budget support. In 
2007, through the TIMS and PEGASE, the EU became 
the primary supporter of the PA.  
 
The North American countries (US and Canada) gave 
almost no budget support over the three years. In 2005, 
they disbursed two-thirds to humanitarian aid and one-
third to development. Development disbursements 
dropped to a fifth in 2006 and a tenth in 2007 in favor of 
humanitarian aid. Today, much of the USAID support to 
the WB&GS is put toward security sector reform 
programs. Much of the remainder is channeled through 
IGOs or INGOs, with a much smaller portion reaching 
PNGOs through direct partnerships in comparison with 
European donors. The apparent absence of US influence 
in the PNGO sector in our survey was not found to be the 
case in Hanafi's study of donor funding in 1998. At that 
time, the US was the largest single country donor to the 
                                                 
24  According to the former director of the MoP Aid Management 
and Coordination Directorate, though much of the aid from 
countries was reported as development support, much of it was 
shifted into budget support and humanitarian assistance in an 
effort to avoid funding the Hamas government. 
PNGO sector (Hanafi, 2005). To find out more about the 
development and changes in USAID, see section 3.4. 
 
2.2.5 The Twenty Largest Donors to the WB&GS 
 
Table 6 shows the top twenty donor countries to the 
WB&GS from 1994 to 2008, according to commitments 
and disbursements. The percentage column on the right 
illustrates how good each country has been at keeping to 
their pledge. 
 
The EC is by far the largest donor to the WB&GS. 
Moreover, when one includes EU member states (*), 
European Union aid to the WB&GS comprises 
approximately 54% of the funds by the top twenty 
donors since Oslo.  
 
Though Europeans are by far the largest donors, their 
Arab counterparts are a little better at keeping their 
pledges. Saudi Arabia, the third largest donor to the 
WB&GS, has met 97% of its pledges. The remaining 
Arab countries (Algeria, Kuwait and Qatar) all disbursed 
100% of their pledges. On the other hand, the Islamic 
Development Bank, a multi-lateral instrument 
channeling Arab aid into the WB&GS, has met only 80% 
of its commitments since Oslo, lower than the EC or US. 
It is not only the ability to keep their financial promises 
that make Arab donors preferable to others. According to 
MoP officials, Arab funds come with fewer ties and 
conditions and a greater space for ownership. 
 16 
Table 6: Twenty Largest Donors to the WB&GS  
by Commitment and Disbursement (1994– 2008) 
 
Country Total Committed Total Disbursed % 
*European Commission 3,719,401,847 3,230,002,683 87 
United States 1,203,982,588 1,061,958,817 88 
Saudi Arabia 827,755,843 804,228,880 97 
Japan 777,238,751 714,084,293 92 
*United Kingdom 693,259,350 537,018,778 77 
*Sweden 596,145,732 469,647,898 79 
Norway 500,243,210 460,583,842 92 
*Germany 808,501,952 400,632,219 50 
United Arab Emirates 370,994808 368,422,339 99 
Algeria 300,004,624 300,004,624 100 
*France 409,204,441 296,412,676 72 
Canada 264,136,825 262,563,216 99 
Kuwait 239,274,673 239,274,673 100 
*Italy 286,973,587 236,721,432 82 
*Spain 252,553,120 227,146,006 90 
The World Bank 286,560,467 220,242,931 77 
*Netherlands 245,695,649 215,613,985 88 
Qatar 149,563,561 149,563,561 100 
Switzerland 128,663,334 116,244,385 90 
Islamic Development Bank 123,072,884 99,417,066 80 
Source: Ministry of Planning  PAMS Database. 
Note: Percentages are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
Note: Japan’s position as the fourth largest donor to the WB&GS is misleading as 
much of their aid arrives as technical assistance not managed by the PA. 
 
 
2.2.6 PA Dependence on External Aid 
 
The Palestinian economy is characterized by its 
structural dependency on external aid. The following 
subsection  aims  to  highlight  the  extent  of  Palestinian  
 
 
 
 
dependence upon external aid by measuring it as a 
percentage of Gross National Income (GNI), 
Government Expenditure (GE), as well as on a per capita 
basis. 
Table 7: External Aid as a Percentage  
of Gross National Income and  
Government Expenditure (1999-2008) 
 
Year GNI  GE 
1999 10.47 55.09 
2000 13.10 53.15 
2001 20.59 79.40 
2002 44.21 162.61 
2003 23.73 78.35 
2004 25.17 72.99 
2005 22.36 55.97 
2006 28.73 101.69 
2007 35.94 73.07 
2008* 60.66 99.30 
Source: Calculations based upon PCBS 
(2009) and OECD/DAC and 
World Bank databases (2009). 
Note: ‘*’ estimated.  
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2.2.6.1 Aid versus GNI 
 
As table 7 shows, the percentage of aid in comparison to 
GNI has been extremely high leading up to the 2002 
height of the Second Intifada. By constituting around a 
third of GNI, the sustainability of the Palestinian 
economy is questionable – as the removal of aid will 
bring disastrous effects. The huge increase in aid flows 
with modest growth in GNI means that in 2008, external 
aid constituted as much as 60% of the Palestinian GNI.  
 
2.2.6.2 Aid versus Government Expenditures 
 
As figure 9 shows, aid flows in 2002 were around 163% 
of    government   expenditures    as    a    result    of    the 
 
 
 
humanitarian crisis that shifted financing from 
Development to Emergency. During the years 2000 and 
2005, aid constituted as much as half of government 
expenditures, as the PA began to accumulate massive 
deficits. In 2006 aid was almost 100% of public 
expenditures, as the PA was prevented from collecting 
taxes or clearance revenues by Israel. These revenues 
were eventually freed up in the latter half of 2007 and the 
beginning of 2008. Despite the return of other revenue 
streams, aid as a percentage of government expenditure 
increased from 73% and 99% between 2007 and 2008. 
 
 
Figure 9: External Aid versus Government Expenditures  
(1999-2008 – Millions USD) 
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Source: PCBS- National Accounts (2009a), OECD/DAC and World Bank Databases 
(2009)  
 
2.2.6.3 Aid versus Government Deficits  
 
Since 2000, the PA has recorded high levels of deficit. 
However, more recently aid flows through PRDP have 
generated a surplus, allowing the government to carry 
out development projects in  addition  to  emergency  and 
 
 
restructuring programs. Between 2005 and 2008 the 
bottom line changed from a 275 Million USD deficit to a 
surplus of 270 Million. 
 
Table 8: Government Budget Surplus (Deficit) Before and After Aid (1997-2008 – Millions USD) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Net Domestic Revenues Public (Gov't) Revenues 942 939 273 290 747 1,050 1,370 722 1,616 1,780 
Total Expenditure and Net Lending Public (Gov't) 
Expenditures 
937 1,199 1,095 994 1,240 1,528 1,994 1,426 2,567 3,273 
Recurrent Budget Surplus (Deficit) before Aid-
Budget support  
5 -260 -822 -704 -493 -478 -624 -704 -951 -1,493
Recurrent Budget Surplus (Deficit) After Aid-
Budget support  
28 -206 -291 -236 -232 -125 -275 34 61 270 
Source: PCBS – National Accounts (2009a) 
Note: In 2005, external donors withheld aid to the PA as a consequence for not meeting a series of benchmarks.  
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2.2.6.4 External Aid per capita in the WB&GS 
 
Figure 10 shows the fluctuations in the amount of 
external aid to Palestinians in the WB&GS on a per 
capita basis. There is a dramatic rise beginning in 2000 
and culminating at the height of the 2002 Intifada, and a 
similar pattern emerging in  between  the  2006  elections 
 
 
and the 2007 advent of the Emergency Government. 
Between 2000 and 2002, and between 2006 and 2008, 
the level of external aid on a per capita basis more than 
doubles (219 to 518 and 405 to 848 respectively). 
 
 
Figure 10: External Aid Per Capita  
to the WB&GS (1999-2008) 
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Source: Table drawn from OECD/DAC and World Bank Databases (2009) and the 
PCBS (2009). Figures are given in USD. 
 
 
2.3 External Aid Coordination Structure 
 
As a result of the almost unprecedented amount of aid 
being channeled to the WB&GS and the highly 
politicized conditions in which it is delivered, a complex 
structure governing external aid has developed. The 
following section briefly maps the structure and 
evolution of this system, as well as its influence on the 
direction of external aid system. As these bodies 
represent the macro-level decision makers and 
stakeholders in the Palestinian development process, how 
and what decisions they make have an effect on external 
funding to PNGOs, which are only a small part of the 
bigger picture of externally financed development. 
 
2.3.1 Capital Level Aid Coordination 
 
As figure 2.3.1 shows, the external aid coordination 
structure is divided into two levels, the capital and the 
local. At the capital level are the major donor bodies, 
represented by the Quartet, EU, US, Russia and the UN. 
These players liaise with the Ad-Hoc Liaison Committee 
(AHLC), a 12-member committee, established on the 1st 
of October 1993 by the Multilateral Steering Group of 
the multilateral talks on Middle East peace in the context 
 
 
of the Washington Conference. The AHLC serves as the 
principal policy-level coordination mechanism for 
development assistance to the Palestinian people and 
seeks to promote dialogue between donors, the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and the Government of Israel 
(GoI). The AHLC is chaired by Norway and co-
sponsored by the EU and US. Its members include 
Russia, the EU, Japan, Canada and Saudi Arabia, while 
the PA, Israel, Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia are associate 
members. The World Bank acts as the Secretariat of the 
body.  
 
According to Brynen (2000:3), the AHLC acts as a 'sort 
of political steering committee, responsible for the 
overall guidelines and policies of the aid process, with all 
decisions made by consensus. 
 
The Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) follows up on 
AHLC decisions and recommendations at the local level, 
in between meetings of the AHLC, which are usually 
held twice a year (spring and autumn). The JLC was 
originally created in 1995 to enhance ‘tripartite’ 
cooperation with the understanding that implementation 
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could not proceed without the cooperation of the 
occupying power.  The JLC was disbanded in the early 
part of the decade as a result of the Intifada and was 
revived in June 2008. Its current members include 
Norway, the PA, the World Bank, UNSCO, the IMF, the 
US, EC and EU and GoI. 
 
A Task Force on Project Implementation (TFPI) 
which liaises with the GoI on issues of project 
implementation and comprises USAID, UNSCO, EC, the 
World Bank. The TFPI has a rotating Chairmanship with 
each member taking on the position of Chair for a six-
month period.  
 
2.3.2 Local Aid Coordination 
 
LACS is central to aid coordination. Established in 1995 
as the Local Aid Coordination Committee (LACC), 
LACS was responsible for establishing the Sectoral 
Working Groups (SWGs) in 1995 and coordinates 
between aid agencies and the PA. The original LACC 
was co-chaired by UNSCO and the World Bank. The 
LACS, on the other hand, is made up of a small team of 
technical experts who provide support to the Local 
Development Forum. The secretariat is led by the MoP, 
the World Bank, Norway and UNSCO. 
 
The change from the LACC to the LACS came following 
a decision by the AHLC in December of 2005 to better 
align aid structures to the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and encourage more Palestinian 
'ownership' over the development process. In response to 
the perception that the previous model was more 'top-
down and donor-driven', especially since the outbreak of 
the Second Intifada, the new structure worked to put PA 
policy makers in the driver’s seat. After its downsizing to 
a Secretariat, the LACS is now responsible for providing 
cross-cutting ‘support to nearly every component part of 
the system25.  
 
The Local Development Forum (LDF) was created in 
2005 as a type of hub for external aid and development 
planning. Membership is open to PA representatives, all 
donor and aid agencies, as well as to the Association of 
International Development Agencies (AIDA). The 
Forum is co-chaired by the Ministry of Planning (MoP), 
together with Norway, the World Bank and UNSCO. 
LDF meetings are planned and prepared through 
meetings of the LDF co-chairs and 'Friends of the Co-
Chairs' with the help of the LACS. Since October 2007, 
                                                 
25  In its cross-cutting role, the LACS support the LDF, SGs, SWGs 
and TFPI. They are charged with assisting the co-chairs of the 
SGs, liaising with the TFPI, and guiding the agenda of the LDF 
through the preparation and organization of meetings. 
LDF meetings have been chaired by Prime Minister 
Salaam Fayyad.  
Four distinct Strategy Groups (SGs) dealing with: 
economic policy, governance, infrastructure 
development and social development and humanitarian 
issues are guided by the LACS and LDF. 'The SGs focus 
on policy formulation and programmatic coordination, 
and pursue better design of donor projects to support the 
PA’s priorities. Membership is limited and based on 
solely upon the financial or analytical value of the 
respective agency' (LDF, 2009).  
 
According to the LDF and LACS, ‘each Strategy Group 
is co-led and chaired by the most relevant PA line 
ministry and lead donor to the sector’ (ibid). Though the 
words co-led and co-chaired are used, the ministry chair 
is given the power to convene meetings and determine 
the agenda. The donor chair is only to ‘support’ or 
‘advise’ the minister.  
The key functions of the SGs include: 
 
 Creating a space for national development policy 
formulation and adjustments that take into account 
socio-economic and political circumstances. 
 A body to ensure convergence between PA priorities 
and donor commitments.  
 
The Palestinian MoP is assigned to each of the four SGs 
as a representative of the Directorate General of Aid 
Management and Coordination (AMC) (LDF, 2009:9). A 
representative of the team creating the PRDP II is also 
invited. This cross-cutting role allows the MoP to fulfill 
its primary duty of 'ensuring the alignment of donor 
interventions with the PRPD, and other national plans, in 
accordance with relevant aid effectiveness principles' 
(ibid).   
 
The SGs are supported by 15 Sector Working Groups 
(SWGs) and one Working Group. These groups 
coordinate between the PA and the donor community at 
the technical level. Certain SWGs are supported by 
Thematic Groups (TGs) or Taskforces, such as in the 
education and health sectors. The first responsibility 
assigned to the Co-Chairs of the Sector Working Groups 
is to ‘Promote principles of ownership, alignment, 
harmonization, results and accountability’ (LDF, 
2009:6). The SWGs and their corresponding TGs are as 
follows: 
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Table 9: Sector Working Groups and Subgroups 
 
Sector Working Groups Thematic Groups and Taskforces 
Agriculture  
Fiscal  Fiscal Taskforce 
Private Sector Development  Micro Finance Taskforce 
Water and Sanitation   
Municipal Development and 
Local Governance  
 
 
Health  
National Nutrition Steering Committee, Pharmaceutical 
TG, Mental Health TG, Non-Communicable Diseases 
TG, Women's Health TG, Children's Health TG 
Education  Higher Education TG 
Social Protection   
Judiciary   
Public Administration   
Civil Service   
Security   
Elections  
Energy and Electricity  
Environment  
 
 
2.3.3 The Critique of the Aid Coordination 
Structure 
 
Though the sheer amount of aid entering the WB&GS 
requires a system of external aid coordination, questions 
still remain about the effectiveness of this structure in 
responding to Palestinian needs and priorities, and the 
ability of Palestinian Ministries to put forward a 
competent agenda to guide donors, as opposed to follow 
them.   
 
The blame for this cannot be entirely placed upon the 
door of international donors though. While the donors 
have changed the system to align with the principles of 
aid effectiveness outlined in the Paris Declaration, the 
ongoing occupation and political instability in the PA 
have ensured that decision making power still rests in the 
hands of donors at the capital level. Even with the 
structural changes, and even with a competent stable PA, 
the same client-recipient relationship would remain 
(Khan, 2003). After all, it is the donor who gives the 
money, or not, as the case may be. The response to the 
election victory of Hamas in 2006 is only too clear an 
example of donor’s political agendas overriding their 
development strategies. 
 
 
 
 
There is another important criticism of the system of aid 
coordination: it largely fails to include Palestinian 
NGOs26. Though critical to development, these 
organizations have little say in the overall direction of 
aid at the strategic levels. While International NGOs are 
represented through AIDA, the Palestinian NGO 
Network (PINGO) has continually asked the AHLC for 
more representation and access to technical 
information27. 
                                                 
26  A few PNGOs, such as MAS, are given ‘observer’ status within 
SWGs. However the numbers are low and the placement is not 
fixed. The ability to do little more than observe has meant that 
attendance is low for the small number of PNGOs invited to the 
table.    
27  For an expanded and critical account of the Aid coordination 
system, see: Brynen, 2000: chapter 4, Le More, 2004 and Khan et 
al., 2004. 
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Figure 11: Aid Management Structure in the oPt 
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2.3.4 The Question of Ownership in External Aid 
 
Having reviewed the structures of external aid 
coordination and the ways in which they have evolved 
over time to nurture Palestinian ownership, the 
following section reviews how Palestinians have taken 
advantage of the changing themes of development. The 
most pivotal points in this process were the 
announcement of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness and the 2007 launch of the PRDP. 
 
Though the debate over ownership had been going on in 
Palestine for some time, only in the past few years have 
local and international actors begun to turn the ideas of 
‘ownership’ into a more concrete structural reality28.  
 
‘In 2003, aid officials gathered in Rome for the 
High Level Forum on Harmonization, where donor 
countries agreed to better streamline and 
coordinate their aid efforts in the developing 
world. In the same year, the MoP drew up a Socio-
Economic Stabilization Plan (SESP) in an attempt 
to steer donor assistance towards the deteriorating 
social and economic environment. Until 2000, most 
donor support was largely in the areas of 
institution-building and reconstruction. (…)As the 
Second Intifada extended into its third year, it 
became clear that funding priorities were no 
longer sustainable. The successive implementation 
from one year to another of emergency and relief 
plans, which are decoupled from development 
needs,  leads  t o dependency  and   donor   fatigue. 
 
 Through the SESP, the PA sought to regain the 
leadership of its development agenda and enhance 
the quality of its dialogue with the international 
donor community by providing a framework for 
foreign aid’ (MTDP, Forward). 
 
Work on the Medium Term Development Plan 2005 – 
2007 (MTDP) started in March 2004 and involved a core 
group of staff from the Ministry of Planning (MoP) and a 
wide range of counterparts from other line ministries of 
the Palestinian Authority (PA). 
 
Much like the SESP, the MTDP worked to transform the 
relationship between the PA and donor institutions. 
Despite the ongoing difficulties to development posed by 
the occupation, the PA recognized its responsibility to 
guide the development process 'within the limits of the 
occupation' (MTDP, 2005-2007, Forward). The MTDP 
attempts simultaneously to pursue relief efforts and 
address development issues in a way that sustainably 
addresses two of the WB&GS’s most prominent needs: 
the reduction of poverty and the building of institutions 
(ibid). 
 
In 2005, representatives of over 100 countries and dozens 
of international NGOs signed the Paris Declaration on 
Aid Effectiveness. Unlike the Rome Declaration on 
Harmonization, which focused on relations between 
donors, the Paris Declaration laid out a framework for 
relations between donors and recipients. The Declaration 
is focused on five mutually reinforcing principles. 
 
 
Paris Principles on Aid Effectiveness (2005) 
 
 
• Ownership: Developing countries must lead their own development policies and strategies, and manage their own 
development work on the ground. The target set in Paris was that 75% of developing countries would produce their own 
national development strategies by 2010. 
 
• Alignment: Donors must line up their aid firmly behind the priorities outlined in developing countries’ national development 
strategies.  
 
• Harmonization: Donors must coordinate their development work better amongst themselves to avoid duplication and high 
transaction costs for poor countries. They agreed on a target of providing two-thirds of all their aid via so-called “program-
based approaches” by 2010. 
 
• Managing for results: All parties in the aid relationship must place more focus on the end result of aid and must develop 
better tools and systems to measure this impact. 
 
• Mutual accountability: Donors and developing countries must account more transparently to each other for their use of aid 
funds, and to their citizens and parliaments for the impact of their aid. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28  For more information on early research in development initiatives, see: Abdelkarim 2005; Adullah 2005; and Al-Naqib 2003, 2004. 
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These five principles, agreed upon by 91 nation states, 
26 IGOs and multi-lateral bodies and 16 large INGOs 
representing civil society, and later reaffirmed and 
refined in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) in 2008, 
has prompted major changes in the development 
structure in the WB&GS29. 
 
Shortly after the Paris Declaration, a meeting of the 
AHLC in London restructured the external aid system in 
Palestine to adhere more closely to the principles laid 
out in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. In this 
new structure, the local aid coordination bodies were all 
to be chaired by relevant PA Ministries and overseen by 
the Minister of Planning. This new position of 'Gavel 
Holder' meant that for the first time, the PA was meant 
to take the lead in guiding development policies, rather 
than following the donors. 
 
The PRDP (2008 – 2010)  
Following the election of Hamas and the eventual 
clashes between Hamas and Fatah for control of the 
Gaza Strip, a six month bridge plan was quickly put into 
place by the Emergency Government. The planning 
began for an expanded, 3-year MTDP that would 
eventually become known as the PRDP. Unlike previous 
plans,  the  PRDP  involved  the  Ministries  of  Planning 
 and Finance and the Prime Minister’s Office. This 
cooperation and cohesion meant that, for the first time, 
the major policy organs of development were behind a 
single vision. In the words of the PRDP’s developers: 
 
‘To begin with, it is worth noting that in previous 
years there has been an almost complete 
disconnect between policy-making, planning, and 
budgeting. This lack of linkage between policy, 
planning and spending played a major role in 
undermining the PA’s ability to manage effectively 
the implementation of its reform agenda, and its 
policies and plans to deliver better development 
and service delivery outcomes for its citizens (…) 
The absence of an integrated expenditure 
framework and performance management 
mechanisms has also frustrated efforts to 
harmonize and increase the effectiveness of donor 
aid and assistance.' 
 
The following table shows the breakdown of the PRDP 
(2008-2010). Unlike the published plan, there are five 
sectors listed, with Security and Governance being 
divided into two.  
 
 
Figure 12: Sector Distribution of Total  
Recurrent and Development Budget Resources 
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Source: The Palestinian Reform and Development Plan (2008) 
 
                                                 
29  To learn more about ACCRA Agenda for Action, please visit http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/58/16/41202012.pdf  and  http://www.accrahlf.net  
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The Subsector Breakdown of the PRDP (2008 – 2010) 
 
 
Infrastructure – Road Improvement, Road Safety, Air and Sea, Electricity Sector Investment, Water and Wastewater 
Management, Public Recreation and Culture 
 
Economy – Institutional Reform for Enterprise, Trade Infrastructure and Facilitation, Enterprise Investment and 
Development, Agribusiness Development, Industrial Capacity Development, Tourism Industry Development, 
Affordable Housing 
 
Social - Social Protection Reform and Integration (SPRI), Access To Education, Quality Education For All, Education 
Performance & Efficiency, Vocational Training Initiative, Health Quality Improvement, Health Care Affordability, 
Women’s Empowerment, Youth Empowerment, Employment Generation Initiative 
 
Governance – Justice Now, Open and Accountable Government, Efficient and Effective Government, Accountable 
Local Government Security –Reform and Transformation  
 
Source: MoP, 2007. PRDP (2008 – 2010) 
 
 
During the December 17th, 2007 Paris Conference, 
“Building a Palestinian State: Towards Peace and 
Prosperity”, donors pledged over 7.7 billion USD to the 
three year plan. Table 10 shows the distribution of the 
pledges by donor country groupings.  
 
Table 10: Distribution of PRDP  
Pledges by Donor Country Groupings 
 
Donor Country Grouping Pledges (*) % of Total 
European (incl. EU) 4,093 53.1 
North America 839 10.9 
Arab Countries 1,524 19.8 
Other Countries 411 5.3 
Int’l Organizations 843 10.9 
Total 7,710 100% 
Source: PA MoP, 2008 
Note: (*) Amounts given in millions USD. 
 
Critics of the PRDP 
 
‘The PA has formed twelve governments during 
the thirteen years of its existence. Each of these 
governments experienced instability in the 
political, economic, social, and security 
environment. This discontinuity of leadership 
and lack of stability left little space for effective 
Palestinian institutions to take root and mature’ 
(PRDP, 2008:31). 
 
According to some of the Plan’s architects, the PRDP is 
an agenda that guides the incoming government’s work. 
Individual ministers may reformat and restructure 
components of the plan, but they must remain within an 
overall framework. This has in many ways worked to 
reverse the crippling effects of political instability upon 
policy making. However, the plan is not without its 
critics. 
 
A number of people interviewed described the PRDP as 
a ‘donor-driven’ exercise, and apparently one aimed at 
furthering the elusive ‘donor agenda’, while clothed in 
the fashionable phrasing of ‘ownership’30. According to 
the PINGO Network and other progressive organizations 
such as Stop the Wall, the PRDP the represents an 
implantation of the World Bank and G8's neo-liberal 
agenda into the WB&GS31. Critics claim that there is an 
overemphasis on the role of the private sector and 
security in bringing about development that blatantly 
ignores the political and economic constraints to such an 
approach.  
 
                                                 
30  For an extended critique of the PRDP, see Stop the Wall (2008) 
Development or Normalization? 
31  According to Adam Hanieh (2008), the PRDP may represent the 
'harshest attack on any public sector in the Middle East in recent 
history, with the PA committed to cutting 21% of public sector 
jobs by 2010'. 
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One of the harshest criticisms of the PRDP is that it has 
yet to gain public endorsement due to the absence of the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and the lack of 
stakeholder meetings preceding it– and is therefore 
democratically illegitimate. They argue that, although 
annual budgeting is one of the very limited set of powers 
granted to an emergency government according to the 
basic law, providing frameworks that will bind following 
governments is not. It was not only the PLC that was 
excluded from the planning process of the PRDP, 
according to a number of other critics. The wide variety 
of civil society actors and institutions also claim to have 
been left out of the process.   
 
Whether the new PRDP II (2011 – 2013) being 
developed by the 13th Palestinian government will 
address any or all of these concerns and garner public 
support and engagement remains to be seen. It also 
remains to be seen whether the plan will provide more 
details about the Gaza Strip.  
 
As envisioned by the original PRDP planners, this plan is 
a continuation and refinement of the original, including 
much more detailed sector strategies. With much more 
time available to planners, there has also been a 
concerted effort to open up the process to a wider variety 
of stakeholders.  
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3. Tracking of External Donor Funding to PNGO 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip from 1999 to 2008. 
 
 
Having looked into the historical, statistical and 
structural aspects of external aid to the WB&GS, we are 
better able to understand our own research data compiled 
between April and September of 2009. The purpose of 
the following chapter is to track external funding to 
PNGOs by surveying both sides of the equation: PNGOs 
themselves and their donor partners.  
 
The first section will focus on the results of our survey of 
80 PNGOs that, as discussed previously, has provided an 
excellent picture of hundreds of donors over the ten years 
analyzed. With this data, we paint a picture of: 
 
 The importance of external aid to PNGOs according 
to the percentage of their operating budgets it 
comprises; 
 The broad types of external aid granted to PNGOs;  
 The difference amongst different donor groupings in 
the type and amount of aid given; 
 and the differences between governmental and 
nongovernmental sources of external aid to PNGOs.  
 
The data provided in our PNGO survey concerning the 
activities and nature of PNGOs themselves is only 
indicative of the larger PNGOs. In order to look at the 
activities and nature of the PNGO population as a whole, 
the donor survey is used. 
The second section of our research will look at the 
results of our survey of 41 donors in order to paint a 
picture of the externally funded PNGO activities of 
hundreds of PNGOs over a ten year period of time. 
External Funds to PNGOs will be analyzed according to 
the 
 
 Broad sectors and sub sectors of their activities 
 the target populations that their the externally 
funded PNGO projects serve 
 and the geographic location of external donors and 
partner PNGO headquarters, as well as the site of 
project implementation 
 
3.1 Amount of External Aid to PNGOs 
 
As our surveys set out to cover as high a percentage as 
possible of external funds to PNGOs in 2008, we first 
had to estimate the total amount of aid entering into the 
PNGO sector over the course of the period studied. 
Figure 13 below illustrates the trend in aid to PNGOs as 
estimated by the MoP over a ten year period, versus the 
estimates of aid derived from the two previous MAS 
mappings of the PNGO sector in 1999 and 2006.  
 
 
Figure13: Estimated Donor Funding to PNGOs 
in the WB&GS (Millions USD) 
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Sources (MoP): 1994-2002 – MoPIC Data from Quarterly Reports. 2003-2008 – MoP 
PAMS Database. 
Note: MoP data is backed by agreements with donor governments. 
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The MoP's estimates indicate that aid to PNGOs has 
risen dramatically in the last ten years - by nearly 500%. 
Noticeable declines in external PNGO funding appear to 
have occurred in 2000, 2004 and 2006. In 2000, the 
second Intifada began shifting funding to the emergency 
sector, but amidst an overall increase in aid to the 
WB&GS. Thus there is only a slight dip before a steady 
increase coinciding with the ongoing shift back from 
relief to development. In 2004, there is a slight dip 
followed by a dramatic rise into 2005. The results of our 
survey, however, have made us suspicious of scale of 
growth in external aid estimated by PAMS between 
2004 and 2005.  
 
In 2006, much like in 2000, there is a brief dip in aid to 
Palestine, but amidst an overall surge of aid into the 
WB&GS as a whole. So while 2006 actually saw a 
decline in external PNGO revenues, new funding 
opportunities arose at such a rate as to give the 
perception that it was a ‘boom’ year rather than a ‘bust’. 
 
3.1.1 Previous MAS Estimates of Aid versus the 
MoP’s 
 
When the MoP's time series estimates are compared with 
the two previous snapshots by MAS in 1999 and 2006, 
there is a marked difference (see figure 13). In 1999, for 
example, MAS's survey of 982 PNGOs estimates that 
these organizations received 53 million USD of external 
aid, versus the MoPIC's estimate of 48 million USD. If 
MAS's estimate is indeed closer to reality than that of 
the MoPIC's, the latter's underestimation of the total 
external funding of PNGOs is indicative of   
the  MoPIC's  lack  of  mandate  to monitor the INGO or 
 PNGO sectors. The only contributions to PNGOs 
measured by PAMS and MoPIC were bi-lateral 
contributions 
 
Again in 2006, MAS mapped the PNGO sector and 
estimated that the sector received a total of 136 million 
USD, versus the MoP PAMS estimate of 196 million 
USD. If MAS's estimates are indeed closer to reality than 
that of the PAMS', the latter's overestimation (by nearly 
30%) follows upon the weakness of the PAMS database in 
tracking aid to the PNGO sector, as opposed to the NGO 
sector as a whole. There is currently no system in place to 
account for the roles of INGOs as intermediary conduits 
of aid to local PNGOs, project implementers or both. As 
such, administrative cost, and even the projects 
implemented without PNGO partners are possibly 
included in their estimates of total funds being channeled 
through PNGOs32. Furthermore, the database also returns 
a large number of project results that do not fit with our 
definition of PNGO partnerships, such as those partially 
or fully channeled to municipalities or university centers33.
 
The following table 11 illustrates the success of our 
surveys of external donors and PNGOs versus PAMS 
estimates of. Doing so highlights some more of the 
possible inaccuracies of the of the database. Whereas for 
2005 our donor survey captures only 70% of the total aid 
to PNGOs, in 2004 we were able to capture an 
‘impossible’ 119% of the total external aid to PNGOs. 
This leads us to believe that the database has inaccurately 
distributed funds from 2004 into 2005. If this indeed the 
case, revised MoP estimates would more closely align to 
the trends in our surveys.  
 
Table 11: Estimated Donor Funding to PNGOs in the 
WB&GS versus the Amount Surveyed (USD) 
 
Year 
Total amount captured 
in Donor survey 
Total % of MoP 
estimate surveyed 
Total amount captured 
in Donor survey 
Total % of MoP 
estimate surveyed 
1999 39,356,000 82 7,966,000 17 
2000 20,256,000 37 14,228,000 26 
2001 28,476,000 31 20,273,000 22 
2002 36,022,000 35 46,225,000 45 
2003 30,741,000 47 49,409,000 76 
2004 42,241,000 74 67,556,000 119 
2005 54,684,000 27 96,767,000 44 
2006 120,953,000 62 103,567,000 53 
2007 146,575,000 69 147,597,000 69 
2008 126,033,000 49 165,035,000 64 
Total 645,354,000 50 718,623,000 55 
Sources (MoP): 1999-2002 – MoPIC Data from Quarterly Reports. 2003-2008 – MoP PAMS 
Database. Amounts are rounded to the nearest thousand 
                                                 
32  According to one employee of a large INGO that does not implement its own projects, the amount of administrative costs to act as an 
intermediary between donor governments and PNGOs is up to 30%. 
33  An example of the difference between our definitions of PNGO and that used by the PAMS and the PA is the Bir Zeit University’s Institute of 
Law. Within the PAMS database, donors have described the funding to the public university as funding an NGO. 
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3.1.2 External Aid to PNGOs as a Percentage of 
Total External Aid to the WB&GS 
 
The following table 12 measures the percentage of 
external aid to the WB&GS that is captured by the PNGO 
sector between 1999 and 2008. As the table shows, the 
percentage of aid to the PNGO sector fluctuates 
significantly from year to year. However, similar to the 
early  estimates  of  the  MoPIC,  when  all  ten  years  are 
 
 
 
 
averaged, the PNGO sector captures approximately 10% 
of total external aid to the WB&GS. Note: As mentioned 
in previous sections, estimates of external disbursements 
to PNGOs in 2005 is suspected to be partially 
misallocated from 2004. 
 
Table 12: External Aid to PNGOs as a Percentage 
of Total External Aid to the WB&GS (USD) 
 
Year 
Estimated External  Aid to 
the WB&GSWorld Bank 
Estimated External 
Aid to PNGOs MoP 
% of 
External Aid 
1999 516,000,000 48,000,000 9.3 
2000 637,000,000 55,000,000 8.6 
2001 869,000,000 93,000,000 10.7 
2002 1,616,000,000 103,000,000 6.3 
2003 972,000,000 65,000,000 6.7 
2004 1,115,000,000 57,000,000 5.1 
2005 1,116,000,000 218,000,000 19.5 
2006 1,450,000,000 196,000,000 13.5 
2007 1,876,000,000 213,000,000 11.4 
2008 3,250,000,000 258,000,000 7.9 
Total 13,417,000,000 1,305,000,000 9.7 
Sources (MoP): 1999-2002 – MoPIC Data from Quarterly Reports.  
2003-2008 – MoP PAMS Database. World Bank/OECD Databases 
Note: Amounts are rounded to the nearest million and percentages to the 
nearest tenth of a percent. 
 
 
 
3.1.3 The Number of PNGOs Compared to 
External Aid 
 
Figure 4 compiles four different estimates of the number 
of PNGOs over a 20 year period and overlays it against 
the estimated amount of external aid entering the PNGO 
sector. When put against the political timeline, the story 
of PNGOs, especially their ‘rocky’ relationship with the 
PA, becomes clearer.  
 
In the early 1990s, Curmi estimated that nearly 2000 
PNGOs were operating in the WB&GS, while the World 
Bank described the number as being between 2000 and 
1400 between 1990 and the 1994 establishment of the  
 
 
 
 
PA. In 1997, Curmi estimated that there were only 
around 1200 PNGOs operating in the WB&GS, a 15% 
drop over three years. MAS’s Mappings of the PNGO 
sector in 2001 and 2007 showed that there were 
respectively 982 and 1495 active PNGOs in these years. 
If these previous estimates are accurate, between 1990 
and 2001, the number of PNGOs declined by over 50%. 
Between 2001 and 2007, on the other hand, the number 
of PNGOs has grown by nearly 62%, and is suspected to 
be even higher today with the increase in external aid to 
both the WB&GS as a whole and PNGOs in particular 
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Figure 14: Estimates of Aid to PNGOs Compared to the Number 
of PNGOs Operating in the WB&GS (1990 -2008) 
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PNGO Funding Sources: 1990: Author’s Estimate (indicative only). 1991, 1992, 1993: The 
World Bank 2008 (indicative only.) The estimate given is between 200 and 140 million USD per 
year. 1994: Sullivan 1998:95 (cited in Challand, ????:68). 1995: World Bank, 2008, estimates that 
between 1995-96, 60 million dollars went to PNGOs, which is not far off from MOPIC’s (1998) 
estimates of 45-50 million between 1995-1998, which is an underestimate that excludes 
contributions to INGOs. 1996, 1997, 1998: Welfare 1998 (cited in Hanafi, Tabar, 2005:73,75). 
1999 – 2008: MoP PAMS Database 
Number of PNGOs Sources: Curmi, 2002, MAS, 2001 & 2007. 
 
 
 
Ministry of Interior Estimates of PNGOs 
 
Over the course of the study, MAS sought to fill in figure 14 with the help of the Palestinian Ministry of Interior (MoI). 
The data that they returned was problematic for our study for a number of reasons:  
 
 We received data for 9 years as opposed to the ten requested 
 The Gaza Strip is not included in any of the numbers 
 Data returned conflicted wildly with our own compilation of estimates 
 
According to the MoI in figure 15 below, the number of PNGOs, in only the West Bank, rises throughout the period 
studied, sharply in 2004, and steadily after that. When compared to our own previous Mappings of PNGOs, the 
differences between the MoI and MAS are very large. Whereas the MoI estimates that there were 370 PNGOs in the West 
Bank in 2001, MAS estimates the number to be 675, or nearly double. In 2007 however, the MoI estimates that 1811 
PNGOs were operating in the West Bank, representing a nearly 500% increase in 6 years. MAS estimate that 951 PNGOs 
were active in the West Bank in 2007, representing a 40% increase. 
 
The differences between the numbers of the MoI and our own table are suspected to be the following: 
 
 The MoI accounts for ‘registered’ NGOs, whereas other studies are looking for ‘active ones’. The high rate of 
‘NGO turnover’, caused by donor funding shifting in and out of different sectors by year may not be accounted for 
by the MoI. In sum, those who registered, may never un-register.  
 The definition of NGO used by the MoI differs from that used by MAS (see Glossary of Terms Used). The MoI 
uses the Palestinian Charitable Law on Associations (2000) Article 2 where an NGO is defined as “Any charitable 
Association or civil society Organization with an independent judicial character, established upon the agreement of 
no less than 7 persons to achieve legitimate objectives of public concern, without aiming at financial profit-making 
or other personal benefit for the members”. This broader and more ambiguous definition contributes significantly to 
the difference between MAS and MoI estimates.  
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Figure 15: Number of Registered NGOs in the West Bank (2001-2009) 
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Source: Palestinian Ministry of Interior 
Note: Numbers for 2009 are registered in the database as of the 14th of September, 2009. 
 
 
3.2 The Importance of External Aid to 
PNGOs  
 
Previous MAS mappings of the PNGO have produced 
an interesting set of snapshots concerning PNGO 
reliance on external donors. As figure 16 shows, external 
assistance has by far outdistanced local assistance in 
terms of scale and rate of growth34. Between the two 
studies mapping the whole of the Palestinian population 
(1999  and  2006),  there  is a  14%  increase  in  external
  
 
 
donor dependency and a smaller increase in dependency 
on the PA for funds – both at the expense of 'other' 
sources. The ‘Other’ category includes: revenue 
generating activities, aid from the PA, aid from within 
the Green Line, Aid from Palestinian Diaspora and Other 
sources of revenue35.  
 
Figure 16: Percentage of PNGO Funding from External Donors, 
Local Communities and Others (1999, 2006 & 2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2001, 2007 and 2009 – PNGO Survey 
                                                 
34  Local assistance means donations or in-kind contributions of from private individuals or organizations in the WB&GS. 
35  To see the data concerning the individual types of aid to PNGOs in 1999, 2006 and 2008, refer to the statistical appendix. For more analysis of 
PNGOs and financial sustainability, see: Abdelkarim, 2002. 
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The measurement for 2008 shows a continued increase in 
dependence upon external aid. However, as this figure is 
derived from our PNGO survey, it is biased toward a 
sample of those PNGOs receiving the highest sums of 
external aid. Though a comparison between this figure 
and the results of MAS’s mappings of 1999 and 2006, 
According to the survey, these larger PNGOs receive 
nearly 80% of their funding from external sources and a 
much lower percentage of their aid from other PNGO 
revenue streams. The biggest difference between these 
larger PNGOs and the PNGO population as a whole, in 
terms of revenue streams other than external aid, is the 
much lower rate of revenue-generating activities (12.5% 
and 21.5% respectively).  
The following table 13 shows the whole picture of 
PNGO revenue sources. Much like before, the estimates 
for 2008 are biased toward large PNGOs, heavily 
dependent on external aid. In spite of this bias, a number 
of interesting trends can be identified: 
 
Self generated revenue continues to fall throughout the 
periods studied. The same is true, to a less dramatic 
extent, of the aid the Diaspora or local sources. Aid from 
1948'ers, the PA and 'Others' fluctuates slightly over the 
three measurements, but remain relatively 
inconsequential in total PNGO revenues, usually at less 
than 1%.  
 
Table 13: PNGO Sources of Revenue  
(1999, 2006 & 2008) 
 
Source/ Year 1999 2006 2008 
External Aid 46.8 60.9 78.3 
Self-generated Revenue 28.8 21.5 12.4 
PA Funding 4.9 0.7 0.8 
Local Donations 10.8 9.3 5.3 
Donations from 1948'ers (*) 1.4 3.7 0.1 
Donations from the Diaspora 5.5 3.2 2.3 
Others 1.8 0.7 0.8 
Total 100 100 100 
Sources: MAS, 2001, 2007 and 2009 – PNGO Survey.  
Note:  '1948'ers' refers to Palestinians living in what is now 
Israel. 
 
3.3 Tracking External Funding to PNGOs by 
broad Type of Aid 
 
Before looking into the specific sectors and groupings of 
externally funded PNGO activities, we have divided their 
programs into the broadest categories possible: Relief 
and Development. In the simplest sense, relief and 
development aid are differentiated by the sustainability 
of the impact and the goals of the activity. Relief aid 
typically takes the form of direct welfare to marginalized 
families or communities, or comes in response to an 
acute crisis. In either scenario the purpose is to meet an 
immediate need. Development aid, on the other hand, 
aims to engender long term social, economic or political 
transformations and consists of a wide variety of 
activities ranging from public infrastructure development 
to women’s empowerment. 
 
The results of our PNGO survey shows that PNGOs are 
engaged in Development activities on at least a 2:1 basis 
compared to Relief over the three periods analyzed. 
During the second period of the Intifada, amount of 
activities targeting relief increased slightly, before 
subsiding again in the third period when over 70% of 
PNGO activities were focused on development.  
 
 
 
The dominance of development over relief activities 
amongst PNGOs makes sense when one considers the 
limited role of PNGOs in externally funded emergency 
relief programs. Though there are a number of PNGOs 
engaged in relief, the largest part of relief work and 
budgeting is captured by INGOs, such as Care, or UN 
Agencies, such as UNRWA. For this reason, in the 
context of an overall increase of aid to the WB&GS, and 
a dramatic shift in this aid from development to 
emergency relief, there is only a slight increase in the 
percentage of PNGO activity in the Relief sector. 
 
This is especially true in times of political unrest, such as 
in the 2001 Intifada. As the violence and need for 
external aid increased, donors may have chosen to 
channel much their funds through the IGO and INGO 
sectors in order to avoid entering into the much more 
political realm of PNGOs, where donor support could be 
misinterpreted for support of the ongoing uprising – or 
where the funds could be channeled into a PA shunned 
by many in the donor community. 
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Figure 17: Comparing the Percentages of PNGO Activities 
of Relief and Development 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
3.4 Tracking External Aid to PNGOs by 
Donor Country Groupings 
 
The statistical overview of aid to the WB&GS showed 
how different donor country groupings vary dramatically 
in the amount and type of aid they give to Palestine over 
the ten years studied, as well as how these groupings 
react to the political environment. Our survey of PNGOs 
showed that differences among donor groupings also 
exist in terms of their funding to PNGOs. 
 
European Aid to PNGOs 
According to our survey of PNGOs, the European Donor 
Country Grouping is by far the largest donor to the 
PNGO sector, comprising 67.8% of total funding in 
200836. During the period of the Intifada (2001 – 2005), 
European funding declines 22.7% from the prior period 
(1999-2000) – precisely when needs when local need for 
external aid was the highest. There is a slight increase in 
European funding during the height of the Intifada 
(2001-2002), but amidst a much larger increase in 
funding to the WB&GS as a whole that signals Europe’s 
to channel aid through INGOs and IGOs during the 
period. Between the second (2001 – 2005) and third 
periods (2006 – 2008), European funding grew by 98%.  
 
 
 The United States’ Aid to PNGOs 
Surprisingly, the United States was surveyed as 
contributing only 4.3% of the external aid to PNGOs in 
2008. Our assumption was that it would be much higher. 
Despite Hanafi’s assertion that the US was the single 
largest country contributor to the PNGO sector between 
1995 and 1998, our own survey of the largest PNGOs 
shows US bi-lateral and funds channeled to PNGOs 
through the INGO sector to PNGOs account for just over 
12% of the external aid to PNGOs. 
 
We believe that there are a number of reasons for a low 
representation of US funding in our survey that were not 
present during Hanafi’s fieldwork. First, USAID remains 
highly tabooe among Palestinian NGOs, some of whom 
may have been unwilling to disclose it and instead 
allocated the funding to a different grouping. Secondly, 
and especially since the advent of the Anti-Terrorism 
Certification (ATC), USAID has worked through a 
number of INGOs, who in turn fund PNGOs. The 
possible consequences of this is an inability on the part of 
local PNGOs to identify the real source of funding, and 
instead allocated the budget to the home country of the 
donor INGO37. Finally, USAID’s activities focus more on 
the private sector and municipalities as opposed to 
NGOs.  
 
 
                                                 
36  Europe as a donor grouping includes European States, including those not affiliated to the EU such as Switzerland, European INGOs and the 
Various Agencies of the EU, such as the EC or the ECHO. 
37  It is not uncommon for the USAID to grant money to a number of US based INGOs, such as ANERA, ARD, CHF or ACDI-VOCA, who in turn 
fund a European INGO, who then grant money to the local PNGO. In such a scenario, PNGOs may identify Europe as being the source of aid. 
According to conversations with a number of INGO donor recipients of USAID, this confusion is somewhat by design, as it allows USAID to 
fund PNGOS in spite of the taboo which has surrounded it since the advent of the ATC. 
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Multilateral Aid to PNGOs 
Multilateral funding, primarily distributed through UN 
Agencies and the World Bank, appears to rise and fall in 
a negative correlation to European Aid. As European aid 
to PNGOs decreased during the Intifada, external 
multilateral aid to PNGOs increased. As we have 
discussed previously, political upheaval and crisis have 
caused shifts in external aid away from development 
PNGOs and into emergency relief programs run by large 
INGO or IGOs, as a way of addressing the crisis in 
Palestine without entering into the politics of the 
Intifada. figure 18 below shows  how  these  multilateral 
 institutions virtually replace Western partnerships with 
local PNGOs.  
 
Arab Country Aid to PNGOs 38 
Unlike the Europeans or Americans, Arab aid to PNGOs 
increased dramatically during the Intifada, from less than 
4.5% of total aid to PNGOs to a peak of nearly 18.5% in 
2003. As the Intifada began to wind down, so did Arab 
aid to PNGOs, comprising just over 10% of the total in 
2008. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Percent PNGO Funding by Donor Groupings (1999 – 2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
Note: ‘Other’ funding sources includes a number of countries, the most important of 
which are Japan, Korea, Australia and Canada. As the figure shows, the amount 
of aid from this grouping in comparison the others is relatively insignificant.  
 
3.5 Governmental and Nongovernmental 
Donors 
 
The PNGO survey also sought to group donors into two 
categories: Nongovernmental and Governmental 
Donors. In the following section, multilateral institutions 
are included in the Governmental category, and only 
separated to highlight particular trends.  
 
Nongovernmental Donors 
Nongovernmental external donors to PNGOs began by 
making up just under half of the external aid to PNGOs 
in 1999, after which it declined into 2001. With the 
onset of the Second Intifada, Nongovernmental funding 
to  PNGOs  rises  dramatically  from  40% of  total aid 
to62%.From 2001 onwards, Nongovernmental aid 
remains higher than Governmental aid. 
  
 
 
According to our survey of PNGOs, governmental donor 
contributions to PNGOs dropped significantly with the 
onset of the Intifada, from 61 to 38%, Ouurvey shows 
that donor governments have preferred to work with local 
PNGOs through INGOs from 2001 onward.  If 
multilateral agencies are measured separately from 
governmental aid (12.2% of total external aid to PNGOs 
in 2008), then direct governmental partnerships with 
PNGOs account for only 1/3 of the total. The dotted line 
in figure 20 below shows the percentage of governmental 
aid captured by multilateral agencies. The black line 
represents governmental aid, including multilateral 
agencies. 
 
 
 
                                                 
38  For an extended review of Arab Aid to PNGOs, see section 3.9.  
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Governmental Donors 
As discussed in the previous sections, decreases in 
governmental aid to PNGOs runs in parallel to an 
increase in PNGO partnerships with multilateral 
agencies. During the period of the Intifada for example, 
 
multilateral aid to PNGOs comprises around ¾ of total 
governmental aid, as opposed to only around ¼ in 
2008.  
 
Figure 20: Governmental versus Nongovernmental 
Donors as a Percentage of PNGOs’ External  
Revenues (1999 – 2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
 
3.6 Tracking External Funding to PNGOs by 
Sector and Sector Grouping 
 
3.6.1 Distribution of PNGOs by Sector 
 
MAS mappings of the PNGO population in 1999 and 
2006 revealed what activity sectors PNGOs are engaged 
in. figure 21 shows both the growth in the number of 
PNGOs as a whole, as well  as  the  shift  among  sectors. 
 
The sectors that saw the most dramatic growth between 
1999 and 2006 were Charity and Relief, Family 
Planning, Liberal Arts Education, Rural Development, 
Health, Vocational Training, Democracy Promotion and 
Women’s Affairs. All of these sectors at least doubled 
the number of NGOs working in them, within an overall 
65% growth in the number of PNGOs between 1999 and 
2006. The sectors of Disabled Care, Scientific Education, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and Human Rights all saw more moderate growth in the 
numbers of PNGOs working in them. 
 
Given the overall growth of PNGOs, it is not surprising 
that relatively few sectors saw a decline. The fact that 
some do decline, however, signals a clear difference in 
priorities between the two cross-sectional snapshots. 
According to our mappings, the sectors of Children’s 
Activities, Elderly Care, Water & Environment, 
Research, Religious Activities, Youth & Sports and 
‘Others’ all saw a decline in the number of PNGOs 
identifying them as their primary activity between 1999 
and 2006.  
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Figure 21: Number of PNGOs Based on 
Principal Program (1999 & 2006) 
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Source: MAS, 2001 & 2007. Mapping PNGOs in the WB & GS 
Note: There was not a category for Good Governance in the 2001 Mapping of PNGOs. 
 
 
3.6.2 External Aid to PNGOs by Sector 
 
The previous section concerning the sectors of PNGO 
activity is even more interesting when one looks at the 
amount of external aid individual sectors receive. The 
change in the number of NGOs working in a sector, and 
the percentage of their budget coming from the 
international community, highlights the importance of 
the donor community in guiding Palestinian development 
through their partnerships with local PNGOs. Table 14 
details the distribution of PNGOS in 2000 and 2006 
based upon their primary sector of work, as well as the 
percentage of their total budgets coming from external 
donors. 
 
As the table shows, PNGOs whose primary programs 
were Children’s Activities, Rural Development, Water 
and the Environment, Human Rights, Good Governance 
and Religious Activities receive more than three quarters 
of their revenues from external donors. Meanwhile, 
PNGOs working in Liberal Arts Education, Charity and 
Relief, Research, Vocational Training, Women’s Affairs, 
Youth and Sports, Health Care and ‘Other’ receive half  
 
 
 
 
to three quarters of their operating budgets from external 
donors. Only four PNGO sectors received less than half 
of their revenues from external donors in 2006: Elderly 
Care (37.7), Family Planning (13.4), Scientific Education 
(45.0) and Disabled Care (42.0).  
 
When 1999 and 2006 are compared, only the sectors of 
Research, Scientific Education, Women’s Affairs, 
Human Rights and ‘Others’ decreased their level of 
dependence upon external donors, if only slightly. A 
number of sectors, such as Youth & Sports, Religious 
Activities, Water & Environment, Elderly Care and 
Children’s Activities, see a decline in the percentage of 
PNGOs operating in those sectors, together with an 
increase in the percentage of their total funding from 
external donors. This suggests that the PNGOs which 
closed down or shifted out of these sectors were those 
less dependent upon external aid.   
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Table 14: Comparison of the Percentage of PNGOs 
Working in each Sector with the Percentage 
of the Funding Coming from External Donor (2000 & 2007) 
 
% of PNGOs based on 
‘Primary’ Objective 
% of PNGO Revenues 
from External Aid Sector 
1999 2006 1999 2006 
Children’s Activities 20.4 9.8 44.5 75.6 
Charity & Relief 13.3 18.3 53.2 55.9 
Elderly Care 1.6 0.6 27.7 37.7 
Family Planning 0.5 0.6 63.4 13.4 
Liberal Arts Education 10.2 16.4 34.2 60.1 
Rural Development 2.8 5.5 54.2 79.8 
Water and Environment 0.9 0.5 91.9 93.4 
Health Services 4.9 7.1 34.4 50.2 
Research 2.0 1.2 76.4 71.8 
Disabled Care 4.4 4.6 66.7 42.0 
Vocational Training 3.5 5.3 64.7 72.5 
Religious Activities 1.8 0.4 54.7 89.2 
Scientific Education 3.4 3.7 47.0 45.0 
Women’s Affairs 1.5 8.8 85.9 54.9 
Human Rights 2.6 2.0 86.5 75.8 
Enhancing Democracy 0.6 1.3 0.0 83.2 
Good Governance n/a 0.2 n/a 83.0 
Youth and Sports 22.7 13.0 9.7 59.5 
Other 3.0 0.6 69.8 66.3 
Total 100% 100% 46.8% 60.9% 
Source: MAS, 2001, 2007 
Note: 2006 includes 1206 out of the estimated 1495 PNGOs. 1999 
includes 881 out of 926.  
 
 
3.6.3 Distribution of PNGOs and External Aid by 
Sector Groupings 
 
The following table 15 shows the division of our 19 
sectors into five groupings in order to track broader 
trends.  
When comparing the 2007 distribution of the whole of 
the PNGO population with the data on external aid 
distribution in 2008, there are clear indications that 
PNGOs in different sector groupings receive a different 
percentage of external aid.   
 
Table 15: Grouping of 19 Sectors into Five 
 
Group Sectors 
Charity & Relief Charity & Relief 
Economic Rural Development, Water and the Environment, Vocational 
Training, Other 
Rights-based 
Development  
Human Rights, Enhancing Democracy, Good Governance, 
Women’s Affairs 
Education Research, Scientific Education, Liberal Arts Education, Religious 
Activities 
Social services  Health Services, Elderly Care, Disabled Care, Children’s 
Activities, Youth and Sports 
 
 Charity & Relief PNGOs make up just fewer than 
20% of the PNGO population while receiving less 
than 10% of external aid.  
 PNGOs engaged in the economic sector grouping 
make up fewer than 12% of the PNGO population, 
and receive over 21% of total external aid.  
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 Rights-based PNGOs make up around 12% of the 
PNGO population, but receive 30% of total external 
aid.  
 PNGOs focused on education make up more than a 
fifth of the PNGO population but receive only 
13.9% of external funds. 
 PNGOs engaged in the social services sector 
grouping make up more than 36% of the total PNGO 
population, but receive a quarter of the external aid 
to PNGOs.  
 
Figure 22, drawn from our survey of external donors, 
shows the trends in aid to sector groupings on an annual 
basis.  
 
Figure 22: Percentage of External Donor Funding to PNGO  
Sector Groupings (1999 – 2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
 
Charity and Relief sees a dramatic, yet predictable, 
increase and decline in funding surrounding the worst 
parts of the Intifada in 2002. After declining until 2005, 
there is an increase into 2006, followed by a slight 
decline into 2007 and a near doubling into 2008. The 
fluctuations in emergency aid over the last few years 
may be attributed to the actual humanitarian needs, such 
as those in Gaza resulting from the siege, or politics, as 
the emergence of the Hamas government in 2006 often 
meant a shift in donor aid away from the PA and into the 
NGO sector. As such, the doubling of aid between 2005 
and 2006 appears not to have been in response to a 
specific crisis or acute need as was the case in 2002. 
 
External Funding to PNGOs working in the Economic 
sector grouping saw a decline by nearly half between 
2000 and 2001. Over the following two years, the sector 
nearly recovers all of the losses. In 2004 and 2005, 
funding remained relatively stable at around 17.5% 
before fluctuating upwards to almost 24% into 2007 and 
back down again to little over 18% in 2008. Between 
2004 and 2008, funding to the grouping remained 
relatively stable between 20% and 25%. 
 
External funding to Rights-based PNGO programs 
declined steadily between 1999 and 2003. Between 2003 
and 2005 however, Rights-based PNGO programs more 
than doubled from around 16% to 37%. Much of this 
growth was spurred on by democratization projects 
leading up to the 2006 elections. From 2005 to 2008, the 
percentage of funding to development related programs 
drops from 36 to 30%. The decline in democracy 
projects following the elections is responsible for this 
decline; however the decrease would have been much 
more dramatic had funding to Good Governance not 
remained steady. 
PNGOs aimed at providing Education or capacity 
building remained relatively stable throughout the period 
studied, hovering near 10% from 1999 to 2006. Between 
2006 and 2008, external aid to the sector grew by over 
4% to 13.8%.  
 
The Social Sectoral grouping begins increases quickly 
between 1999 and 2001, from just over 5 to 42% of total 
funding. There is a dramatic increase in 2001, 
presumably in response to the Intifada and the increased 
need for PNGO health workers. Following a slight 
decrease in 2002, funding to this grouping increases 
again in 2003, before declining steadily after that. In 
2008, Social PNGOs received just over a quarter of the 
total aid.   
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3.6.4 Tracking External Aid to PNGOs by 
Individual Sectors (1999 – 2008) 
 
Figure 23 illustrate the trends in aid by individual sectors 
over the last 10 years. The grouping of the sectors into 
five separate charts is not done in the same manner as the 
previous section. The analysis also includes a brief 
description of the trends in Governmental versus 
Nongovernmental (NGO) funding. The full SPSS tables 
on total funding, Governmental and INGO, can be found 
in the appendix. As the following five Figure 23-27 
divide the total external aid to PNGOs between our 19 
sectors, they do not add up to 100% of external aid for 
any given year. 
 
3.6.4.1 External Funding to Charity & Relief PNGOs 
Spending for emergencies and welfare programs peaks at 
the height of the Intifada, and then declines steadily into 
2005, as more funding shifted away from short term 
emergency programs and into longer term development 
projects.  The ‘stability’ that led to a decline in 
emergency spending ended between 2005 and 2006 
when funding to the sector nearly double from 2.6 to 
5.2% of total external aid. There is a slight decline into 
2007, before another near doubling into 2008, 
presumably in response to the siege-led crisis in the Gaza 
Strip. 
 
Governmental donor aid to Charity and Relief follows 
the trend of overall aid, but apportions a lower 
percentage than the INGO donor sector. The INGO 
sector similarly follows the trend, but with an even 
greater increase in 2008. Assuming that this is in 
response to the crisis in Gaza, the difference in the rate 
of emergency response makes sense: INGO donors have 
more leeway than governments in who they can work 
with and where. This makes it possible for governments 
to continue to fund activities in the Hamas-led Gaza Strip 
without having any direct contact with the organization. 
 
According to MAS PNGO mapping in 2007, PNGOs 
working in charity or relief have spread their sources of 
income more broadly than the other sectors discussed 
(democracy, HR and governance). Only 59% of their 
budgets come from abroad, while 17.5% is funded 
locally and 15.4% is self-financed (MAS, 2007:80). 
 
Figure 23: External Donor Funding to PNGOs 
Working in Charity and Relief (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
3.6.4.2 External Funding to Economic-Based 
Development PNGOs 
 
Rural Development / Water & Environment  
Funding to support Rural Development is closely 
related to the funding of Water and Environmental 
programs, as a difficult challenge facing most rural 
communities is access to Palestinian resources, either 
as a result of insufficient infrastructure or the Israeli 
occupation. INGO donors to the sector follow roughly 
the same pattern as the overall aid. Government donor  
 
 
 
 
aid to the sector, on the other hand, declined much 
more sharply in 2007. Government donors apportioned 
more aid to the sector from the beginning of the survey 
until 2007 and 2008, when INGO donors paid more. As 
2007 saw the creation of the Emergency technocratic 
government and the subsequent Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan (PRDP), the decrease in donor 
funding to the PNGOs in favor of the public sector is 
understandable. 
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In 2006, 79.8% of PNGO funding in Rural Development 
came from the external donors. Most of the remainder 
came from self-financing. In 2006, PNGOs working in 
the Water and Environment sector were the most heavily 
dependent upon international aid, with a total of 93.4% 
of their funding financed from abroad39.  
 
Vocational Training  
The Vocational Training sector hits a peak in 2002 
during the height of the Intifada. before decreasing 
slightly into 2003. From 2004 to 2005 Vocational 
Training begins to decrease again before remaining 
steady between 2 and 3% through to 2008. 
 
INGO donors follow the overall trend closely. 
Governments do as well, with the exception of 2004 
where their funding  does  not  begin to decrease. INGOs 
 
 contributed less than Governmental donors in the earlier 
years, and more in the latter. 
 
In 2006, PNGOs in this sector received 72.5% of their 
funding from international aid, with almost all of the 
remainder coming from self-financing activities (MAS, 
2007:80). 
 
Other  
From what our researchers were able to gather about the 
small number of the donors who used this sector as a 
definition of their aid, activities focused around 
microfinance and capacity building for recipients. Any 
number of other activities however may be included. 
Without knowing what the activities are, from our 
previous studies we do know that PNGOs who fit into the 
Other sector receive 66.3% of their funding through 
external aid (MAS, 2007:80).  
 
Figure 24: External Donor Funding to PNGOs 
Working in Economic-Based Development (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
3.6.4.3 External Funding to Rights-Based 
Development PNGOs 
 
Human Rights 
External aid to Human Rights PNGOs peaked during the 
2002 height of the Intifada, before sharply declining into 
2003. Following this there is a steady decline until 2005, 
after which it plateaus to between 10 – 11% of total 
external aid to PNGOs. Much like Charity and Relief, 
Human Rights funding tends to correlate closely with 
political events, mainly crisis. However, as Figure 25 
shows, Human Rights spending remained at its peak 
from 2005 – 2008.  
  
 
 
 
The INGO donor sector follows the pattern of overall, 
while apportioning a smaller percentage of funding to the 
sector than Government donors. Governmental donors 
apportioned between 16 – 18% of their aid to the sector 
between 2001 and 2008. INGO donors, on the other 
hand, apportioned between five and seven percent over 
the same period. According to previous MAS mappings, 
75.8% of Human Rights PNGOs’ funding consists of 
external aid (MAS, 2007:80). 
 
                                                 
39  It should be noted that PARC receives the lion’s share of funding to this sector to the rural development, and often acts as a donor to smaller 
implementing PNGOs or CBOs. The same is largely true of the Palestinian Hydrology Group in the water and environment sector. 
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Enhancing Democracy  
Funding to Enhancing Democracy remained relatively 
low until a dramatic increase beginning in 2003 and 
peaking in 2005  at 8.9% of total external aid. The 
decline in funding between 2006 and 2008, presumably 
in response to the elections of Hamas, is nearly as 
dramatic as the rise in funding preceding the elections. In 
2008, the percentage of funding was only 3.58 %, down 
dramatically from the high in 2005. The funding from 
INGO and Governmental donors closely follows the  
 
 
overall trends, but with INGO donor funding fluctuating 
much less dramatically. Government donors apportion a 
higher percentage of their aid to this sector in general, 
but it has fluctuated severely leading up to and since the 
2006 elections. Despite the decrease in support following 
the electoral victory of Hamas, 83.2% of the funding to 
PNGOs engaged in the sector of Enhancing Democracy 
still came from external aid in 2006. 
 
Figure 25: External Donor Funding to PNGOs 
Working in Economic-Based Development (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
Good Governance 
Much like Enhancing Democracy, Good Governance 
funding begins relatively low and steady until a dramatic 
rise in 2003 to the start of 2006. Unlike Enhancing 
Democracy projects though, external Good Governance 
funding remains relatively steady after the elections, 
fluctuating between 8 and 10% of total aid to PNGOs. So 
while the perceived need for Enhancing Democracy was 
‘eased’ by the 2006 elections, the need for Good 
Governance was not – presumably spurred locally with 
the advent of the PRDP.  
 
Like the overall trend, Governmental donor funding to 
the sector remains low until rising dramatically from 
2003 – 2005. Government funding drops more rapidly, 
by half, than over all aid following the 2006 elections, 
and then increases more rapidly following the creation of 
the Emergency 12th Government in 2007. The percentage 
apportioned the sector then decreases again by half into 
2008 to 5.7%. INGO donor funding to the sector 
fluctuates in the opposite manner as Governmental 
donors – slightly higher in 2006, lower in 2007 and 
higher again in 2008. 
 
Much like Enhancing Democracy, Good Governance 
PNGOs rely heavily on external aid to cover 83% of 
their budgets. The sector does receive less local funding 
than democracy, but far more assistance from 
Palestinians living in the Diaspora who make up another 
15% of their support with individual contributions 
(MAS, 2007:80). 
 
Women’s Affairs 
Funding to Women’s Affairs appears to have declined 
rapidly since its peak in 2001, and only began rising 
again steadily from 2003 to 2008 – more reflective of 
other long-term development oriented sectors. There was 
a slight decrease into 2008. 
 
Governmental donors account for the dramatic decrease 
between 2001 and 2002 as they disbursed 14% and 1.2% 
of their aid to the sector respectively. INGO donors on 
the other hand, continued to support Women’s Affairs 
throughout, only decreasing slightly between 2001 and 
2002. In terms of percentage of disbursements, INGO 
donors apportion more of their funding to the sector. 
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Women’s Affairs received 54.9% of their funding from 
external donors in 2006. They also record a higher 
percentage of self-financing (32.5%) than most other 
sectors (MAS, 2007:80). 
 
3.6.4.4 External Funding to Education-Based PNGOs 
 
Scientific Education 
Throughout the period studied, donor funding to 
Scientific Education remained relatively small in scale 
and consistent – between 2 and 4% of total external aid 
to PNGOs. This small number reflects the fact that 
external aid flows to this sector primarily through public 
bodies, such as the Ministry of Education and Higher 
Education (MoEHE), or semi-public bodies, such as Bir 
Zeit University.  
 
INGO donors apportioned a slightly higher percentage of 
their funds to this sector than Governmental donors, the 
most significant year in terms of differences being 2007, 
where INGO donors apportioned 6.79% of their funding 
to PNGOs in this sector versus 0.27% from 
Governmental sources. According to MAS’s 2007 
mapping of PNGOs, organizations working in this sector 
received 45% of their funding from international aid, 
with the remainder split between self-financing, local aid 
and aid from the Diaspora (MAS, 2007:80). 
 
Figure 26:  External Donor Funding to PNGOs 
Working in Education-Based Development (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
Research 
External funding for PNGOs engaged in Research 
remained steady between 2 and 3%. Governmental 
donors apportioned a higher percentage in the early 
years, but the pattern was reversed in 2006 and 2007 
with INGO donors contributing more. In 2008, 
Governmental donors contributed significantly more than 
 
their INGO counterparts (5.13% and 1.64% 
respectively). In 2006, PNGO research institutes 
received 71.8% of their funding from external donors 
(MAS, 2007:80). 
 
 
Liberal Arts Education 
Aid to PNGOs working in the Liberal Arts sector began 
to rise in 2001 with the onset of the Intifada and the 
corresponding increase in funding toward peace building. 
There is a slight decline between 2002 and 2003, after 
which funding stabilized around 8% of total external aid 
to PNGOs before beginning to recover again between 
2006 and 2008 to nearly 8%.  
 
INGO and Governmental donors followed similar trends, 
with the latter apportioning a higher percentage of aid. 
According to MAS’s PNGO mapping (2007), this sector 
received 60.1% of its funding from international aid. The 
Liberal Arts sector also received by far the highest 
percentage of of their funding from ‘Palestinians within 
the Green Line’ or ‘1948’ers.’(24.3%). 
 
Religious Activities 
External funding to PNGOs engaged in religious 
activities is not captured well in this survey. We do know 
from previous studies that religious PNGOs receive 
nearly 90% of their funding from abroad, one would 
have to assume from regional sources – which are also 
the least represented in our study.  
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3.6.4.5 External Funding to Social Service-Based 
PNGOs 
 
Health Services 
The percentage of PNGOs engaged in Health Services 
was at its peak in 2001 with the start of the Intifada, after 
which it declines sharply, over 10%, into 2002. From 
then on there is a steady decline, broken only by an 
increase in 2006, presumably from the shifting of some 
money out of the public health sector and into PNGOs. 
From 2007 to 2008, the funding remained at a steady 
15%. 
 
Unlike the overall trend and governmental donors, INGO 
funds declined straight through to 2008, without 
climbing in 2006 in response to the elections. The INGO 
donor sector also apportions a higher percentage of its 
aid to health related activities that the Governmental 
sector, presumably because the latter also funds the 
Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH).  
 
In 2006, MAS measured external financing to PNGOs in 
the Health Services sector as covering a total of 50.2% of 
their budgets. As many health INGOs offer their services 
at a price, the amount of self-financing in this sector is 
far higher than the others, with the exception of family 
planning. 
 
Elderly Care 
According to our survey, Elderly Care is not a PNGO 
sector heavily funded by external donors. The data may 
also be open to the possibility of respondents including 
Elderly Care projects that are part of larger health 
programs into the Health Services sector.   
 
In 2006, Elderly Care PNGOs only received 37.7% of 
their budget from international aid. In contrast to most 
other PNGOs, this sector receives a high percentage of 
aid from self-financing revenues (20%), local sources 
(28.3%) and from the Diaspora (11.1%) (MAS, 
2007:80). 
 
Disabled Care 
After the height of the Intifada, and presumably in the 
wake of intense violence, the Disability Care sector 
began to grow. It peaked in 2003 at 6.74%, before 
remaining steady at around 5% of total external aid to 
PNGOs into 2008.  
 
Unlike the overall trend in aid, INGO donor funding to 
PNGOs working in the disabilities sector peaks in 2005, 
at the same time when Governmental funding is at an all 
time low, less than 1%. This could in part be due to the 
fact that Governmental donors had shifted so much of 
their funding into the sector of Human Rights, 
Democracy and Good Governance in 2005 in advance of 
the elections.  
 
 
 
 
Disabled Care received 42% of its funding from external 
aid in 2006 and a total of 31.9% of its funding from self-
financing - much like PNGOs engaged in the more 
general health sector (MAS, 2007:80). 
 
Family Planning 
According to our survey, external donor funding to 
PNGO programs in Family Planning is almost 
nonexistent. As we assume this is untrue, we suspect that 
a number of respondents allocated these projects to other 
sectors, such as Health Services or Women’s Affairs. 
However the low figures are not too far off when we 
look at the percentage of external aid in Family Planning 
PNGOs’ budgets in 2006. According to MAS survey of 
PNGOs in 2007, only 13.4% of funds came from abroad, 
while a full 78.4% of aid came from self-financing. 2005 
represents the peak in donor funding to the sector and the 
trend is mimicked by both Governmental and INGO 
donors. 
 
Children’s Activities 
External aid to PNGOs working in Children’s Activities 
decreased dramatically between 2001 and 2002. In 2003 
it began to recover dramatically, finally reaching its peak 
of 8.04% in 2004. Between 2004 and 2005 there was a 
dramatic drop in aid to the sector, presumably following 
a shift in funding toward the PA or into sectors such as 
Enhancing Democracy or Good Governance.  
 
Both Governmental and INGO donors generally follow 
the overall pattern of aid to the sector – with the former 
apportioning a higher percentage of its disbursements 
from 2003 forward. According to previous MAS 
mappings, 75.6% of the budgets of PNGOs working in 
Children’s Activities came from external aid (MAS, 
2007:80).  
 
Youth and Sports 
Unlike work with the children’s sector, Youth and Sports 
increased dramatically during the Intifada and peaked in 
2003 at 3.62% of total aid. Since 2003, funding to the 
sector has steadily declined. The increase in funding 
throughout the Intifada was due largely to INGO donors, 
who also apportioned a higher percentage of their aid to 
the sector in general.  
 
It is important to note that Youth and Sports 
organizations are the most numerous type of PNGO in 
the WB&GS, and at the same time, one of the sectors 
receiving the least amount of external aid. External aid 
made up 59.5% of Youth and Sport PNGO budgets in 
2006. Local funding to the sector is higher than any 
other, with the exception of elderly care, at 19.6% of 
their operating budgets (MAS, 2007:80). 
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Figure 27: External Donor Funding to PNGOs Working 
in Social Service-Based Development (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
3.7 Tracking Externally Funded PNGO 
Activities by Target Area 
 
One of the aims of our donor survey was to look at how 
externally funded PNGO activities were distributed 
according to target areas: Urban, Rural and Refugee40. 
We do this by looking at the distribution of the 
Palestinian population, PNGO HQs and external funding 
to target populations.  
 3.7.1 Distribution of the Palestinian Population 
and PNGOs by Target Area  
 
The previous MAS mappings of PNGOs in 2001 and 
2007 have provided us with snapshots of the distribution 
of local organizations among the different target areas, as 
well as the percentage of external aid these PNGOs 
receive in comparison to their counterparts.  
 
 
Figure 28: Distribution of the Palestinian Population vs.  
PNGOs HQs by Target Area 
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Sources: PCBS, 2002 and 2007 Census. MAS, 2001 and 2007 Mapping of PNGOs in 
the WB&GS 
 
                                                 
40  Official PCBS definitions of these populations can be found in the glossary at the back of the book. 
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The following Figure 28 compares the distribution of 
PNGOs with that of the Palestinian population as a 
whole. Though at a glance it appears that the distribution 
of PNGOs aligns with the distribution of the population, 
there are slight differences. While rural areas are almost 
exactly aligned, the number of PNGOs operating in 
urban areas is higher than the percentage of Palestinians 
living there, with the opposite being true of refugees. 
 
3.7.2 External Aid to PNGOs versus Palestinian 
Demographics  
 
The following Figure 29 compares our survey results 
with the Palestinian Population distribution, the 
distribution of PNGOs and the distribution of those 
under the poverty line by target population. We also 
looked into the differences in funding  to  target 
 
populations between governmental and nongovernmental 
sources. 
 
Urban – While the percentage of Palestinians living in 
urban areas in 2007 was 53.1%, over half of them 
(50.6%) are under the poverty line. In spite of this, Urban 
Palestinians only received 38% of the total externally 
funded PNGO projects, with a marked difference 
between Governmental (49%) and INGO donors (32%). 
 
Rural – The percentage of Palestinians living in rural 
areas in 2007 was approximately 31%, 29.8% of them 
live below the poverty line. In spite of these two facts, 
rural Palestinians receive 41% of total externally funded 
projects managed through PNGOs, with only a slight 
difference between Governmental (34.8%) and INGO 
donors (44.5%).  
 
Figure 29: External Donor Funding to Target Population (2008) 
 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Palestinian Population
(2007)
Distribution of Poor
(2004)
PNGO HQ Location
(2006)
External Aid
Distribution to PNGOs
(2008)
Urban Rural Refugee
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PCBS (2004). 
External aid Distribution – MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
Refugee – While comprising 15.9% of the total 
population in the WB&GS, 19.6% of them live below 
the poverty line. 21% of all external aid channeled 
through PNGOs targets the refugees, with a marked 
difference between Governmental41 (16%) and INGO 
donors (23.8%). 
 
3.7.3 Tracking External Funding to PNGOs by 
Target Area (1999 -2008)  
 
The following section focuses on the distribution of 
external aid to PNGO projects according to the target 
area of the project’s implementation over ten years.  
 According to our survey results, external aid to PNGO 
projects targeting urban populations rose from 2000 to 
2003, before remaining  steady  just  below  40%  of  the 
total, 13% lower than the Palestinian percentage of urban 
inhabitants. 
 
External aid to PNGO projects targeting rural 
populations is consistently the highest, garnering 42.2% 
of aid in 2000 and 2007, while only comprising 31% of 
the total population in 2007. This is in large part due to 
the scale of projects targeting urban areas versus rural, 
the latter receiving more large-scale assistance in terms 
of infrastructure. 
 
                                                 
41  While Governmental donors channel a smaller percentage of their aid through PNGOs to the refugee population than INGO donors, the former 
invest heavily in this sector through support to UNRWA. 
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Figure 30: Proportion of External Donor Funding to 
Target Areas by Location of the Project  
Implementation (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
External aid to PNGO projects targeting Refugee 
populations slowly declined between 2001 and 2008. In 
2007, refugees comprised nearly 16% of the total 
population and were the recipients of over 20% of the 
external aid channeled through PNGOs in 2008. 
 
Breakdown of Aid to Target Populations by Donor 
Type  
The following two Figure 31and 32 break down external 
aid to Palestinian target populations according to the 
broad type of donors engaged: Governmental and INGO.
 From 2002 onwards, slightly more focus is placed on 
refugees by the INGO donors than Governmental ones. 
Also throughout the period studied, INGO donors have 
focused more upon rural populations; and finally, urban 
populations receive less INGO funding than the 
Governmental. However, there is a clear trend upwards 
by INGO donors in their focus on urban populations 
 
Figure 31 shows that INGO donors largely follow the 
same trends as overall aid, with a few exceptions. 
 
Figure 31: External Nongovernmental Funding to 
Target Population (1999-2008) 
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As Figure 32 shows, donor government funding by target 
population shows a heavy focus upon urban areas, with 
the majority of the years measuring between 45 and 50% 
of total funding. When compared with the sectors funded 
by the government, this makes more sense. On average, 
governmental contributions to PNGOs working in the 
rural sector is lower than their nongovernmental 
counterparts. Unlike nongovernmental donors, however, 
donor governments contribute significantly to rural 
development through partnerships with the PA and local 
municipalities. 
 
Figure 32: External Governmental Funding 
to Target Population (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
With the exception of 2000 to 2002, donor government 
contributions to PNGOs working with refugees has 
remained low. Between 2002 and 2008, the percentage 
of total funding apportioned to this sector fell from 
27.4% to only 16%. Much like governmental work with 
rural communities, PNGOs are not the primary conduit  
 
of governmental development assistance to refugees. 
UNRWA, the largest UN agency with a budget 
extending into the hundreds of millions, is fully financed 
by nation state contributions to work with refugees above 
and beyond the efforts of the PA or PNGOs. 
 
3.8 Tracking Externally Funded PNGO 
Activities by Geography 
 
One of the primary tasks of our survey was to pinpoint 
the geographic location of external aid at the governorate 
and district level. Previous studies, such as Welfare 
1998, were unsuccessful in distinguishing between the 
location of partner PNGOs and the location of their 
work. Furthermore, there has been little analysis done on 
the location of donors themselves.  Our geographical 
analysis of external funding and PNGOs focused on the 
geographic distribution of PNGOs, the geographic 
distribution of donors, the location of the HQs of 
external financed partner PNGOs and the geographic 
distribution externally financed project implementation.  
 
3.8.1 Geographic Distribution of PNGO HQs in 
the WB&GS 
 
Tracking the number and sector of PNGOs is not as 
difficult as tracking the location of the organizations 
themselves, and further, the location of their project 
implementation. As Figure 33 show, there is a marked 
difference between MAS and MoI data on the 
distribution of PNGOs. The trends from the MoI data of 
PNGO distribution align more closely with International 
Agency Distribution (focused on the central West Bank), 
while MAS's mapping spreads NGOs and their activities 
almost evenly throughout the West Bank. Most 
noticeable is the 2007 trend toward greater activity in the 
Northern West Bank as opposed to the Center. The 
following Figure 33 shows the distribution of PNGOs by 
region in the WB&GS in 1999 and 2006. 
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Figure 33: Geographic Distribution of PNGOs by Region (2000 & 2006) 
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Source: MAS, 2007. Tracking Donor Funding to the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
2000 – 881 PNGOs surveyed, 2007 – 1388 PNGOs surveyed 
 
3.8.2 Geographic Distribution of PNGOs HQs and 
External Aid by Governorate 
 
Previous MAS mappings of the PNGO sector have 
provided us with more data of PNGO activities and 
external aid at the governorate level.  
 
In the Northern West Bank region, Jenin and Nablus 
have the highest number of PNGOs, with the former 
more than doubling the numbe of organizations between 
1999 and 2006. However, only 23% of the budgets of 
PNGOs working in Jenin come from external sources, 
and only 25% of those of PNGOs working in Nablus. In 
Tubas, on the other hand, where the number of PNGOs 
tripled between 1999 and 2006, the dependence on 
external aid is much higher at over 70%. 
 
Table 16: Number of NGOs by Governorate, External 
Aid as a Percentage of PNGO Funds by Governorate 
 
# of PNGOs in 
each Governorate 
% of PNGO funding 
from External  Aid Governorate 
1999 2006 1999 2006 
Jenin 42 110 37 23.1 
Tubas 8 24 78 70.7 
Tulkarm 35 65 28 20.2 
Nablus 81 125 35 25 
Qalqylia 22 32 29 63 
Salfit 12 26 0 73.3 
Ramallah/Al-Bireh 85 132 37 71.4 
Jericho  9 17 8 8.1 
Jerusalem 69 63 49 21.4 
Bethlehem 82 99 44 63.3 
Hebron 112 133 32 35.6 
North Gaza 10 48 81 58.4 
Gaza City 64 149 60 68.1 
Dier Al-Balah 28 70 81 73.5 
Khan Younis 35 62 57 83.4 
Rafah 16 51 57 82 
Total 710 1,206 46.8 60.9 
Source: MAS, 2001 & 2007. 
Note: The survey covers approximately 77% of NGOs in 1999 and 
81% of PNGOs in 2006. 
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In the Central West Bank, Ramallah and Bireh are 
home to over 130 PNGOs who have almost doubled 
their reliance upon international aid between 1999 and 
2006, from 37% to over 71%. In Jerusalem, both the 
number of PNGOs and their percentage of reliance on 
external aid decreased. Jericho, the least active 
governorate in terms of PNGO activity and external 
aid, moves from 9 to 17 PNGOs between 1999 and 
2006, while the dependence of these organizations 
remained steady around 8% of their total budgets. 
 
In the Southern West Bank, both Hebron and 
Bethlehem have seen an increase their number of 
PNGOs, as well as increased the dependence of these 
organizations on external aid. However, reliance on 
external aid is much higher in Bethlehem (63.3%) than 
in Hebron (35.6%) and has increased more 
dramatically between 1999 and 2006.  
 
In the Gaza Strip, the number of PNGOs increased 
dramatically throughout all of the governorates 
between 1999 and 2006. Furthermore, all of the 
PNGOs operating in the Strip derive at least half of 
their budgets from external donors. In Khan Younis 
and Rafah, the dependence on external donors is the 
highest in the WB&GS at over 80%. 
 
3.8.3 Geographic Distribution of External Donor 
HQs in the WB&GS 
 
The location of the HQs of external donors was 
gathered through a mapping of ten years of PASSIA 
Directories42. External NGOs and Governmental 
donors are located overwhelmingly in the Central West 
Bank, in Ramallah and Jerusalem, with no presence in 
Jericho. According to our sample, nearly 84.5% of 
International agency HQs are in the Central West 
Bank, as opposed to only 5.6% in the North, 5.3% in 
the South and 4.6% in the Gaza Strip (see appendix for 
full 10 year statistical layout). On a regional basis, this 
remains virtually unchanged over the 10 year period.  
 
In Palestine, where projects and programs are 
undertaken amidst a military occupation, restrictions on 
movement are levied upon local and international aid 
workers alike. The overwhelming presence in 
Ramallah and Jerusalem, where access and movement 
to international workers is facilitated by a series of 
specialized checkpoints, is understandable for reasons 
of comfort and efficiency43. Furthermore, the two cities 
                                                 
42  Full data on the results of this survey can be found in the 
appendix. Surveyed PASSIAs were from 2009 to 2000, with 
each year representing the data from the year before. 
43  Due to the DCO and the access to ‘settler routes’, such as 
Hizme, international aid workers can move more easily 
between Jerusalem and Ramallah than any other major city 
centers within the WB&GS. Once inside of Israeli-controlled 
represent the political centers of Israelis and 
Palestinians. As such, international agencies gravitate 
to where the decision makers are. Though this is 
natural in the case of Governmental donors, the same 
holds true for INGO ones as well. 
 
The concentration of international agencies in the 
Central West Bank raises interesting questions 
concerning PNGO access to external aid.  
 
 Can these agencies be accessed as easily by 
PNGOs located outside of these cities and 
surrounded by a series of checkpoints and 
obstacles; or are the more ‘cosmopolitan’ elite 
urban PNGOs in Ramallah and Jerusalem given 
an advantage by their proximity to donors?  
 
In 2006, PNGOs with HQs in Ramallah and Bireh 
received 71.4% of their funding from external sources. 
This is in stark contrast to more marginalized cities in 
the Northern or Southern West Bank. PNGOs located 
in Hebron, for example, receive only 35.6% of their 
funding from abroad; while those located in Tulkarm 
receive only 20.2%44. It should be noted that the 
percentage of funding from external sources of PNGOs 
in Ramallah and Bireh has nearly doubled since 1999 
(MAS, 2007:76-77). 
 
 Secondly, do donors prefer to work with NGOs in 
the Central West Bank due to the much greater 
freedom of movement and access they enjoy in the 
region that makes oversight easier and more 
efficient? 
 
As you will see below, 69.6% of external aid 
partnerships are made with PNGO headquartered in the 
Central West Bank. According to our previous 
mappings, PNGOs working at the national and semi-
national levels are also overwhelmingly located in 
either Ramallah or Jerusalem.   
                                                                            
Jerusalem, international workers have better access to the 
entirety of the West Bank. For example, the typical drive time 
from Jerusalem to Bethlehem can be just ten minutes. Due to 
checkpoints and the destroyed or diverted transportation 
network of the WB&GS, a drive from Ramallah to Bethlehem 
can take hours. 
44  In those communities where external aid to PNGOs is relatively 
lower, the organizations tend to rely much more heavily on 
local aid and revenue-generating activities (MAS, 2007:68). 
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Figure 34: Location of International Aid Agencies by Region (2008) 
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Source: PASSIA Diaries, 2009 
 
 
The Central West Bank 
Within the Central West Bank, we tried to analyze 
changes in the preferences of donors between Ramallah 
and Jerusalem over a ten year period. As the two cities 
are located next to each other, and both are important 
centers of political activity, it was expected that the 
trends would be negatively related. That is, a decrease in 
the number of agencies in one city would mean an 
increase in the number of the other. We also tried to 
measure the impact of Israel’s construction of the 
Separation Wall in 2002, with the assumption that it 
would lead to significant fluctuations in the percentages 
of NGOs working in either city as restrictions and 
obstacles to movement increased.  
 
However, as the Figure 35 below shows, from 2002 until 
2006, the percentages of agencies located in either city 
remains relatively stable. One possible explanation for 
this has already been discussed. Namely, the fact that 
movement restrictions do not affect international 
agencies in the same way that they do Palestinian ones, 
allowed international organizations to stay put 
throughout the Wall’s construction.  
 
Figure 35:  External Donor and Agency Distribution 
in the Central West Bank (1999 – 2008) 
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Source: PASSIA Directory, 2000 – 2009  
Note: The numbers do not add up to 100% because the graph excludes the HQs of 
donors in other regions of the WB&GS 
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While the Figure 35 shows a relative stability in the 
location of donor HQs in the Central West Bank, 
between 2006 and 2008, the number of international 
agencies with HQs in Ramallah increases by nearly 
10%, mirrored by a near 10% decrease in Jerusalem over 
the same period. This trend towards Ramallah from 
Jerusalem, in terms of the location of Donor Agencies’ 
HQs, seems to have been mirrored by the percentage of 
international aid received by PNGOs in the area. In 
1999, 49% of PNGO budgets came from abroad, after 
which it had dropped to only 21.4% in 2006. PNGOs 
working in Ramallah on the other hand received 37% 
and 71.4% of their funding from abroad in 1999 and 
2006 respectively (MAS, 2007:76-77). 
 
The Gaza Strip 
Our team also looked into the trends of international aid 
agencies HQs with respect to the Gaza Strip. As Figure 
36 below shows, the number of international aid 
agencies with HQs in the Gaza Strip peaked in 2001 at 
nearly 12%, before declining to the present level under 
5%. The gradual decline between 2001 and 2003 
steepens between 2004 and 2005. Between 2005 and 
2006, the year of the Israeli ‘Disengagement’ Gaza, 
there is a slight rise in international presence, perhaps in 
preparation for the coming elections. The following year 
 though there is another decline into 2007; and since then, 
the number of international agencies with HQs in Gaza 
has remained just under 5%45. It must be noted that over 
the two last years of the survey Gaza remained under a 
siege, which brought in a number of new international 
agencies, such as those from Qatar, and forced out a 
number of others who were unable to guarantee access to 
their staff or work with the de-facto Hamas 
Administration46.  
 
The Figure below also details the number of international 
agencies with field offices in the Gaza Strip. While the 
number of HQs begins to decrease in 2001, the number 
of Field Offices begins to increase. However, in 2004, 
both the number of HQs and Field Offices begins to 
decrease. Between 2007 and 2008, the number of 
agencies with Field Offices in the Gaza Strip rises by 
more than 5%, perhaps due to the siege requiring 
agencies to maintain a permanent staff in the area to 
oversee ongoing projects. In 2008 there were only two 
international governmental agencies listed as being 
headquartered in Gaza, compared to four INGOs. 
Largely the same is true of Field Offices as well, where 
26 are maintained by INGOs in comparison to 14 by 
IGOs or governmental agencies. 
 
 
Figure 36: International Donors and Agency with HQs in the 
Gaza Strip Compared to the Number of International Donors 
and Agencies with Field Offices in the Gaza Strip  (1999 – 2008) 
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Source: PASSIA Directory, 2000 – 2009 
                                                 
45  While the number of international agency HQs in Gaza may be low, the amount of dependency on international aid amongst Palestinian NGOs 
is quite high. In 2006, with the exception of North Gaza, the remaining four districts’ PNGOs receive the highest percentage of budget from 
abroad. In Rafah and Khan Younis it is over 80% (MAS, 2007:76). This dependency on international aid amongst Gazan PNGOs is mirrored by 
the Gaza Strip as a whole, where 86% of the population is ‘heavily dependent’ upon international aid (MAS, Economic and Social Monitor 13).   
46  Those agencies receiving USAID funding, for example, are not permitted to communicate or cooperate with individuals or organizations 
affiliated to the Hamas party. Since the June 2007 skirmishes resulted in the takeover of the Gaza Strip by Hamas, the line between ‘affiliated’ 
and ‘unaffiliated’ to Hamas has blurred significantly. Despite this, a number of agencies, even those receiving USAID funds, have continued 
working in the Strip and many are planning to increase their activities in the wake of the war on Gaza that began in the closing days of the 
period studied.  
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3.8.4 Geographic Distribution of External Donors’ 
Partner PNGO HQs 
 
Our geographical survey asked two different questions: 
where are the HQs of your partner PNGO, and where is 
the location of the project or program’s implementation. 
Over the ten year period, interesting patterns emerged in 
terms of the location of the external donors PNGO 
partner organizations.  
 
The Gaza Strip, even if well-represented in the first 
years, declines steadily throughout the  decade,  with  the 
 
 
 
 
exception of 2006. After this slight increase the 
percentage of partnerships falls by nearly 10% between 
2006 and 2008, perhaps in response to the takeover by 
Hamas. 
 
Partnerships with PNGOs in the Northern and Southern 
West Bank remain low throughout the decade, at or near 
10%.  
 
Figure 37: The Location International Donors’ Partner PNGO 
HQs by Region (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
Partnerships with PNGOs located in the Central West 
Bank, on the other hand, rise rapidly in the early years of 
the study, and steadily afterwards until 2008, with the 
exception of a slight dip between 2003 and 200447. By 
2008, 66.8% of international donors' partner PNGOs are 
located in the Central West Bank. 
 
In terms of Governmental versus INGO donors, the 
former have a higher percentage of partnerships in the 
Central West Bank, presumably as it is home to 
Jerusalem and Ramallah, the political capitals of the 
WB&GS. INGO donors closely mirror the overall 
trends, with the exception of having fewer partnerships 
in the Northern West Bank. Between 2006 and 2008, 
INGO partnerships with PNGOs in the Gaza Strip 
decreased by nearly 10%, with a corresponding 12% 
increase in the Central West Bank. 
 
 
 3.8.5 Geographic Distribution of Externally 
Funded Project Implementation 
 
After having learned where international donors' PNGO 
partners are headquartered, we sought to find out the 
location of the implementation of the projects they were 
funding.. 
 
As shown in the Figure 38 below, the Central West Bank 
receives the highest percentage of international aid in 
terms of project implementation. At 34.2%, the region 
receives nearly double the aid in proportion to its share of 
the population (17.8%). Only the Southern West Bank, 
mostly due to Bethlehem, is the share of aid also higher 
than the share of total population (23.5% and 18.9% 
respectively). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
47  During this same year, the percentage of partnerships in the Southern and Northern West Bank both rise. 
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Figure 38: The Location of International Donors’ Partner PNGO HQs 
versus the Location of Externally Funded PNGO Project by Region (2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey. Population: PCBS 2007 Census. 
Note: Percentges are rounded to the nearest whole number. 
 
 
In the Northern West Bank, where 24.3% of Palestinians 
live, and where over 29% of PNGOs are headquartered, 
only 20.5% of externally financed projects are 
implemented. In the Gaza Strip the disparity is much 
greater. With a total of 39% of the Palestinian 
population and 31.5 percent of the total PNGOs, only 
21.6% of externally funding to PNGO activities are 
implemented there48.  
 
The following Figure compares the location of 
international donors' PNGO partners with the location of 
their project implementation  
 
While the Figure above provides only a snapshot of the 
geographic distribution of international donor funded 
PNGO projects, the Figure below shows how this has 
changed over the ten-year period.. According to our 
survey, the Gaza Strip received a much higher 
proportion of international aid in the late 1990's, until 
peaking in 2000 at just over 60% of total aid49. In 2001, 
with the onset of the Second Intifada, the percentage of 
internationally funded PNGO projects in Gaza falls 
dramatically, nearly 20%, before stabilizing between 
23% and 30% from 2002 onward.   
 
Internationally funded PNGO projects remained 
relatively stable throughout the ten years studied, 
remaining between 19% and 27% throughout, with the 
exception of a slight decline in 2000. By 2008, the NWB 
was the beneficiary of nearly the same percentage of 
international funding as the GS, despite being home to 
15% less of the of the Palestinian population. 
 The Central West Bank hosts the highest proportion of 
internationally funded PNGO projects, despite being the 
home to the smallest percentage of the Palestinian 
population. According to our study, there is a dramatic 
increase (nearly 15%) in the percentage of projects 
implemented in the CWB between 2001 and 2002, 
correlating very closely with the dramatic decline in the 
GS over the same period. From 2002 onward, the 
percentage of internationally funded PNGO projects 
implemented in the CWB remains stable at or slightly 
above 30% of the total. There is a slight dip in 2005, 
once more seeming to correspond with a slight rise in the 
GS. 
 
The Southern West Bank was the location of 
implementation of nearly 10% of externally funded 
PNGO projects between 1999 and 2001, before climbing 
to nearly 20% in 2002. From 2002 to 2008, the 
percentage remains stable around 20% of the total. 
 
In terms of the different types of donors studied, INGO 
donors give a higher percentage of their aid to the NWB, 
less than the average to the CWB, noticeably less to the 
SWB and more to the GS than the average. Between 
2007 and 2008, funding for project implementation in the 
GS increased by 5% among INGO donors. Governmental 
donors, on the other hand, devote over 34% of their 
funding to projects implemented in the CWB.  
 
                                                 
48  As the following sections will show, the low percentage of international aid to PNGOs in Gaza has not resulted from the 2007 takeover by 
Hamas, but has remained consistently low since 2002.   
49  However, these earlier years of data are biased toward the small number of organizations who were able to provide it. 
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Figure 39: Location of Implementation of Externally Funded Projects 
Carried Out in Partnership with PNGOs by Region (1999-2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
3.8.6 Overview: Geographic Distribution of 
PNGOs and External Aid 
 
The Figure 40 below works to summarize the story of 
external aid and PNGO activity in terms of geography. 
The first, checkered, bar represents the regional 
distribution of the Palestinian population as a whole in 
2006. The second striped bar represents the location of 
donor HQs in 2008. As mentioned above, there is an 
overwhelming presence in the Central West Bank as 
opposed to the rest of the oPT. The black bar shows how 
PNGOs are distributed throughout the oPT, with 
thelowest percentage actually being in the Central West 
Bank. The grey bar, representing the location of  
 
 
 
 
international aid agency partner PNGO HQs, shows that 
although there are a smaller number of PNGOs in the 
Central West Bank, they enjoy much greater access to 
international funds other regions. Finally, the white bar 
represents the location of internationally funded projects 
implemented by partner PNGOs. Though much more 
evenly distributed throughout the oPT than partnership 
HQs, there is still a higher percentage of funds targeting 
the Central West Bank than any other region – despite 
the fact that in many ways, it is the least in need of 
assistance. 
 
Figure 40: Geographic Breakdown of International Aid to PNGOs 
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Source: Donor HQ source: Source: PASSIA Organizations Directory, 2009. 130 listed 
organizations. 
NGO HQ Source: MAS, 2007. – figures are from 2006. Donor implementation and 
Partnership Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey.  
Palestinian Population Source: PCBS, 2007 Census. 
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3.8.7 In Focus: PNGO Hierarchies 
 
The fact that PNGOs have not distributed themselves along the same lines as donors and contributions does not mean that 
those outside of the Central West Bank are forgotten by international aid. The geographical structure of aid, as detailed in 
the Figure 40 above, tells the story of a developing hierarchy amongst local organizations. Large professionalized PNGOs 
working on a regional or national basis are overwhelmingly located in the Central West Bank. In 2007, 29.6% of NGOs in 
the Central West Bank claimed to work at the national level, as opposed to only 4.9% in the north, 9% in the South and 
7.8% in the Gaza Strip (MAS, 2007:74). These powerful, nationally oriented organizations act as patrons to smaller 
PNGOs or CBOs spread throughout the remainder of Palestine – often serving as conduits of donor aid, capacity builders, 
ad-hoc project contractors or oversight and administrative support.  
 
An example of the hierarchy of aid extending to the local level could be when a donor government provides funding to the 
Welfare Association, an INGO, who in turn gives money to the NGO Development Center (NDC), a Palestinian NGO that 
often acts as a donor to smaller local organizations. Among the dozens of PNGO partners of NDC is The Palestinian Center 
for Peace and Democracy (PCPD), an NGO located in Ramallah who works with and through smaller PNGOs and CBOs 
through a network of offices in the West Bank. In such a scenario, there would be three intermediary steps between the 
donor and the implementing agency.   
 
 
3.9 Arab Funding to PNGOs  
 
When setting out to track external funding to PNGOs, 
the team at MAS worked to better understand the 
relatively small percentage of aid arriving from Arab 
governments and institutions. The following section 
reviews two important reports on Arab funding to the 
WB&GS, as well as the findings of our survey. 
 
According to Dr. Malhis (2007), Arab aid to Palestine is 
characterized by its solidarity with the Palestinian cause 
and liberation movement. From the 1940s until 1967, 
remained   reactive  to  the   severity  of   the    economic, 
political and social conditions in the oPT while lacking 
an overall framework.  
 
After the 1967 war, Arab countries’ priorities shifted 
from helping in the liberation of Palestine toward 
eliminating the war’s effects. Following the 1973 war, 
countries gathered at the seventh League of Arab States 
Summit where they pledged to give countries 'on the 
front line' (Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO) 1.369 
Billion USD annually. At the time this represented a far 
higher amount than their Western counterparts.  
 
Following the signing of the Camp David Peace 
Agreement between Egypt and Israel in 1978, attendees 
of the ninth Arab League Summit pledged to allocate 150 
Million USD to Palestine annually over ten years. 
Although detailed data is not available, the joint 
Palestinian-Jordanian Committee reported to have 
received around 422.6 Million USD between 1979 and 
1985, only 40.2% of the pledged amounts, and 29.5% of 
total pledges (10 years at 150 Million USD/yr). 
Between 1988 and 1993, following the onset of the first 
Intifada, the League of Arab States pledged immediate 
support of 128 Million USD to Palestine along with a 43 
Million USD stipend per month. However, the onset of 
the first Gulf War between the United States and Iraq, 
prevented most of these pledges from turning into 
disbursements.  It  is  estimated  that   transfers   between 
 
 
1988 and 1992 totaled to around 103 Million USD, most 
of which went to emergency aid and medicines. This 
number represents a far cry from the promised monthly 
stipend of over 40 Million USD. 
 
The period between 1994 and 2000 saw another shift in 
Arab country aid giving, influenced by the Oslo Accords 
and the push to support the nascent PA. Between 1994 
and 1996, Arab aid reached around 393.4 Million USD, 
only about 15.6% of the total aid. The MoP on the other 
hand, reports that between 1994 and 2000, Arab aid 
totaled 7.3% of total aid to Palestinians50. Regardless of 
the differences in estimates, both clearly show that Arab 
funding was becoming increasingly limited and 
marginalized in comparison to its Western counterparts.  
 
Between 2001 and 2007, Arab funding saw a dramatic 
rise. Between 3.96 Billion USD was committed as direct 
budget support and total commitments reached 5.11 
Billion USD. 
 
The major increase in funding followed on the eruption 
of the Second Intifada and the intensified occupation of 
the West Bank and Gaza. Arab countries convened an 
emergency summit in Cairo where they created two 
funds: The Al Quds Intifada Fund (200 Million USD) 
and the Al-Aqsa Fund (800 Million USD). The following 
year in 2002, an additional 150 Million USD was 
pledged to those two funds. 
 
However, actual disbursements are different than 
pledges. The actual contributions to the two funds totaled 
around 761.8 Million USD, representing only 66.2% of 
the total pledges. Moreover, of the disbursements made, 
89% came from only five countries (Saudi Arabia at 
                                                 
50  It should be noted that the PAMS system and the previous MoPIC 
inaccurately captured the data of many multi-lateral instruments 
and foundations.  
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35.6%, Kuwait at 22.4% and United Arab Emirates at 
19%, Qatar at 7% and Algeria at 5%).  
 
Since 2000, 84.4% of Arab funds have targeted 
government budget support, with the remaining 15.6% 
going to reconstruction projects. As such very little aid 
has been channeled through PNGOs. 
 
3.9.1 Review of the Islamic Development Bank 
Report – Published July 2009 
 
The Al-Aqsa Fund is managed by the Islamic 
Development Bank (IDB) on behalf of the Arab Bank for 
Economic Development in Africa; Arab Fund for 
Economic & Social Development; Arab Monetary Fund; 
Saudi Fund for Development; and The OPEC Fund for 
International Development (OFID). Between 2003 and 
2008, the Al-Aqsa fund managed a portfolio of around 
$462 million. 
 
Amongst the millions of dollars managed by the fund, 
very little has entered the PNGO sector. The fund 
primarily targets the PA, local governments and 
municipalities, emergency relief, building reconstruction, 
road constructions and schools. It is worth mentioning 
that the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 
had a program that aims to economically empower the 
poor families (around 12,000 families) through helping 
them in establishing their own projects. The budget for 
program is $3 million. Those funds are channeled mainly 
through PNGOs, such as the Sharek Youth Forum, the 
Palestinian Hydrology Group, PARC and others. These 
PNGOs directly implement the program, distributing aid 
to 2,133 families as of May 2009. A further 1,071 
interventions are in the implementation phase and 1331 
are being planned.  
Besides welfare programs, there is a micro financing 
scheme of around $3.38 million also channeled through 
private institutions and PNGOs. Between 2003 and 2008, 
873 loans were granted and allocated as follows: Faten 
granted 250 loans for $1,110,500; Asala granted 205 
loans in $706,100; the YMCA granted 110 loans for 
$395,000; PARC granted 105 loans for $498,500 and 
ACAD granted 203 loans for $674,800. Recently, Faten 
received an additional in $500,000 micro financing funds 
and Asala received $600,000. According to the report, 
the other institutions will all so receive more funding 
shortly.  
 
The Welfare Association is one of the primary recipients 
of Arab Aid, however not many of the projects funded 
utilize PNGO partnerships. For example, the Arab Fund 
for Economic & Social Development granted Welfare $4 
million from September of 2008 to September of 2010 
for renovation and reconstruction old city in Jerusalem 
and Nablus. The Arab Monetary Fund also is directly 
partnering with the Welfare Association by granting $1.5 
million between May of 2008 and May of 2010 to 
renovate the old city in Jerusalem, in addition to $1.1 
million in support of the Maqased hospital by $1.1 
million for 2009 and 2010. 
 
The Saudi Fund for Development is providing $2 million 
between 2008-2009 for 10 organizations, PNGOs, and 
charities in Jerusalem under the scope of ‘Al Quds 
Capital of Arab Culture 2009’ for building, renovation, 
machinery and equipment. PNGO partners include: the 
YMCA, Silwan Club, Olive Mountain Club, Edward 
Said national music institute and others. 
 
 
Table 17: Commitments and Disbursements of Al-Aqsa Fund  
Members (2003 – 2008) 
 
 Membership Committed Disbursement Com./Dis. 
Islamic Development Bank  62.7 26.5 42.30% 
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa 58.8 27.7 47.40% 
Arab Fund for Economic & Social Development 50 16.4 32.70% 
Arab Monetary Fund 43.7 18.7 42.80% 
Saudi Fund for Development 41 8.1 19.80% 
The OPEC Fund for International Development  8 4 50.00% 
The Arab Investment & Export Credit  Guarantee 
Corporation  1.1 0 0.00% 
The Arab Authority for Agricultural Investment 
and Development  0.8 0.8 100.00% 
Al-Aqsa Fund 196.2 155.3 79.2 
Total 461.8 255.5 55.33% 
Source: IDB Report, 2009. 
Note: Amounts given in Millions USD. 
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The OPEC Fund for International Development will 
provide $1.5 million between June 2009 and June 2010 
for ‘empowering the Palestinians live in Jerusalem’. 
However, this project is implemented in partnership 
between Al-Awqaf Islamic affairs department and a 
‘PNGO’ called Al Quds for Welfare and Development, 
who received $600,000 out of the $1.5 million granted. 
 
In spite of the few samples of Arab-PNGO partnerships 
outlined above, it looks like the funds provided through 
Al-Aqsa Fund are primarily directed at the Palestinian 
Authority. Arab funding to PNGOs is still limited and 
exclusive to certain area and priorities. 
 
3.9.2 PNGO Survey Results 
 
Though we are aware of the limitations of our survey of 
Arab funding, our PNGO survey has given us an 
interesting picture of the broad trends in Arab aid to 
PNGOs between 1999 and 2008. According to our 
survey, Arab funding decreases in the proportion of total 
aid to PNGOs almost throughout the 1990’s. Only with 
the onset of the Second Intifada and the decline in 
funding from the West. As the Intifada began to wind 
down in 2003, Western support returned, reducing the 
significance of Arab funding to the PNGO sector. 
Between 2006 and 2008, Arab aid has accounted for 
around 10% of the total. 
 
Figure 41: Arab Funding as a Percentage of Total External 
Aid to PNGOs (1999 – 2008) 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
 
3.10 The European Union Funding to 
PNGOS 
 
The European Commission is a major benefactor to the 
PNGO sector. Unlike USAID, however, PNGOs 
accepting European money is not tabooed, and there are 
a number of programs through which local NGOs can 
apply for direct partnerships with the EC (eg. the 
European Partners for Peace Initiative). As most often 
occurs though, European money flows through a member 
states INGO before it reaches the local partner.  
 
The trend in EU funding from 2002 to 2008 to PNGOs 
could be characterized as a roller coaster. It nearly 
doubles between 2002 and 2003, before quadrupling the 
following the year. In 2005 the amount of funding 
decreased by a factor of four over 2004 and dropped 
again in 2006. In 2007 the EU reached over 3.5 Million 
Dollars in direct funding to PNGOs, and in 2008 the 
amount had grown to over 8.5%. 
 
 
 
In 2002, 2003 and 2006, the EC was heavily invested in 
Rural Development which comprised 72, 98, and 64% 
respectively. 2005 saw a big move into peace education 
and forums (67%), categorized here as Liberal Arts 
Education. 2006 ironically saw the greatest amount of 
funding to activities falling under Democratization. In 
2008, there is a wide variety of projects (27 in total). The 
majority of the funding however is captured by three 
main sectors: Health (primarily in the treatment and 
rehabilitation of torture victims), Human Rights and 
Women’s Affairs.  
 
The EU tends to focus on urban populations with its 
NGO funding, though rural populations also benefit. 
Their impact or targeting of refugees however remains 
relatively low – most likely due to their funding of 
UNRWA. 
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Figure 42: EC Funding to PNGOs (2002 – 2008) 
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Source: 2002 – 2003: MoP’s PAMS database. 2004 – 2008: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
Note: The numbers are given in 1000’s and presented in USD. 
 
The location of the EU’s partners is overwhelmingly the 
Central West Bank. Only in 2007 does the percentage of 
partners in the Center drop below 80%, and then only to 
an increased number of projects targeting the Gaza Strip. 
EU partnerships with organizations headquartered in the 
Northern West Bank are almost non-existent; while on 
the other hand, there is a small but consistent percentage 
of organizations in the Southern West Bank, primarily 
Bethlehem, who have accessed EC Money. 
 
Information Availability 
Whether it is a policy choice aimed at aligning with the 
principles of the 2005 Paris Declaration, or simply a by-
product of their complex procedures, information on EU 
projects is more readily available than that of other major 
donors, such as the US or UN. The EU trend toward 
thematic multi-year grants also makes it easier to track 
data.   
 
3.10.1 Ownership 
 
In interviews with EU press officials, it was cited that the 
organization wanted to increase local ownership over the 
development process by increasing the proportion of 
direct partnerships (those without an INGO 
intermediary). In order for this to happen however, 
obstacles to access and EU practices should be reformed.  
 
1. Expertise: The expertise required to even apply for 
an EU grant, much less implement it, is often well 
beyond the capacity of local NGOs, often those 
closer to the 'grass roots'. Even if there is a 
competent local administration in place, the inability 
to apply for funds or carry out reporting in the local 
language, often means PNGOs rely heavily on 
expensive international personnel in their 
fundraising departments, who are adept in the 
language of the donor. 
 
2. Recycling: Though never admitted on record, the 
use of indirect partnerships through home country 
INGOs is a useful way for donor countries to recycle 
international aid back into their own economies. The 
administrative costs of these intermediaries support 
a number of salaries of donor country expatriates.  
 
In conversations with one European INGO worker, the 
effect of these two barriers is extensive when it comes to 
bottom lines of PNGO project budgets. The interviewee 
described the recent submission of a multi-partner, multi-
year grant proposal by her INGO. In exchange for the 
INGO carrying out the complex reporting and oversight 
required by the EU – with no implementing role 
whatsoever – the INGO earmarked 24% of a 500,000 
Euro grant, or 120,000 Euros. 
 
3.11 Large PNGOs and External Aid 
 
Though our survey of PNGOs was not nearly 
representative enough to analyze the PNGO population 
as a whole, it has provided some interesting data 
concerning the activities of Palestine’s larges NGOs – 
precisely those who receive most of the international aid. 
The following section reviews the distribution of 
externally funded activities of large PNGOs by the 
sector, target and geography of their work. 
 
3.11.1 Distribution of Externally Aid to Large 
PNGOs by Sector Groupings & Period 
 
Figure 43 shows the distribution of external aid to large 
PNGOs by sector grouping and time period. 
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According to the survey, external funding to large PNGO 
projects in Charity and Relief doubles between the first 
and second period, as the onset of the Intifada increased 
the need for short term assistance. Between 2006 and 
2008, charity and relief projects receive just over 18% of 
the total external aid to PNGOs.  
 
External funding to large PNGOs in the Social Services 
Grouping drops steadily over the three periods from 
54.7% of total external aid in the first to 32.9% in the 
last. The largest part of the social sector grouping is 
healthcare, which alone captures 42.2% and 34.4% of 
total funding to PNGOs in the first two periods. In the 
third period, PNGO projects related to health received 
19.8% of total funds. The Palestinian Medical Relief 
Society (PMRS), one of the largest Palestinian healthcare 
NGOs, declined to take in the survey, leading us to 
believe that the percentage of funding captured by the 
Health Services sector of the social services grouping 
would be even higher. 
 
According to our survey of PNGOs, external aid to 
projects included in our Rights-based grouping 
decreased slightly between the first and second period, 
despite the increased focus on human rights at a time of 
crisis. The percentage of aid designated to this grouping 
rises between the second and third period, moving from 
8.6% to 14.8% of the total, presumably spurred on by the 
rapid increase in funding to democracy and good 
governance in the 2005 lead up to Palestinian elections. 
 
 
Figure 43: Distribution of External aid to Large PNGOs  
by Sector Groupings & Period 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
External aid to PNGOs engaged in the Group Education 
behaved predictably, dropping by more than half during 
the Intifada, and recovering once more in the third 
period, where it makes up 5.9% of externally funded 
PNGO activities. 
 
Funding to PNGOs working in sectors that benefit the 
Economy rises steadily over the three periods analyzed. 
In the first period this grouping captured 14.2% of total 
aid to PNGOs, 21% over the second period and 27.9% in 
the third - nearly as large as the Social Sector.  
 
3.11.2 External Funding to Large PNGOs by 
Target Area 
 
Though our donor survey returned a more representative 
picture of external aid to PNGOs by target population, 
our survey of PNGOs captured an interesting picture of 
the target populations of the largest PNGOs. Unlike our 
donor survey however, PNGO respondents were given 
the option of choosing ‘All  Populations’  to  describe  
the  beneficiaries  of large programs spread throughout 
target areas. Though the data is more ambiguous, 
interesting trends can be identified. 
 
As the following figure 44 shows, large PNGO projects 
targeting Urban areas have fallen steadily over the three 
periods from around  
 
External funding to PNGOs working with Rural 
populations carries the largest percentage throughout the 
period studied. In the first and second period, the 
percentage of aid sits around 43%, dropping only slightly 
in the second period in favor of refugees and ‘all 
populations’. In the final period, rural populations are 
allocated nearly 53% of the total.  
20 to 10% between 2006 and 2008.  
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Figure 44: Percentage of Externally Funded PNGO 
Activities by Target Population and Period 
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Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
Refugee target groups receive only a fraction of the total 
external aid to large PNGOs, with the highest percentage 
(11%) being in the second period.  
 
The high percentage of respondents choosing the ‘All 
Populations’ category is reflective of a sample weighted 
towards large PNGOs working at the national and semi-
national levels. We suspect however that the lower 
percentage of external funded PNGO activities targeting 
‘all populations’ in the third period, reflects the better 
record keeping of PNGOs in more recent years, allowing 
them to better allocate their activities by target 
population. 
 
3.11.3 Location of Large PNGO Project 
Implementation by Region and Period  
 
Our PNGO survey aimed to capture the changes in the 
geographic distribution of large PNGO project 
implementation on the regional level over the three 
periods of time, rather than the population of PNGOs as 
a whole. As the following table shows, there is a slight 
increase (12.4% to 14.8%) in large PNGO activity in the 
North WB during the second period, when the region 
underwent extreme economic and social destruction in 
Israel’s operation “Defensive Shield”. In the third period, 
the percentage returns to little over twelve, highlighting 
that within the West Bank, the north is the most under 
represented region in comparison to the population 
(24.3%).  
 
The Central WB sees a slight increase between the first 
and second periods, before declining again in the third 
period to around 11% of the total. As the Central WB 
constitutes 17.8% of the total Palestinian population, it 
could be viewed as under represented in terms of 
externally funded PNGO activities. However, we believe 
this to be untrue as a number of the organizations 
working at the All Palestine levels are located in the 
Central WB and carry out activities there, as well as the 
rest of the WB&GS.   
 
The distribution of externally funded PNGO activities in 
the South WB increases steadily over the three periods, 
from 14.8% to 18.9%. This is precisely the distribution 
of the population in the region. 
 
The Gaza Strip is home to 39% of the Palestinian 
population in the WB&GS and 29% of its activities. Like 
the other regions, the Gaza Strip does receive a portion 
of the aid designated as ‘All Palestine’. 
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Figure 45: Palestinian Population Distribution versus the  
Location of PNGOs and their Project Implementation  
by Region and Period (2008) 
 
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
N WB C WB S WB GS All
Population Distribution PNGO Distribution
PNGO Project Implementation
 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
 
 62 
 
 63 
4. Reflections and Policy Recommendations 
 
 
It has been the objective of this study to produce a 
comprehensive review of the external finances absorbed 
by the Palestinian NGO sector. Neither the above 
research nor the following recommendations include any 
discussion of whether these organizations have achieved 
their stated objectives; no evaluation or judgment has 
been made regarding the effectiveness of the aid received 
by the Palestinian Territories. By way of conclusion, we 
will outline the problems associated with the 
unavailability of PNGO financial data and end by 
recommending a potential means of overcoming these.     
 
4.1 The Absence of Data, Policy 
Harmonization and Transparency  
 
In response to the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, the MoP crated the PAMS system for 
tracking external finances. This database, however, is 
still unable to capture a genuinely accurate picture of aid 
flows to both the governmental and non-governmental 
sectors in the WB&GS. Often, smaller organizations 
with budgets of less than a million US dollars are 
overlooked by PAMS. Yet are research demonstrates that 
small budgets can quickly accumulate, and thus grow, 
into significant sums deserved of our attention.   
 
An obvious consequence of the limitations inherent in 
the PAMS system is a lack of coordination between non-
governmental and governmental organizations operating 
within the Palestinian Territories. This lack of 
harmonization between sectors has, on occasion, resulted 
in poor communication between donors, PNGOs and the 
PA or even direct duplication of services or projects; a 
reality that may have challenged the legitimacy of 
collective and long-term development strategies.  
 
It is clear, therefore, that a lack of transparency regarding 
the finances and activities of PNGOs has helped to 
prevent effective policy harmonization. Moreover, an 
unwillingness to disclose this information may well have 
restricted the effectiveness of the non-governmental 
sector in general. Only through an increase in the level of 
transparency can a harmonized and collective 
development strategy be forged. Unless all parties are 
made aware of what development aid is being spend on, 
successful policy coordination will remain allusive; 
harmonization cannot be achieved without reference to 
an accurate picture of the totality of development efforts.   
 
It must be noted, however, that achieving greater 
harmonization is not as simple as it initially sounds. 
Efforts must be made to balance the need of greater 
transparency with the needs of PNGOs to maintain the 
autonomy and flexibility which they require to do the 
work that they do. Both local and international NGOs are 
often unwilling to reveal the sources and destination of 
their finances. It may be the case that many local NGOs 
would be unwilling to participate in any effort to increase 
transparency without first being assured of their 
continued right to operate in a manner they deem 
necessary and serve the constituencies they choose.    
 
4.2 Policy Recommendation: NGO Project 
Database 
 
It is for the above reasons that this study recommends the 
development of a database capable of accurately tracking 
aid flows to PNGOs; a database superior to those that 
already exist. Such a database could be made available to 
governmental and non-governmental organizations both 
within and outside of the WB&GS. Care would have to 
be taken, however, to manage access to this database. It 
would be essential that it did not become viewed as an 
encroachment into the rights of the nongovernmental 
sector by the PA instead of a move towards mutually 
beneficial harmonization.  
 
4.3 Potential Benefits of the Proposal  
 
Our research suggests that a database of this sort would 
have some clear and tangible benefits. Most importantly, 
it would allow policy-makers, project managers and 
researchers to build a broad and accurate picture of the 
financial resources that are entering the Palestinian 
Territories, the origins of these resources, what they are 
being spent on and where they are being spent. Improved 
transparency and increased access to data regarding the 
finances and activities of PNGOs and their international 
counterparts would allow for a harmonization of 
development strategies between governmental, non-
governmental and international organizations. In turn, 
this would allow for greater coordination, a far more 
efficient distribution of resources and increased “value 
for money” for both Palestinian citizens and international 
donors alike. Donor states and organizations, for 
example, would be able to better assess the impact of the 
finances they provide and make superior decisions 
regarding which organizations to financially support. 
 
Likewise, the collated data could be employed be 
researchers and academics to evaluate the role that 
NGOs play in Palestinian development and the value of 
their development strategies to the Palestinian economy 
and the wider society. Any lessons learned from such 
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research could be fed back into the policy making 
machine and, hopefully, allow for more relevant and 
effective policy-making in the future.    
 
Furthermore, such a database could provide an important 
source of institutional memory for the NGO sector. It 
would allow PNGOs to track, more effectively than 
before, their past activities and how their objectives and 
structure has changed over time. Perhaps more 
importantly, this information could then be compared to 
similar organizations and used to learn from the 
successes of other PNGOs. Improved access to data 
could also allow for more effective and relevant project 
planning. Likewise, the collated data and information 
could be used to educate and train incoming staff, not 
only to help create a cohesive organizational structure 
and a common understanding of the organizations role, 
but also, to educate staff in past mistakes and lessons 
learned.     
 
4.4 Evaluation of the Proposal by Key 
Stakeholders  
  
On November 18th, 2009, a focus group was held at the 
MAS Institute to discuss this proposal. Attendees 
included Representatives from the MoP PAMS 
department, the World Bank and the Local Aid 
Coordination Secretariat as well as a small number of 
PNGO donors. We asked them if they thought the 
database was relevant, whether it endangered donors or 
their local partners and whether real implementation was 
feasible.  
 
Those in attendance agreed on the utility of such a 
database. However, it was argued that the peculiarities of 
the occupation would render mandating the use of the 
database nearly impossible. INGOs and donors located in 
Jerusalem are not required to register with the PA MoI 
nor do those headquartered in the rest of the WB&GS. 
As the PA’s authority does not extend to East Jerusalem, 
tracking these institutions would prove difficult. 
Moreover, donors are encouraged to headquarter in 
Jerusalem, as opposed to Ramallah, in order to receive 
work permits from the Israeli Government. 
Consequently, publically disclosing the whereabouts of 
their work may endanger their legal status. Without the 
PA being able to mandate the use of the database to all 
PNGOs and INGOs, the data that it would collate may 
not be relevant to either policy makers or development 
professionals. 
 
During the focus group concerns were also raised over 
whether the PA was ‘trust worthy enough’ to be given 
access to the financial data of the nongovernmental 
sector. The rocky relationship between the PA and 
PNGOs culminating in the 1999 ‘public fight’ between 
the two, was cited as a reason and justification for the 
nongovernmental sector maintaining its independence 
from central authorities. Others argued that, regardless of 
the performance of the PA, it has a right to know, and 
that INGOs and international agencies should not be 
choosing when they should or shouldn’t be acting in 
accordance with Palestinian law or the principles of the 
Paris Declarations. It should be noted that it is not only 
the PA that poses a potential threat to PNGOs. In the 
aftermath of the September 11th attacks in New York, a 
number of NGOs from the region have come under 
intensive scrutiny for their supposed or possible links to 
organizations or individuals designated as terrorists by 
the US Government. Following the closure of a number 
of high profile organizations for precisely this reason, 
PNGOs are much more cautious about revealing the 
sources of their finances.  
 
The proposed project would depend on securing 
adequate funding for it. At present, funding for PAMS is 
insufficient to fulfill its stated mandate. Further 
extending the scope of that mandate or creating an 
entirely new data collection system, as is being suggested 
here, would require a significant increase in funding for 
PAMS. It may well be the case, however, that the 
changes in funding priorities that resulted from the 
PRDP and the Paris Declaration would allow for funds to 
be allocated to such a project.   
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I. Political Timeline 
 
 
1991  
Oct – Madrid Peace Conference 
 
1993  
Sep – Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government, Oslo Accords 
Oct – First Pledging Conference for Middle East Peace in Washington, DC 
Nov – First Meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) in Paris 
Dec – First Meeting of the Consultative Group in Paris 
Dec – First Palestinian Police Donors Conference 
 
1994 
Jan – Establishment of the World Bank administered Holst Fund 
Mar – Second Police Donors Conference and the formation of the COPP 
Apr – Paris protocol on economic relations between Israel and the PLO 
May - The Gaza-Jericho Agreement is signed by Israel and the PLO 
May – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
July/Aug – Establishment of the PA with the Arrival of Yasser Arafat in Gaza 
Sep – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
Oct – Israel and Jordan sign peace treaty 
 
1995 
Jan – First meeting of the LACC and the formation of the Sector Working Groups 
Jan – Informal Meeting of the AHLC 
Apr – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
June – First meeting of the Joint Liaison Committee (JLC) 
Sep – Oslo II Agreement in Taba 
Sep – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
Oct – CG meeting in Paris 
Nov – Assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Rabin 
Nov – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
 
1996 
Jan – International conference on aid to Palestine 
Jan – Legislative and Presidential Elections held in Palestine 
Spring – Intensified attacks between Israelis and Palestinians 
Apr – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
May – Benyamin Netanyahu is elected Israeli Prime Minister 
Sep – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
Nov – CG meeting 
Dec – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
 
1997 
Jan – An agreement on redeployment in Hebron begins 
June – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
Nov – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
Dec – CG meeting in Paris 
 
1998 
May – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
Oct – Wye River Memorandum signed to begin final status negotiations 
Nov – Second Pledging Conference for Middle East Peace in Washington, DC 
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1999 
February – CG meeting held in Frankfurt, Germany 
May – Oslo Accords expire 
May - Ehud Barak is elected Israeli Prime Minister 
Sep – Sharm El Sheikh Agreement to start final status negotiations 
Oct – AHLC meeting in Tokyo 
 
2000 
July – Camp David Peace Summit Fails 
Sep – Outbreak of the Second Intifada 
Dec – President Clinton provides parameters for accelerated negotiations 
 
2001 
Jan – Negotiations in Taba fail 
Feb – Israel elects Ariel Sharon Prime Minister 
Sep – First meeting of the Middle East Quartet (US, EU, Russia & UN) in New York 
 
2002 
Spring – Israel launches ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ 
June – ‘100 Days Reform Plan’ for the PA is announced 
June – US President George W Bush delivers speech on peace in the Middle East 
June – Israel begins construction of the Separation Wall 
July – The ME Quartet launches a Task Force on Palestinian Reform (TFPR) 
 
2003 
Feb – AHLC meeting 
Apr – Mahmoud Abbas is appointed first Palestinian Prime Minister 
May – The ‘Roadmap to Peace’ is launched by the Quartet 
 
2004 
Apr – Sharon’s Disengagement Plan from Gaza Strip is announced 
Nov – The death of Palestinian President Yasser Arafat 
 
2005 
Jan – Mahmoud Abbas is elected Palestinian President 
Feb – Ariel Sharon and Mahmoud Abbas announce a ceasefire in Sharm el-Sheikh 
Mar –Endorsement of Paris Declaration on Aid effectiveness 
Aug – Israel disengages from Gaza 
Dec – AHLC meeting 
 
2006 
Jan – Hamas wins a majority in Palestinian Parliamentary Elections 
Mar – Hamas-Led Government is established 
May – EU Launches TIM mechanism of international aid 
June - Parliament Disbanded  
 
2007 
Feb – Signing of the Palestinian unity agreement/Mecca Agreement 
Mar – The Palestinian unity government formed 
Mar – The ‘Riyadh Declaration’ is adopted following the 19th Arab league summit  
May – The U.S security plan ‘Acceleration benchmarks for agreement on movement and access’ is adopted 
June – Hamas takeover of Gaza 
June –Unity Government disbanded 
June –First Emergency Government Formed 
Sep – AHLC meeting 
Oct – AHLC meeting  
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Nov – Annapolis peace conference 
Dec – Paris Donor's Conference- PRDP financing 
 
2008 
Jan – AHLC meeting 
Feb – AHLC meeting 
Feb – EU replaces the TIM with the PEGASE 
Mar – AHLC meeting 
Apr – Informal meeting of the AHLC 
Sep – AHLC meeting 
Dec- Israeli war on Gaza  
 
2009 
Mar – The 12th Palestinian government is disbanded by Salaam Fayyad 
Mar – Sharm el Sheik conference on Gaza Reconstruction 
May – AHLC meeting 
June – The 13th Palestinian government is formed by Salaam Fayyad 
June – AHLC meeting 
Sep – AHLC meeting 
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II. Glossary of Terms 
 
 
What is a PNGO
1
? 
 
MAS standards for categorizing organizations as PNGOs were developed in previous mappings (2001; 2007). They 
include2: 
 
1. To be of official legalized presence: meaning an institutionalized presence for the organization. The organization 
must have a headquarters, an administrative and financial system, a membership system, clear objectives, and a 
long-term operation program that distinguishes it from a temporary gathering of people. 
2. To be independent: meaning to be institutionally separate from the government, be of dignified character and self-
governed, as opposed to controlled  by an external power. 
3. To be a non-profit organization:  it should not have the objective of seeking profit for its members.  If some of its 
programs seek profit, the purpose should be to serve the non-profit objectives of the organization. 
4. To contain a reasonable degree of voluntary participation: this should be either in its administration or in its 
activities and can include the activities of steering committee or Board of Trustees. 
5. To be un-inheritable: this means that membership should not be based on blood relations and positions of power 
are not inherited. 
 
Where are PNGOs and Externally Financed Programs in the WB&GS? 
 
A key component of both surveys is to track external aid and PNGO activity by governorate and region. To do so, the 
study adopted the geographic divisions used by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). The Palestinian 
territories are divided into two broad areas: the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.   
 
The West Bank (WB) is divided into three regions with eleven governorates: 
Northern WB (NWB): Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqylia, Jenin, Tubas, and Salfit. 
Central WB (CWB): Ramallah and El-Bireh, Jerusalem and Jericho. 
Southern WB (SWB): Bethlehem and Hebron. 
 
The Gaza Strip (GS) is its own region and is divided into five governorates: Northern Gaza, Gaza City, Deir Albalah, 
Khan Younis, and Rafah. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1  For reasons of simplicity, as well as the scope of the study, the authors have refrained from using the term Civil Society in relation to NGOs. 
Firstly, NGOs only constitute a portion of the larger civil society. Secondly, there is an ongoing debate as to the ‘civility’ of these organizations 
after having undergone the decades of growth from the grassroots to professionalization. 
2  MAS previously included another criterion for PNGOs: that they not be aligned to a political faction in Palestine. Our research team has found 
this to be more ideal than realistic in the context of Palestine where a large number of PNGOs, especially the bigger ones, are closely affiliated 
to a political party or individual.  
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Figure 1: Geography of West Bank  
and Gaza Strip 
 
 
 
 
What Population Areas do PNGOs Serve? 
A second component of our work looked at the target population being affected by external aid through the PNGO 
sector. To do so, the study adopts the PCBS categorization of Palestinians into three distinct populations or types of 
residence:  
 
Urban is defined as: (1) a population area where the number of residents equals 10,000 or more; (2) a population area 
where the number of residents is between 5,000 and 9,999 and four out of the five conditions are met: there is a water 
network, a health clinic, an electricity network, and a high school. The center of a governorate is also considered to be 
an urban area regardless of its size.   
 
Refugee Camps are those areas under the administration of UNRWA, resulting from the 1948 or 1967 wars. The PCBS 
defines the areas which are neither urban nor camp as Rural. The Bureau used to use the terms city, village, and camp, 
defining “city” as a population area with a municipality which pre-dates 1967. 
 
The Sector of Work 
 
An important part of our survey tries to understand the sector of external aid to PNGOs. Though there are a number of 
different sector frameworks, the most widely used being the OECD-DAC definitions adopted by the MoP, our research 
uses the categorization developed by MAS in 2001. We feel these definitions are more suited to the unique environment 
of Palestine and the work of PNGOs here. Furthermore, this allowed us to utilize the key findings of previous MAS 
studies in the NGO sector from 2001 and 2007. 
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Table 1: MAS 2001 and 2007 Sector Definitions 
 
Sector Definition 
Rural Development Programs targeting rural areas of Palestine, primarily focused on agriculture. These do not include 
water project, though many are specifically aimed at agriculture. 
 
Charity & Relief 
Activities aimed at providing general assistance to marginalized sectors of society or immediate 
assistance to following an acute crisis. In previous MAS mappings these were separated into two 
distinct categories. For this study they have been linked due to the complexity of separating them 
within a context of perennial conflict. 
Children’s Activities This sector describes activities aimed at young people under the age of 18. They typically include 
summer camps, exchanges and cultural activities specifically aimed at children. There are 
additional advocacy projects included when their primary target is children. 
Disabled Care Those activities aimed at supporting sectors of society living with physical or psychological 
disabilities. This includes the specific healthcare and educational programs targeting the disabled. 
Elderly Care Projects and programs aimed at supporting the elderly in Palestine, including specific healthcare 
and educational programs. 
 
Enhancing Democracy 
Projects or programs aimed at bringing about an improvement in civic activism through democratic 
structures and practices at both the social and organizational levels. This also includes projects 
aimed at enhancing the capacity of free media, as well as the vague contributions to ‘civil society’ 
development. 
 
Good Governance 
Projects aimed at improving the transparency, accountability and decision-making structure of an 
organization, sector or the Palestinian Authority. This sector also includes contributions to the 
strengthening of the judicial sector and the encouragement of civil rights. 
Family Planning Reproductive health services ranging from health care, lobbying, education and advocacy. 
 
Health Services 
Programs that aim to provide general health care through NGOs as opposed to either the public or 
private sectors. This includes the broad range of care to all populations except: disabled, elderly, 
and specific reproductive healthcare programs. 
Human Rights Projects that either monitor the situation of Human Rights, or work to raise awareness of HR issues 
both locally and internationally. 
Professional Training Capacity-building programs aimed at increasing the target population’s technical skills in the 
public, private and civil society spheres.  
Religious Activities Activities that bring together participants under the broader framework of shared spiritual beliefs 
and range from one time events to ongoing programs. 
Research Projects whose primary activity involves data gathering and analysis 
Liberal Arts Education Educational projects focused on culture and humanities. This sector also includes ‘peace-building’ 
activities and those aimed at dialogue between Israelis and Palestinians.  
Scientific Education Educational projects focused on the sciences and technology, as opposed to culture and humanities. 
This sector also includes contributions to PNGO educational infrastructure.  
 
Water and 
Environment 
Projects aimed at protecting and conserving Palestinian resources, either in terms of water or the 
environment as a whole. It should be noted that the number of projects targeting the water sector far 
outweigh the number targeting the environment. In the future this should be separated into two 
categories. 
 
Women’s Affairs 
Projects and programs targeting women that aimed to increase their economic and social mobility. 
This sector also includes advocacy, education and legal programs specifically targeting women. 
Youth and Sports These programs target youth, male and female, between the ages of 18 and 34. The activities 
primarily revolve around sports and recreation 
 
Other 
Any project or program that does not fit into the above categories. It should be noted that major 
donors, whose programs fit into a number of categories, often chose other as an alternative to 
breaking the numbers down. 
 
 
Conduits of Aid to PNGOs 
Bi-lateral Aid is provided directly by a donor country or organization to an aid recipient (OECD DAC, 2003:321-324, 
cited in Challand, 2009:74). An example of bi-lateral aid to PNGO would be the Danish Government partnering with 
the Palestinian Hydrology Group (PHG) in order to improve water infrastructure in the Jordan Valley.  
 
In Multilateral Aid donors pool funding that is then 'channeled via an international organization' (ibid). The best 
example of mulit-lateral assistance entering into the WB&GS is that of the European Commission. By pooling large 
amounts of money, EU countries are able to collectively invest in larger programs, rather than individual projects. 
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International Non-Governmental Organizations are an important conduit of international aid into the WB&GS – 
they are also the least understood. These organizations receive both bi-lateral and multi-lateral funds, as well as 
donations from various constituencies that are used for their own project implementation or partnership with 
implementing PNGOs.  
 
Types of NGOs 
New Organizations (Vocational Centers) were formed at the end of the seventies and beginning of the eighties and 
adopted new methods of administration to tackle issues previously left unattended by the main Palestinian players. Such 
organizations depend on a specialized professional staff for both their structure and function and include full-time, part-
time, and voluntary workers.  Usually, their authoritative bodies are composed of a small number of interested people 
who agree on the objectives of the organization and its message. 
 
Traditional Organizations use less rigidly structured administrative methods in their work.  Their interests usually 
include charity work and activities related to local society, such as youth clubs and charitable institutions. 
 
Development Organizations aim to generate a long-lasting impact on Palestinian society through sustainable projects 
and programs, not by addressing the immediate needs of the population.  
 
Relief Organizations are those whose programs aim at providing for immediate social needs, such as food, shelter, 
housing, health and other services. These organization typically act in reaction to a event or crisis in the short term and 
forego longer term development activities.  
 
Aid Types 
International flowing into the WB&GS is generally broken down into three types: PA Budget Support, Emergency Aid 
and Development Assistance.  
 
Budget Support includes all contributions to PNA institutions, and since 2006, to the Temporary International 
Mechanism (TIM) and the ESSP, as well as any aid going directly to the Ministry of Finance to cover the government's 
recurrent costs. It also includes payments of the PNA recurrent costs, such as fuel. Significantly, this does not include 
support for specific ministries running specific programs—these are largely classified under development assistance (ie. 
The Ministry of Health) (MoP, 2008:10). 
 
Emergency Aid: Includes all funding to UNRWA and other humanitarian organizations, all funding which is directly 
responding to the conflict such as rebuilding destroyed infrastructure or mitigating the effects of the Wall or closures, 
any short-term employment generation/ job creation activities, all food aid, all work directed at refugee camps, all work 
addressing crossing points, psychosocial/trauma programs, Quartet activities, support to Palestinians in Israeli detention, 
Avian flu-related activities, any funds channeled through the Consolidated Appeals Process, and conflict/humanitarian 
monitoring activities (ibid).  
 
Development Aid: Includes everything which does not fall in the first two categories, including "peacebuilding" 
activities. The broad definition of development, and its overlap into by other sectors, is reflective of the wide variety of 
organizations that fall under this banner. This is the primary type of aid flowing to the PNGO sector and the least 
understood by planners.  
 
Local Partners  
Though our study does not distinguish between NGOs and CBOs, there is a noticeable and growing difference between 
the two.  
 
NGOs (PNGOs) are the larger, well-established organizations that have grown more and more dependant and adept to 
the international aid system. These organizations have administrative capacity, infrastructure and organized governance. 
While nearly all of them are engaged in direct project implementation, large PNGOs, much like the INGOs, now often 
partner with smaller organizations known as CBOs. 
 
CBOs are often better described as ‘ad-hoc’ organizations that form around a single project or idea before melting back 
into society. They usually lack the same structures, hierarchies and expertise as larger NGOs, and as such, are unable to 
access international funding in the same way.   
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III. Perceptions of International Aid 
 
 
The following section is a review of a pair of surveys carried out by the Bir Zeit University’s Center for Development 
Studies in 2004 and 20093. The data for 2009 are indicated in parenthesis when available. 
 
 Do you believe that donor countries and agencies determine priorities according to the needs of Palestinian 
Society or according to their political agendas?  
 
Source: BZU-DSP (2004) and BZU-CDS (2009).  
 
The responses to this question show that Palestinians do not perceive external donors as basing their decisions on the 
needs of Palestinians, but rater their own agenda. In 2009 there is a slight change in the perception of who determines 
priorities. In the WB&GS 15% of respondents believe that Palestinian needs determine the agenda, 57% believe that 
donors follow their own political agendas and 28% believe that they follow a mixture of both. 
 
 Do you believe that international aid reduces the human suffering of the Palestinian people in the WB&GS?  
 
 WB&GS (%) West Bank (%) Gaza (%) 
Yes 49 (52) 44 (46) 55 (63) 
To Some Extent 33 (37) 34 30 
No 16 (9) 18 14 
No Opinion 2 (2) 4 1 
Source: BZU-DSP (2004) and BZU-CDS (2009).  
 
Though the previous table highlighted Palestinian perceptions that aid is not geared toward meeting the needs 
of Palestinian society, there is a widespread belief, especially in the Gaza Strip, that external aid helps to 
decrease the human suffering caused by the occupation. In 2009 there was an increase in the numbers of 
respondents who felt that international aid reduces the human suffering in the WB&GS (89% in 2009 
compared to 82% in 2004). The most marked increase came in the Gaza Strip, most likely due to the ongoing 
siege.  
 
 In general, do you believe that international aid contributes to the development of Palestinian Society?  
 
 WB&GS (%) West Bank (%) Gaza (%) 
Yes 40 (40) 35.8 (36) 43.6 (47) 
To Some Extent 38 39.7 35.9 
No 21  22.1 19.1 
No Opinion 2 2.4 1.4 
Source: BZU-DSP (2004) and BZU-CDS (2009).  
 
Between 2004 and 2009 the perception of international aid’s contribution to the development of Palestinian society has 
not changed significantly. According to the surveys, over three quarters of Palestinians believe that external aid 
contributes to Palestine’s development at least to some extent. This is nearly as high as the number who feels that it 
reduces human suffering. When compared to the first question concerning donor priorities, it is clear that Palestinians do 
not consider relief or development in their calculations determining Palestinian interests. Instead they prioritize the 
political, as highlighted by the following question.  
 
                                                 
3  1,197 and 6,400 Palestinians in the WB&GS were surveyed in 2004 and 2009 respectively. BZU-CDS was gracious enough to allow us to use 
some of their most recent survey data, even though it has yet to be published. 
 WB&GS (%) West Bank (%) Gaza (%) 
According to the needs of Palestinian society 14 (15) 12 16 
According to their own political agendas 62 (57) 65 57 
Both 24 (28) 23 27 
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 Does international aid help to support the achievement of Palestinian national goals or does it reinforce the 
Israeli occupation? 4  
 
 WB&GS (%) West Bank (%) Gaza (%) 
Supports Palestinian national goals 32 29 38 
Reinforces Israeli occupation 55 (23) 57 51 
No Opinion 13 14 11 
Source: BZU-DSP (2004) and BZU-CDS (2009) 
 
As the table above shows, the majority of Palestinians in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip believe that international 
aid reinforces the Israeli occupation. This makes sense when one considers the previous tables in which the majority of 
Palestinians believe that international aid has eased the human suffering of Palestinians. It appears that the public 
associates the easing of suffering as a means of making the occupation more ‘bearable’ for Palestinians and ‘cheaper’ for 
Israelis. However, although the majority of people believe that aid is politicized, but a dramatic shift occurred in this 
regards. According to BZU-DSP (2004), in 2004, 55% of Palestinians believed that aid reinforces the Israeli occupation, 
while only 23% in 2009 believe so. This shift is also reflected in aid/right of refugees to return indicator. 
 
 How do you evaluate the role of the following parties in making ‘important decisions’ for Palestinian 
society?  
 
 WB&GS (%) WB (%) GS (%) 
USA 70 69 71 
Israel 63 63 64 
PA 43 39 48 
Donors 42 38 48 
Egypt 32 29 38 
Jordan 18 20 15 
Source: BZU Development Studies Program (DSP), Survey 
No. 1 2004. The percentage above reflects those 
responding ‘significant’. 
 
 
According to the 2004 survey, the Palestinian Authority is seen as slightly more influential than international donors in 
the WB&GS. Most surprising is the perception that the US, rather than Israel, yields more influence over developments 
in Palestine. 
 
Additional Findings in 2009 
 
 43% of Palestinians believe that international aid has facilitated movement within the occupation (50% in the GS 
and 38% in the WB). The differences between regions are due to the different circumstances of occupation they 
find themselves in. Where as international pressure was nearly the only factor forcing aid into the besieged Gaza 
Strip, international aid in the West Bank has done nothing to halt the increasing number of checkpoints, movement 
restrictions or the Wall. 
 70% of Palestinians believe that international aid is associated with the peace process endeavor. 
 47% of Palestinians believe that international aid targeting youth aims to empower them within the society. 46%, 
on the other hand, believe that international aid to youth aims to marginalize or distract them from the national 
movement. 
 47% of Palestinians believe that international aid and development plans do give space for the participation of the 
Palestinian people. 
 In 2004, 45% of Palestinians believed that aid contributed to protecting Palestinian refugee rights, while another 
45% believe it contributed to their annihilation. In 2009, the percentages were 56% and 36% respectively.  
 76% of Palestinians believe that international aid is creating an elite class within society who are guided by 
international agendas, while only 16% say that it is not5. 
                                                 
4 For more analysis on this subject, see: Jurado 2009; Lagerquist 2003; Le More 2005; Nasser 2006; and Sayigh 2007. 
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 When asked whether international aid contributes to social justice, only 32% responded positively, while the 
remainder chose no. 
 
MAS 2009 Donor Straw Poll 
 
In order to supplement our quantitative survey, MAS approached donors with a follow-up straw poll. These brief 
surveys were given anonymously to international aid agency employees who were asked to respond according to their 
opinions, as opposed to the position of their organization. It should be noted that this survey was not of adequate size, 
30 people, to be taken as more than indicative. It should also be noted that we expect many of the responses to have 
been affected by the recent war on the Gaza Strip, especially the question asking about the need for aid based on 
geography. 
 
The table below shows aid workers’ perceptions of the sectors most in need of international funding in the final opinion 
column. The columns 2006 – 2008 represent the actual disbursements of international aid by sector as captured in our 
survey. 
 
Table 2:  International Donor Worker Perceptions  
versus Organizational Trends by Sector 
 
Sector 2006 2007 2008 Opinion 
Children’s Activities 2.31% 2.74% 3.73% 1.4% 
Charity & Relief 5.21% 4.04% 8.88% 2.9% 
Elderly Care   0.22% 1% 
Family Planning 0.53% 0.08% 1.70% 1.9% 
Liberal Arts Education 5.40% 6.22% 8.25% 1.9% 
Rural Development 10.93% 15.88% 10.17% 14.8% 
Water and Environment 5.47% 2.38% 3.51% 15.2% 
Health Services 18.74% 15.45% 14.72% 5.7% 
Research 2.05% 1.26% 3.00% 1% 
Disabled Care 5.05% 4.68% 3.83% 1% 
Vocational Training 2.85% 2.04% 3.06% 4.8% 
Religious Activities  0.03%   
Scientific Education 1.87% 4.28% 2.61% 4.8% 
Women’s Affairs 7.29% 8.97% 7.99% 10% 
Human Rights 10.21% 10.83% 10.60% 15.7% 
Enhancing Democracy 6.65% 4.81% 3.58% 3.8% 
Good Governance 8.73% 9.32% 7.84% 14.1% 
Youth and Sports 2.66% 1.64% 1.54% 1.9% 
Other 4.04% 5.35% 4.78%  
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Note: Of the 30 international aid workers given the survey, 29 returned 
completed questionnaires.  
Empty Cells are equal to 0% and numbers for the opinions are rounded to the 
nearest tenth of a percent.  
 
 
The most dramatic differences between international agency worker perceptions and the reality on the ground are in the 
sectors of Charity and Relief, Water, Health, Liberal Arts Education, Human Rights and Good Governance. If worker 
perceptions were to become reality in 2009, Charity and relief would decrease by nearly 2/3, as would funds to the 
Health Sector. Water would nearly quintuple its funding while Human rights would increase by a third. Other sectors 
that international workers would emphasize more than their organizations were: Youth, Governance, Democracy, 
Women, Scientific Education, Rural Development, Vocational Training and Elderly Care. Other sectors that these 
workers would de-emphasize were: Children’s Activities, Liberal Arts, Research and Disabled Care. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
5  For more analysis on this subject, see: Brynen 1995; Hanafi and Tabar 2004, 2005; Said 2005; and Taylor 1997. 
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Table 3: International Donor Worker Perceptions versus  
Organizational Trends by Target Population 
 
Target Population/Year 2006 2007 2008 Opinion 
Urban  33.8% 37.4% 38.0% 17.8% 
Rural  41.1% 42.2% 41.0% 43.3% 
Refugee 25.1% 20.4% 21.0% 38.9% 
Note: Of the 30 international aid workers given the survey, 28 returned 
completed questionnaires.  
 
International worker perceptions are closely aligned to the overall funding trends when it comes to targeting urban 
populations. However, opinions and reality are almost the opposite when it comes to funding Refugee versus Urban 
populations, with workers noticeably favoring the former over the latter. 
 
Table 4: International Donor Worker Perceptions  
versus Organizational Trends by Governorate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Of the 30 international aid workers given the survey, 24 returned 
completed questionnaires.  
Empty Cells are equal to 0% and numbers for the opinions are rounded 
to the nearest tenth of a percent.  
 
 
The numbers on governorates collected in our quantitative survey were not sufficient to measure against our qualitative 
survey. However, trends can be identified. The perception of Ramallah in terms of its need for international aid is much 
lower than reality. On the other hand, Hebron, Jerusalem and almost the whole of the Gaza Strip are perceived as 
needing much more assistance than they are currently allocated.  
 
 
Governorate  2006 2007 2008 Opinions 
Nablus 3.4% 2.4% 1.2% 4.1% 
Tulkarm 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 2.1% 
Qalqilya 2.8% 2.3% 3.0% 7.7% 
Jenin 0.6% 0.9% 0.8% 4.6% 
Tubas  0.1% 0.3% 4.6% 
Salfit 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 4.1% 
N WB 17.7% 17.4% 17.2% -- 
Ramallah-Bireh 6.9% 6.7% 5.3% 0.5% 
Jerusalem 1.9% 2.9% 2.9% 11.8% 
Jericho  1.3% 0.6% 3.0% 
C WB 20.8% 19.0% 21.4% -- 
Bethlehem 0.7% 1.8% 1.8% 0.5% 
Hebron 3.1% 2.4% 1.5% 15.4% 
S WB 15.8% 17.0% 17.4% -- 
Northern GS 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 2.6% 
Gaza City 1.7% 5.1% 0.8% 11.3% 
Dier Al Balah  0.2% 0.1% 3.6% 
Khan Younis 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 8.7% 
Rafah 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 15.4% 
Gaza Strip 21.5% 17.2% 22.7% -- 
Total  100% 100% 100% 100% 
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Table 5: International Donor Worker Perceptions  
versus Organizational Trends by Governorate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Of the 30 international aid workers given the survey, 24 
returned completed questionnaires.  
 
International workers tend to favor funding to Gaza at much higher rates than the real disbursements to PNGOs in the 
Strip (35% versus 24%). This higher percentage all comes from the Central West Bank, where workers perceive the 
least amount of need for international aid. Respondents were very close to reality in their perceptions of the needs in the 
Northern and Southern West Bank.  
 
Additional Findings  
 
No Yes Question 
86.7% 13.3% Does your organization prioritize the PRDP? 
40.0% 60.0% Do you believe international aid has helped the Palestinian people? 
73.3% 26.7% Do you believe international aid has helped the Palestinian cause? 
Note: Of the 30 international aid workers given the survey, 20 returned completed questionnaires.  
 
 
As the results show, most international workers did not feel that their organizations incorporated the PRDP into their 
development strategies. Also much like the local Palestinian perceptions of international aid, most also believes that aid 
helps the people of Palestine, while not necessarily helping them to reach their goals.  
 
Region  2006 2007 2008 Opinions 
N WB 26.65% 25.73% 24.79% 24.1% 
C WB 29.72% 29.90% 30.26% 19.2% 
S WB 19.62% 21.09% 20.72% 21.7% 
GS 24.01% 23.28% 24.23% 35.0% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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IV. Review of Welfare Study (1998) 
 
IV.1 Profile of Donors to Palestinian NGOs (1995-1998) 
 
In 1998 the Welfare Association commissioned a study by Dr. Sari Hanafi, Profile of Donors to Palestinian NGOs, 
which would later become the quantitative foundation behind the book The Emergence of a Globalized Palestinian Elite 
(2005). The 16 week study surveyed 100 (of the estimated 230) foreign donor organizations, and approximately 50% of 
those surveyed returned completed questionnaires (50). Dr Hanafi divided donor organizations into four broad 
categories: governmental (GOV), inter-governmental (IGO), non-governmental (NGO) and international non-
governmental (INGO). 
 
IV.2 Research Limitations 
 
Dr Hanafi admits that, without first mapping Palestinian NGOs (Welfare, 1998:9), a true picture of aid may be difficult 
to paint. The survey was unable to properly access the geographic distribution of donor funding to Palestinian NGOs 
and did not clearly define the location of an organization versus the location of its projects, activities and beneficiaries. 
 
The total amount calculated from the data for disbursements for Palestinian NGOs projects from 1995 to 1998, USD 
232 million, must be viewed as low, since disbursements by some larger donors such as Welfare Association, World 
Bank PNGO Project and UNICEF are not included. 
 
IV.3 Results Breakdown by Sector 
 
1. Education and Health remain the most important sectors of interest for NGOs, although responsibility for them was 
transferred to the PA four years ago. 
2. Although the main Palestinian economic sector is Agriculture, it remains neglected or ignored by donors, with only 
7.7% of total PNGO funding being directed to it over a four year period. Of this small amount, the Palestinian 
Agricultural Relief Center (PARC) commands over 2/3. 
3. Traditional sectors, such as Culture and Social Services have a small share with 17 million each (approximately 7% 
separately for a cumulative amount of 14% of the total). 
4. Micro-credit and the Private Sector Support lag far behind other sectors, indicating the lack of NGO activity in the 
economic sphere. Income generation and micro credit only received 3.7% of total funding, with most of it directed 
towards projects for women. 
5. There is a dramatic shift from Emergency Relief to Development Assistance since the end of 1997. Relief activities 
only take up 0.9% of total NGO funds. This is also due to the fact that local NGOs do not often operate in this 
sector, and the brunt of emergency aid is channeled through major IGOs, such as UNRWA. 
6. There is a new interest among PNGOs in the Environment, but this interest has not resulted in an increase in donor 
funding to the sector. 
7. Infrastructure was primarily seen as function of the individual municipalities or the PNA and only comprised 2.9% 
of total funding to the NGO sector. 
8. Human Rights and Democracy have continually increased over the period studied and now sit at 10.5% of total 
funding to PNGOs. 
9. The funding of Institution-Building was 8 million, approximately 3.5%, but it is difficult to differentiate between 
the resources that are directed towards either equipment or training. 
10. Development also includes any unspecified project or projects that are multi-sectoral. 
11. Dr. Hanafi’s study included as subsectors projects targeting Women (6% of total funding) and the Needs of the 
Handi-capped (10% of total funding). 
 
IV.4 Geographic Trends Identified 
 
1. Despite the general view that Jerusalem is ignored by donors, the city enjoys the largest share of WB funding 
(26%). The second is Ramallah with 7.7%, then Bethlehem with 6.9%, Nablus with 5.6% and Hebron with 5.3%. 
2. Bethlehem benefits disproportionately compared to their population, especially when compared to Nablus or 
Hebron. 
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3. Qalquliya and Tulkarm represent ‘marginalized districts’ where the amount of resources does not even compare to 
cities of similar size in the West Bank. 
4. Inside of the GS, Gaza City receives 40% of the funding. 
 
Table 6: Distribution of International Funding 
by Governorate (1995 – 1998-Welfare) 
 
West Bank 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total ($) 
Total: 
1000’s USD 
17,713.3 25,291.4 39,747.6 24,878.9 107,631.2 
% per Governorate Total (%) 
Nablus 4.4 6.9 4.8 4.0 5.0 
Tulkarm 1.7 1.7 1.1 2.0 1.6 
Qalqilya  .3 .2 .2 .2 
Jenin 1.2 5.2 5.4 3.1 3.7` 
Tubas .6 .4 .8 .4 .5 
Salfit .6 .5 .3 .4 .4 
Ramallah-Bireh 7.0 2.9 9.1 9.5 7.1 
Jerusalem 31.1 23.1 25.4 24.3 26.0 
Jericho .4 .3 1.3 .6 .6 
Bethlehem 4.5 4.3 5.7 10.3 6.2 
Hebron 8.0 5.7 4.1 1.8 4.9 
All  West Bank 40.5 48.8 41.9 43.4 43.6 
Gaza Strip 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total ($) 
Total: 
1000’s USD 
5434.1 4321.6 8909.9 8361.4 27,027.0 
% per Governorate Total (%) 
Northern GS 8.3 10.4 5.2 9.0 8.2 
Gaza City 24.8 25.7 34.8 50.4 33.9 
Dier Al Balah   .2 .1 .1 
Khan Younis 1.8 4.7 2.9 1.5 2.8 
Rafah   1.5 1.8 .8 
All Gaza Strip 65.1 59.2 55.3 37.2 54.2 
Source: Welfare 1998. (Taken From: Hanafi, Tabar, 2005:81-82) 
Note: The categories ‘All West Bank’ and ‘All Gaza Strip’ capture the respondents 
whose activities cannot be localized to a governorate, or who lacked the data 
necessary to place past projects. The scale of the ambiguity in both the West 
Bank and Gaza (43.6% and 54.2% respectively) as to the specific direction 
of aid was an important motivation for our study. 
 
 
IV.5 Funding Fashions versus Development Priorities 
 
Dr Hanafi’s 1998 study, and the publication of 2005, emphasizes the role of donor funding in determining the priorities 
at the local level. According to his findings: 
 
a. Donors tend to have a broad framework allowing for maximum flexibility. This flexibility often translates into 
donors working in a number of sectors, rather than focusing on merely one or two. This increases their visibility on 
the ground, perhaps at the expense of their effectiveness, and allows them to follow the funding fashion trends set 
forth by national governments and intergovernmental agencies in the same manner that PNGOs do. 
b. Administrative Staff at INGOs are charged with choosing local partners and thus play a major role the decision-
making and direction of development in Palestine. This is in light of the fact that these agencies are primarily 
channels between the donor governments and the local implementing organizations. 
 89 
c. The donor agenda does not necessarily reflect rational choice in terms of INGOs identifying and meeting their own 
national or Palestinian objectives. Rather than being driven by a specific agenda, Dr Hanafi found that, for the most 
part, INGOs efforts are reactive. 
d. Short term funding that emphasizes certain local and international trends pushes Palestinian NGOs to pursue finite 
projects6 rather than an overall goal of development through long term projects focused on a single sector or 
objective. 
 
 
                                                 
6  ‘Finite’ in this context refers to projects with a clear beginning and end. The criticism of such an approach is that development goals will be 
replaced by the goals of the project itself. Furthermore, these projects are often unrelated to each other, and therefore not aimed at achieving an 
overall goal, rather the objectives of the project itself. 
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V. The Evolution of the Palestinian Assistance Monitoring System (PAMS) 
 
 
In 2003 the MoP’s General Directorate for Aid Management and Coordination began an effort to track donor funding 
into the West Bank and Gaza Strip in a Mechanism known as PAMS, the Palestinian Aid Monitoring System. 
 
Through an interactive computer-based archive, donors were asked to submit the data from their projects, or enter it in 
directly, starting from the year 20027. Donors were asked for a basic amount of information primarily focused on type 
and conduit of aid. 
 
Type of Aid 
 Budget Support 
 Emergency and Relief Assistance 
 Development (technical assistance and institution-building) 
Conduits of Aid 
 PNA 
 UNRWA 
 NGOs 
 
The process of asserting more and more control over both the data and coordination of international assistance to the 
WB&GS by the Palestinian Authority continued into 20058. The PAMS data tracking system was updated, improved 
and placed under the control of a new MoP Directorate for Aid Management and Coordination (AMC), charged with 
monitoring project information’ (MOP 2005:2). 
 
According to the MoP, the information gathered in 2004 was significantly greater than in 2003, and included sector, 
budgets, contractual data and geographic location of the projects implementation. This was far above and beyond the 
previous year’s collection of data on only type and conduit. 
 
Despite the improvements, there was still a heavy reliance on data from the World Bank and, as in 2004’s report on aid 
in 2003, the MoP found it particularly difficult to access data from the NGO sector (2005:1) 
 
In May of 2008, the Ministry of Planning issued a report covering the 3 previous years of international aid flows to the 
occupied Palestinian Territories. The fact that the report was released three years after the previous one reflects the 
turbulence within the Palestinian Authority, and its return to a type of policy making normalcy under the Emergency 
Caretaker Government. By this time the PAMS system was beginning to generate much higher quality data in an easy to 
use system. 
 
 
V.1 Challenges of PAMS 
 
In the beginning of the PAMS effort, the MoP comments that donors were either unwilling or unprepared to give them 
the information needed to build a proper data base, forcing the first report from the AMC, Donor’s Assistance to the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories for the Year 2003, to rely heavily upon World Bank data, and the previously 
discredited data from MOPIC. The MoP’s attempt to gain access to the finances and activities of donors, under the 
auspices of the 2003 report by OECD, Harmonization of Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery9, was as an 
unwelcome encroachment, especially concerning international aid to NGO sector. 
 
                                                 
7  All projects which began prior to 2002 and were still ongoing do not have financial data broken down by years, rather it is all offered as the 
aggregate (prior to 2002). 
8 Prior to the creation of the PNA, international assistance was channeled essentially through UNRWA and NGOs. The last ten years have seen 
the PNA emerge as the leading service provider in the WB&GS. Moreover, the first phase of reconstruction, as well as the recent Intifada, 
resulted in a greater need for budget support, which at times absorbed almost half of the total annual aid disbursed in the WB&GS. By 2003, 
international assistance was channeled primarily through the PNA, 25% through UNRWA and 10% through NGOs’ (MoP, 2005:5). 
9  According to the report, ‘Donors should provide partner governments with full information of aid flows. This should be done regularly and in a 
timely manner’ (OECD, 2003). For its part, the intentions of the MoP were clear. A new movement toward Palestinian ‘ownership’ over the aid 
process was beginning, one which has so far culminated in the 2007 Palestinian Reform and Development Plan. Regarding the OECD’s 
position, “the MOP strongly supports this recommendation and will take all measures necessary to implement it” (MOP, 2004:11). 
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Even when donors were cooperative, they often maintained their own data sets and the need for standardization was 
immediately recognized. 
 
Finally, the PAMS staff and planning committees ran into further difficulties due to the donors scheduling and 
announcement of their commitments, as ‘most donors make their actual commitments (for the following year) available 
in June or Early July of that year’ (MoP, 2004:30). 
 
V.2 Moving Forward 
 
Despite the Inadequacies of the PAMS system, it has certainly been evolving in the right direction, each year becoming 
a better and more useful resource for information on aid. Despite the continued improvement, it now looks like the 
system is beginning to slow its progress considerably in 2009 under the auspices of the 13th Palestinian government. 
While this is written there is only one full-time employee at PAMS, down from the high of four in 2008, who is not 
only tasked with tracking and updating data, but also supporting the ministries or the broader public through reports. 
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VI. Questionnaires  
 
Donor Questionnaire 
 
Organization Name   
Year began working in oPT  
Organization Type Character 
1. Private (PRI) 
2. Religious (REL) 
3. Palestinian NGO (PNGO) 
4. International NGO (INGO) 
5. Intergovernmental 
Organization (IGO) 
6. Governmental Agency (GOV) 
 
**please circle one 
Does your organization implement projects directly? 
 
      Yes            No 
 
If so, what percentage of your resources go toward  
project implementation?  ____% (Estimated) 
and what percentage goes toward funding PNGOs 
 
____%   (Estimated) 
 
 
Sectoral Distribution of Funding 
 
 Sector 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Q Total Budget  for PNGOs10           
Q1 Children’s Activities           
Q2 Charity & Relief           
Q3 Elderly Care           
Q4 Family Planning           
Q5 Liberal Arts Education           
Q6 Rural Development           
Q7 Water and Environment           
Q8 Health Services           
Q9 Research           
Q10 Disabled Care           
Q11 Vocational Training           
Q12 Religious Activities           
Q13 Scientific Education           
Q14 Women’s Affairs           
Q15 Human Rights           
Q16 Enhancing Democracy           
Q17 Good Governance           
Q18 Youth and Sports           
Q19 Other           
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Target Population 
 
Target 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Urban           
Rural           
Refugee           
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
                                                 
10  Please give the budget in 1000's of USD. (ie. 2006 budget for PNGOs = 2,600,000 = 2,600 in table) 
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Governorate or 
Region 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
2008 
Nablus           
Tulkarm           
Qalqilya           
Jenin           
Tubas           
Salfit           
 Northern WB           
Ramallah-Bireh           
Jerusalem           
Jericho           
Central WB           
Bethlehem           
Hebron           
Southern WB           
Northern GS           
Gaza City           
Dier Al Balah           
Khan Younis           
Rafah           
Gaza Strip           
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
 
Governorate or 
Region 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nablus           
Tulkarm           
Qalqilya           
Jenin           
Tubas           
Salfit           
 Northern WB           
Ramallah-Bireh           
Jerusalem           
Jericho           
Central WB           
Bethlehem           
Hebron           
Southern WB           
Northern GS           
Gaza City           
Dier Al Balah           
Khan Younis           
Rafah           
Gaza Strip           
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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PNGOs Questionnaire 
 
 
All information in this questionnaire is confidential and it is only for research and statistical purposes. 
  
Background Information: 
 Organization ID ID01Questionnaire Serial Number ID00 
 Locality……………. ID03 Governorate……………. ID02  
Organization Name………………………………………………………………………. ID04 
 
Sex:    1. Male            2. Female ID06 Director Name…………………….. ID05 
 Main Economic Activity……………………………… 
ID07
 
Organization Address: ID08
 
  
 
Building Name:……………………… … 
Street Name:………………………………… 
Neighborhood: ……..……..……..……..…….. 
P.O box: …………………………………….. 
Phone Number: ………………………………… 
Fax Number: ………………………………… 
E-mail:…………………………………………… Website:……………………………………. 
  
 
     Researcher Name: IR07  
 
Respondent: 
Telephone/ mobile Position Full Name INF01 
    
 
Information about the organization activities: 
 Year of Establishment Q1 
 Number of branches in the oPt Q2 
 
Legal Status 
 
1. Charitable organization              2. Cooperative organization      3. Foundation                                       4. 
Research center                          5. Development institution        6. Human rights organization  
7. Cultural institution                     8. Training / rehabilitation         9. Other (specify): 
Q3 
Type of targeted Locality during the year of 2008? (Percentage of Organization budget)  
1. Urban. ..........% 
2. Rural ............ % 
3. Camps.........% 
Q4 
 
The organization activities cover: 
1. Locality       2. District        3. West Bank         4. Gaza Strip         5. At national level. Q5 
Nature of the activities during the year of 2008? (Percentage of budget) 
1. Relief ...........% 
2. Developmental ............% 
Q6 
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What is the poper discription of Organization  
Q7 
 
Have the organization activities been changed since its establishment?  
1. Yes               2. No  (go to Q11) Q8 
1.yes 
2. No 
     
     
     
     
Aspects of change: 
  
1. Change in programs 
2. Change in the targeted areas  
3. Change in the targeted groups  
4. Other (specify):………… 
Q9 
1.yes 
2. No 
     
     
     
     
     
       
     
 
Reasons of change:  
 
1. Lack of funding  
2. Extra (plenty) of funding  
3. Change in the objectives and policies of the Organization  
4. Changes in the society’s  priorities 
5. To cope with a change in donors’ directions  
6. Poor respond of targeted groups 
7. To face the occupation measures  
8. Other (specify) 
Q10 
1.yes 
2. No 
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
Sources of funding:  
 
1. External funding  
2. self Sources 
3. Grants from the PNA  
4. local donations 
5. Donations from institutions and individuals within the Green Line  
6. Donations from Palestinians abroad  
7. Other (specify) 
Q11 
 
%  
 % 
%  
%  
%  
%  
%  
Sources of funding as percentage of 2008 budget: 
1. External funding  
2. self Sources 
3. Grants from the PNA  
4. local donations 
5. Donations from institutions and individuals within the Green Line  
6. Donations from Palestinians abroad  
7. Other (specify) 
Q12 
 Expenditures of the year 2008? Q13 
 Revenues of the year 2008? Q14 
Distribution of external funding by source and year (as percentage of total external fund) Q15 
Year Donor code Donor  
2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000 1999  
           
           
           
 Total (in US$) 
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Programs shares of external funding distributed by District, Annual average of the period Q16 
Governorate Programs total 
In USD$ 
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100%  
Time 
Period/ 
Program 
1999-2000 
                  1. 
                  2. 
                  3. 
                  4. Other:… 
2001 2005-  
                  1. 
                  2. 
                  3. 
                  4. Other:… 
2006 -2008 
                  1. 
                  2. 
                  3. 
                  4. Other:… 
  
 
Percentage distribution of the budget by program, type of targeted locality and time period (percentage of budget) Q17 
Type of  locality  
 
Total (in US$) 
 
Total 
 
Camps 
 
Rural 
 
Urban 
 
Program code 
Time Period/ 
Program 
 
1999-2000 
 100%     1.  
 100%     2.  
 100%     3.  
 100%     4. Other….  
2001-2005 
 100%     1.  
 100%     2.  
 100%     3.  
 100%     4. Other….  
2006-2008 
 100%     1.  
 100%     2.  
 100%     3.  
 100%     4. Other….  
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Percentage distribution of the budget by work scope and time period (percentage of budget) 
Work Scope Time period 
Q18 
Total (in US$) Total Developmental Relief   
    1999-2000  
    2001-2005  
    2006-2008  
  
  
Field researcher Notes: 
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VII. Statistical Appendix11 
 
1. External Donor Aid 
 
Comparison of MAS and MoI data  
on PNGO Distribution (2001, 2006) 
 
Org MOI MAS 
Year 2001 2006 2000 2006 
Comparison 
No. of 
PNGOs 
% of 
WB 
No. of 
PNGOs 
% of 
WB 
No. of 
PNGOs 
% of 
WB 
No. of 
PNGOs 
% of 
WB 
North WB 77 20.8 492 30.5 231 34.2 405 42.6 
Central WB 205 55.4 704 43.4 232 34.4 267 28.1 
South WB 88 23.8 423 26.1 212 31.4 279 29.3 
All WB 370 100 1615 100 675 100 951 100 
Source: Palestinian Ministry of Interior & MAS, 2007. 
Note: In MAS Studies, the West Bank accounts for 76.6% and 68.5% of all Palestinian NGOs 
in 2000 and 2006 respectively. 
 
 
 
Types of Aid to PNGOs (2008) 
 
Sources of Aid to PNGOs 
# of PNGOs 
surveyed 
receiving aid 
% of external 
aid to PNGOs 
External Aid 80 78.28% 
Self Funding 52 12.37% 
PA funding 20 0.83% 
local donations 41 5.31% 
donation from 1948 area 15 0.09% 
from outside Palestinian- Diaspora 25 2.32% 
Others 16 0.80% 
Total  100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
 
 
 
PNGO Sources of Revenue (1999, 2006 & 2008) 
 
Source/ Year 1999 2006 2008(*) 
External Aid 46.8% 60.9% 78.28% 
Self-generated Revenue 28.8% 21.5% 12.37% 
PA Funding 4.9% 0.7% 0.83% 
Local Donations 10.8% 9.3% 5.31% 
Donations from Palestinians living in Israel 1.4% 3.7% 0.09% 
Donations from the Diaspora 5.5% 3.2% 2.32% 
Others 1.8% 0.7% 0.80% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Sources: MAS, 2001, 2007 and 2009 – PNGO Survey 
*Note: The measurement of external aid dependency in 2008 is biased toward 
larger PNGOs. 
 
                                                 
11  Cells left blank equal zero or 0% 
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Externally Funded PNGO Activity by Type and Period 
 
Activity Type 1999-2000 2001-2005 2006-2008 Average 
Relief 34.3 37.6 29.1 32.7 
Development 65.7 62.4 70.9 67.3 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
 
 
 
PNGO Funding by Donor Groupings (1999 – 2008) 
 
Year EU USA Arab 
Other 
Countries 
Multilateral 
Institutions 
Total 
1999 64.43% 12.41% 8.20% 4.25% 10.71% 100.00% 
2000 62.42% 10.67% 4.46% 0.89% 21.56% 100.00% 
2001 42.14% 6.89% 14.40% 2.40% 34.16% 100.00% 
2002 49.33% 6.08% 16.96% 1.68% 25.95% 100.00% 
2003 40.61% 7.66% 18.47% 4.25% 29.02% 100.00% 
2004 58.06% 7.94% 13.51% 1.82% 18.66% 100.00% 
2005 59.53% 5.40% 12.10% 5.25% 17.72% 100.00% 
2006 62.10% 4.99% 9.13% 3.48% 20.30% 100.00% 
2007 70.44% 3.39% 8.89% 3.30% 13.98% 100.00% 
2008 67.78% 4.32% 10.70% 4.96% 12.23% 100.00% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 
 
 
 
Governmental versus Non Governmental  
Aid to PNGOs 
 
Year Governmental Nongovernmental Total 
1999 52.09% 47.91% 100.00% 
2000 61.14% 38.86% 100.00% 
2001 59.9% 40.1% 100.00% 
2002 38.0% 62.0% 100.00% 
2003 42.3% 57.7% 100.00% 
2004 44.9% 55.1% 100.00% 
2005 41.7% 58.3% 100.00% 
2006 41.1% 58.9% 100.00% 
2007 48.2% 51.8% 100.00% 
2008 44.8% 55.2% 100.00% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
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2. External Aid and PNGO Activity by Sector 
 
International Aid to PNGOs by Sector (1999 – 2008) 
 
 Sector/year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Budget     
(Million USD $) 
7,966 14,228 
20273 46225 49409 67556 96767 103567 147597 165035 
Children's Activities 2.84% 5.10% 6.89% 3.12% 6.62% 8.04% 2.69% 2.31% 2.74% 3.73% 
Charity & Relief 15.26% 9.54% 6.85% 13.16% 7.15% 3.66% 2.58% 5.21% 4.04% 8.88% 
Elderly Care    0.13%  0.10%    0.22% 
Family Planning     0.08% 0.24% 2.23% 0.53% 0.08% 1.70% 
Lib. Arts Education 8.70% 4.03% 4.27% 6.30% 4.66% 6.28% 6.05% 5.40% 6.22% 8.25% 
Rural Development 19.79% 14.64% 4.83% 7.81% 13.67% 9.68% 9.90% 10.93% 15.88% 10.17%
Water and 
Environment 8.20% 1.68% 0.55% 2.09% 5.89% 4.79% 5.04% 5.47% 2.38% 3.51% 
Health Services 2.27% 23.01% 32.94% 21.86% 20.05% 17.66% 17.37% 18.74% 15.45% 14.72%
Research 0.13% 0.45% 0.18% 1.83% 1.96% 2.79% 0.71% 2.05% 1.26% 3.00% 
Disabled Care  0.56% 2.18% 1.83% 6.74% 5.07% 6.57% 5.05% 4.68% 3.83% 
Vocational Training  1.78% 5.30% 6.83% 4.83% 5.78% 2.53% 2.85% 2.04% 3.06% 
Religious Activities     0.15%    0.03%  
Scientific Education 5.69% 6.05% 4.82% 2.87% 2.39% 3.29% 2.29% 1.87% 4.28% 2.61% 
Women’s Affairs 18.41% 11.30% 12.51% 7.58% 3.81% 6.25% 7.51% 7.29% 8.97% 7.99% 
Human Rights 3.66% 8.11% 6.82% 9.65% 5.70% 8.45% 10.54% 10.21% 10.83% 10.60%
Enhancing Democracy 7.06% 7.03% 2.94% 3.49% 2.85% 5.69% 8.96% 6.65% 4.81% 3.58% 
Good Governance 3.15% 2.24% 2.64% 3.52% 3.51% 6.03% 9.89% 8.73% 9.32% 7.84% 
Youth and Sports 0.06%  0.27% 2.30% 3.62% 3.09% 2.54% 2.66% 1.64% 1.54% 
Other 4.79% 4.47% 6.02% 5.65% 6.32% 3.09% 2.57% 4.04% 5.35% 4.78% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
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International Governmental Aid to PNGOs by Sector (1999 – 2008) 
 
 Sector/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Budget (Million 
USD $) 3795 5257 11563 33246 30449 30360 45746 46379 59402 74066 
Children's Activities   2.54% 0.11% 7.39% 11.37% 3.22% 2.33% 3.45% 5.76% 
Charity & Relief    10.99% 6.20% 2.32% 1.72% 4.93% 4.67% 5.01% 
Elderly Care      0.24%    0.50% 
Family Planning     0.18% 0.56% 5.58% 1.33% 0.20% 4.36% 
Liberal Arts Education 14.50% 7.00% 14.00% 11.76% 7.39% 11.51% 12.02% 10.99% 11.14% 12.91%
Rural Development    16.09% 19.62% 7.43% 6.72% 7.66% 16.94% 6.89% 
Water and Environment 17.50%   3.22% 12.41% 4.48% 4.94% 5.73% 0.07% 2.06% 
Health Services 8.50% 33.00% 21.77% 7.55% 12.96% 11.51% 12.30% 18.92% 12.54% 14.50%
Research 0.50% 2.00% 1.04% 4.33% 4.56% 5.03% 1.22% 1.40% 0.20% 5.13% 
Disabled Care  2.50% 12.44% 2.77% 5.20% 4.95% 0.79% 1.53% 5.25% 4.39% 
Vocational Training  6.00%  10.10% 5.20% 2.72% 1.32% 1.70% 0.18% 2.90% 
Religious Activities         0.07% 0.00% 
Scientific Education  5.00%  1.66% 1.46% 3.76% 1.72% 0.07% 0.27% 0.31% 
Women Affairs 18.50% 6.00% 14.00% 1.22% 3.10% 5.91% 4.90% 5.83% 6.74% 6.02% 
Human Rights   5.70% 15.98% 7.39% 10.55% 16.17% 17.19% 18.01% 16.55%
Enhancing Democracy 28.00% 28.50% 13.48% 4.00% 2.37% 9.67% 15.67% 11.33% 7.40% 4.51% 
Good Governance 12.50% 10.00% 15.03% 3.44% 3.74% 2.16% 8.51% 4.60% 11.05% 5.70% 
Youth and Sports    4.99% 0.82% 4.87% 0.21% 2.07% 1.47% 1.94% 
Other    1.78%  0.96% 3.00% 2.40% 0.36% 0.56% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
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International Nongovernmental Aid to PNGOs by Sector (1999 – 2008) 
 
 Sector/Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total Budget (Million 
USD $) 4171 8971 8710 12979 18960 37196 51021 57188 88195 90969 
Children's Activities 3.79% 6.57% 7.09% 5.06% 6.06% 8.37% 2.35% 2.29% 2.29% 2.44% 
Charity & Relief 20.40% 12.29% 8.38% 14.57% 7.85% 4.54% 3.15% 5.40% 3.65% 11.35%
Elderly Care    0.21%      0.04% 
Family Planning           
Liberal Arts Education 6.75% 3.18% 2.22% 2.79% 2.67% 2.24% 2.08% 1.75% 3.16% 5.27% 
Rural Development 26.46% 18.87% 5.90% 2.47% 9.32% 11.04% 12.02% 13.06% 15.22% 12.26%
Water and Environment 5.06% 2.17% 0.67% 1.36% 1.13% 4.88% 5.11% 5.30% 3.83% 4.44% 
Health Services 0.17% 20.12% 35.59% 31.07% 25.22% 21.66% 20.75% 18.63% 17.27% 14.86%
Research    0.21% 0.07% 1.06% 0.38% 2.48% 1.91% 1.64% 
Disabled Care    1.21% 7.87% 5.00% 10.42% 7.35% 4.33% 3.48% 
Vocational Training  0.56% 6.48% 4.72% 4.55% 7.86% 3.34% 3.60% 3.20% 3.15% 
Religious Activities     0.27%      
Scientific Education 7.61% 6.36% 5.89% 3.64% 3.07% 2.85% 2.66% 3.04% 6.79% 4.08% 
Women Affairs 18.38% 12.83% 12.29% 11.67% 4.33% 6.31% 9.25% 8.24% 10.36% 9.24% 
Human Rights 4.89% 10.46% 7.11% 5.57% 4.47% 6.65% 6.80% 5.65% 6.35% 6.80% 
Enhancing Democracy  0.82% 0.71% 3.16% 3.21% 2.59% 4.51% 3.60% 3.18% 2.98% 
Good Governance    3.57% 3.33% 8.71% 10.80% 11.43% 8.24% 9.20% 
Youth and Sports 0.08%  0.33% 0.57% 5.67% 1.68% 4.09% 3.04% 1.75% 1.28% 
Other 6.41% 5.76% 7.35% 8.14% 10.93% 4.56% 2.28% 5.12% 8.47% 7.47% 
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
 
Distribution of Internationally Funded PNGO  
Sectors by Grouping & Period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey
Average 2006-20082000-20051999-2000Sector Grouping 
19.0% 18.4% 23.5% 11.7% Charity & Relief 
7.6% 8.1% 5.6% 10.3% Social 
28.4% 19.8% 34.0% 42.2% Health 
8.4% 11.6% 5.1% 5.7% Rights 
5.1% 5.9% 3.0% 6.7% Education 
20.2% 25.7% 15.2% 14.2% Infrastructure 
0.3% 0.4% 0.1% 0.6% Children 
4.0% 4.6% 4.4% 1.6% Youth 
3.9% 3.2% 3.5% 7.0% Women 
3.1% 2.2% 5.8%  Others 
100% 100% 100% 100% Total 
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External Aid and PNGO Activity by Target Population 
 
 
International Aid Distribution to Target Populations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
 
 
International Aid Distribution to Target Populations  
by Governmental Agencies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
 
 
International Aid Distribution to Target Populations  
by Nongovernmental Agencies 
 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
 
Internationally funded PNGO Activities  
by Target Population and Period 
 
Period 
2006-2008 2001-2005 1999-2000 
Target Population 
10.88% 13.83% 20.13% Urban 
52.89% 42.96% 43.49% Rural 
8.56% 11.26% 5.32% Refugee 
27.67% 31.96% 31.06% All 
100% 100% 100% Total % 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
 Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Urban 26.7% 26.7% 31.0% 32.1% 40.6% 35.3% 37.6% 33.8% 37.4% 38.0% 
Rural 37.8% 42.2% 36.2% 35.0% 33.9% 36.4% 36.9% 41.1% 42.2% 41.0% 
Refugee 35.5% 31.1% 32.8% 32.9% 25.5% 28.3% 25.4% 25.1% 20.4% 21.0% 
 Total (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Urban 50.0% 32.0% 45.7% 44.9% 48.9% 47.7% 48.2% 44.8% 45.9% 49.3% 
Rural 33.0% 32.0% 16.6% 27.7% 30.7% 29.6% 29.5% 37.5% 38.1% 34.8% 
Refugee 17.0% 36.0% 37.7% 27.4% 20.4% 22.6% 22.3% 17.6% 16.0% 16.0% 
 Total (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Urban 22.8% 26.0% 28.1% 23.3% 34.0% 26.7% 31.3% 27.3% 32.5% 31.7% 
Rural 38.6% 43.5% 40.1% 40.0% 36.5% 41.0% 41.4% 43.3% 44.6% 44.5% 
Refugee 38.6% 30.5% 31.8% 36.7% 29.5% 32.3% 27.3% 29.5% 22.9% 23.8% 
 Total (%) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
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3. External Aid and PNGO Activity by Geography 
 
International Aid Distribution by Governorate (if known) and Region  
(1999-2008) According to the Location of PNGO Partner HQ 
 
 Gov/Reg 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nablus 13.58%  7.55% 2.79% 1.72% 0.72% 3.79% 4.64% 2.97% 1.58% 
Tulkarm 0.25% 0.16% 0.09% 0.46% 0.02% 0.91% 0.78% 0.57% 1.03% 0.71% 
Qalqilya     0.68% 3.51% 3.32% 2.40% 2.22% 2.81% 
Jenin 3.33%   3.68%  0.91% 2.04% 1.00% 0.83% 0.64% 
Tubas      0.90% 0.94% 0.40% 0.53% 0.43% 
Salfit       0.25% 1.72% 2.22% 1.56% 
N. WB 2.59% 3.48% 7.64% 3.78% 2.80% 6.70% 3.89% 3.15% 2.03% 2.68% 
Total – N. WB 19.75% 3.64% 15.27% 10.71% 5.22% 13.65% 15.02% 13.88% 11.84% 10.41%
Ramallah - Bireh 10.00% 4.57% 2.45% 14.03% 19.37% 20.38% 21.76% 24.07% 19.53% 15.95% 
Jerusalem 0.99% 3.64% 4.36% 3.64% 2.40% 6.81% 3.26% 4.21% 9.52% 5.03% 
Jericho 0.37%   0.69% 0.16% 0.02% 0.50% 0.31% 1.89% 0.54% 
C. WB 13.09% 23.59% 20.91% 37.22% 43.38% 28.83% 30.00% 30.25% 31.26% 45.30% 
Total – C. WB 24.44% 31.79% 27.73% 55.57% 65.31% 56.04% 55.52% 58.84% 62.20% 66.82%
Bethlehem   3.26% 4.45% 2.97% 3.68% 3.67% 7.01% 3.68% 4.99% 2.88% 
Hebron 3.09% 3.26% 1.27% 1.47% 1.48% 1.72% 2.41% 1.92% 3.08% 4.56% 
S. WB 2.59% 1.85% 1.27% 1.93% 2.32% 6.12% 3.54% 1.83% 3.45% 3.50% 
Total – S. WB 5.68% 8.37% 7.00% 6.38% 7.48% 11.52% 12.96% 7.43% 11.52% 10.94%
North GS 7.47% 2.17% 1.82%    0.22% 0.99%  0.21% 
Gaza City 17.04% 28.59% 11.55% 5.27% 1.52% 3.83% 5.25% 2.92% 4.89% 1.29% 
Dier Al Balah     0.06% 0.07%    0.11% 
Khan Younis 4.38%    0.44% 0.97% 0.53% 0.89% 0.67% 0.67% 
Rafah 2.47%  2.73%    0.03%   0.11% 
Gaza Strip  18.77% 25.43% 33.91% 22.06% 19.97% 13.93% 10.47% 15.05% 8.89% 9.45% 
Total – GS  50.12% 56.20% 50.00% 27.34% 21.99% 18.80% 16.50% 19.85% 14.45% 11.83%
 Total 
Governorate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total Region 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
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International Nongovernmental Aid Distribution to PNGOs by Governorate 
 (if known) and Region (1999-2008) According to the Location of PNGO Partner HQs 
 
 Gov/Reg 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nablus 15.49%  9.2% 4.6% 2.9% 0.9% 3.8% 6.9% 4.2% 2.0% 
Tulkarm 0.28% 0.2% 0.1% 0.8%   0.8% 0.6% 1.6% 1.0% 
Qalqilya      6.6% 3.3% 3.8% 3.5% 4.0% 
Jenin 3.80%   6.7%  1.7% 2.0% 1.6% 1.3% 0.7% 
Tubas      1.7% 0.9% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 
Salfit       0.3% 2.7% 3.5% 2.2% 
N. WB 2.96% 4.0% 9.3% 4.8% 4.3% 7.2% 3.9% 2.5% 0.7% 1.7% 
Total – N. WB 22.54% 4.19% 18.67% 16.88% 7.27% 18.18% 15.02% 18.77% 15.61% 12.36% 
Ramallah - Bireh 4.37% 5.3% 0.8% 15.6% 27.3% 26.8% 21.8% 26.7% 20.4% 13.8% 
Jerusalem 1.13% 0.4% 0.9% 0.8% 1.8% 2.2% 3.3% 2.8% 11.4% 3.9% 
Jericho 0.42%   1.3% 0.3%  0.5% 0.5% 2.1% 0.8% 
C. WB 14.93% 27.1% 25.6% 27.8% 28.6% 23.0% 30.0% 23.2% 23.4% 47.1% 
Total – C. WB 20.85% 32.81% 27.22% 45.33% 58.04% 51.99% 55.52% 53.14% 57.33% 65.61% 
Bethlehem   2.5% 3.2% 2.0% 4.2% 4.1% 7.0% 3.8% 4.2% 2.9% 
Hebron   1.6% 0.6% 2.8% 2.9% 2.4% 2.5% 4.6% 5.7% 
S. WB 2.96% 2.1% 1.6% 2.3% 1.2% 2.4% 3.5% 1.1% 5.1% 2.4% 
Total – S. WB 2.96% 4.63% 6.33% 4.88% 8.24% 9.43% 12.96% 7.34% 13.89% 11.01% 
Northern GS 8.52%  2.2%    0.2% 0.7%  0.3% 
Gaza City 19.44% 29.1% 14.1% 6.0% 0.4% 3.6% 5.3% 4.0% 4.4% 1.8% 
Dier Al Balah    2.4% 0.1% 0.1%    0.2% 
Khan Younis 1.48%     0.9% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 
Rafah 2.82%  1.1%       0.2% 
Gaza strip  21.41% 29.3% 30.3% 24.5% 25.9% 15.7% 10.5% 15.5% 8.1% 7.8% 
Total – GS  53.66% 58.38% 47.78% 32.92% 26.44% 20.41% 16.50% 20.75% 13.17% 11.02% 
 Total 
Governorate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total Region 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
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International Governmental Aid Distribution to PNGOs by Governorate (if known)  
and Region (1999-2008) According to the Location of PNGO Partner HQs 
 
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nablus    0.5% 0.4% 0.5%  0.9% 0.8% 0.5% 
Tulkarm      1.9%  0.5%   
Qalqilya     1.4%      
Jenin          0.5% 
Tubas       0.6%    
Salfit           
Northern WB    2.6% 1.2% 6.2% 4.6% 4.3% 4.3% 4.9% 
Total – N. WB    3.09% 3.00% 8.54% 5.23% 5.56% 5.16% 5.86% 
Ramallah - Bireh 50.00%  10.0% 12.1% 10.8% 13.1% 21.5% 19.6% 18.0% 20.9% 
Jerusalem  25.0% 20.0% 7.2% 3.1% 12.0% 3.9% 6.6% 6.2% 7.7% 
Jericho         1.5%  
Central WB    48.9% 59.3% 35.4% 35.8% 42.3% 45.1% 41.0% 
Total – C. WB 50.00% 25.00% 30.00% 68.23% 73.17% 60.59% 61.23% 68.55% 70.82% 69.64%
Bethlehem   8.3% 10.0% 4.1% 3.2% 3.2% 8.1% 3.6% 6.4% 2.8% 
Hebron 25.00% 25.0% 0.0% 2.6%  0.4% 0.6% 1.0% 0.4% 1.8% 
Southern WB    1.5% 3.5% 10.3% 7.6% 3.0% 0.5% 6.1% 
Total – S. WB 25.00% 33.33% 10.00% 8.24% 6.67% 13.87% 16.31% 7.57% 7.31% 10.79%
North GS  16.7%      1.5%   
Gaza City  25.0%  4.4% 2.8% 4.0% 5.3% 1.1% 5.7%  
Dier Al Balah    3.0%       
Khan Younis 25.00%    0.9% 1.0% 1.3% 1.3% 0.8% 0.5% 
Rafah   10.0%        
Gaza strip    50.0% 19.1% 13.5% 12.0% 10.6% 14.4% 10.2% 13.2% 
Total – GS  25.00% 41.67% 60.00% 20.44% 17.17% 17.00% 17.23% 18.32% 16.71% 13.71%
 Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
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International Aid Distribution by Governorate (if known) and Region  
(1999-2008) According to the Location of Project Implementation 
 
 Gov/Reg 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nablus 12.5%  7.5% 2.6% 1.6% 0.7% 4.0% 3.4% 2.4% 1.2% 
Tulkarm 0.3% 0.2% 0.1% 0.5%  0.9% 0.3% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 
Qalqilya     0.7% 1.6% 0.3% 2.8% 2.3% 3.0% 
Jenin 3.4%     1.1% 1.9% 0.6% 0.9% 0.8% 
Tubas       0.5%  0.1% 0.3% 
Salfit      0.1% 0.3% 1.8% 2.1% 2.0% 
N. WB 6.1% 9.4% 12.5% 15.7% 17.0% 19.9% 18.7% 17.7% 17.4% 17.2% 
Total – N. WB 22.25% 9.61% 20.09% 18.78% 19.36% 24.28% 26.04% 26.65% 25.73% 24.79%
Ramallah – Bireh 7.0% 1.9% 2.5% 13.3% 8.4% 8.9% 6.8% 6.9% 6.7% 5.3% 
Jerusalem 1.0% 3.7% 4.4% 2.5% 0.5% 3.9% 1.2% 1.9% 2.9% 2.9% 
Jericho 0.4%   0.7% 0.2%  0.1%  1.3% 0.6% 
C. WB 9.4% 12.3% 9.0% 15.7% 24.1% 16.6% 17.0% 20.8% 19.0% 21.4% 
Total – C. WB 17.75% 17.94% 15.82% 32.20% 33.18% 29.42% 25.16% 29.72% 29.90% 30.26%
Bethlehem   3.3% 3.5% 1.4% 3.6% 1.0% 3.6% 0.7% 1.8% 1.8% 
Hebron 3.1% 1.1% 2.2% 2.2% 1.7% 1.3% 2.2% 3.1% 2.4% 1.5% 
S. WB 6.1% 7.8% 6.1% 14.4% 16.0% 19.2% 15.1% 15.8% 17.0% 17.4% 
Total – S. WB 9.25% 12.22% 11.82% 18.02% 21.30% 21.47% 20.88% 19.62% 21.09% 20.72%
North GS 7.6% 2.2% 1.8%   1.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 0.1% 
Gaza City 7.9% 20.9% 6.1% 2.4% 1.6% 3.6% 6.0% 1.7% 5.1% 0.8% 
Dier Al Balah    1.4% 0.1% 1.0% 0.5%  0.2% 0.1% 
Khan Younis 4.4%    0.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 
Rafah 2.5%  2.7%    0.5% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 
Gaza strip  28.4% 37.1% 41.6% 27.3% 23.9% 17.7% 19.9% 21.5% 17.2% 22.7% 
Total – GS  50.75% 60.22% 52.27% 31.00% 26.16% 24.83% 27.92% 24.01% 23.28% 24.22%
 Total Governorate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total Region 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
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International Nongovernmental Aid Distribution by Governorate (if known)  
and Region (1999-2008) According to the Location of Implementation 
 
 Gov/Reg 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nablus 14.29% 0.00% 9.22% 4.27% 2.72% 1.25% 5.20% 5.22% 3.12% 1.25% 
Tulkarm 0.29% 0.19% 0.11% 0.77% 0.04% 0.03% 0.40% 0.13% 0.49% 0.34% 
Qalqilya      2.75% 0.30% 4.35% 3.24% 4.48% 
Jenin 3.86%     1.28% 2.90% 0.91% 1.21% 0.95% 
Tubas       0.30%  0.20% 0.25% 
Salfit       0.40% 0.87% 3.24% 3.07% 
Northern WB 7.00% 10.63% 15.22% 15.00% 17.80% 24.63% 19.95% 17.78% 18.34% 16.79% 
Total – N. WB 25.43% 10.81% 24.56% 20.04% 20.55% 29.94% 29.45% 29.26% 29.84% 27.13%
Ramallah - Bireh 0.86% 2.13% 0.78% 18.23% 13.22% 15.31% 10.70% 8.74% 7.98% 6.67% 
Jerusalem 1.14% 0.44% 0.89% 0.69% 0.21% 0.06% 1.10% 0.87% 1.90% 0.80% 
Jericho 0.43%   1.15% 0.29% 0.03% 0.00% 0.00% 1.50% 0.59% 
Central WB 10.71% 13.88% 11.00% 12.08% 17.23% 15.19% 15.65% 19.22% 15.95% 20.00% 
Total – C. WB 13.14% 16.44% 12.67% 32.15% 30.95% 30.59% 27.45% 28.83% 27.33% 28.07%
Bethlehem   2.50% 3.22% 0.35% 3.86% 1.28% 3.03% 0.89% 1.01% 1.33% 
Hebron   1.56% 2.08% 2.64% 1.50% 3.15% 1.87% 3.28% 1.12% 
Southern WB 7.00% 8.75% 7.44% 10.38% 14.22% 14.06% 14.50% 14.65% 17.85% 16.71% 
Total – S. WB 7.00% 11.25% 12.22% 12.81% 20.73% 16.84% 20.68% 17.41% 22.15% 19.17%
North GS 8.64%  2.22%    0.35% 0.02%   
Gaza City 9.00% 19.75% 7.44% 0.92% 0.36% 1.44% 4.68% 2.04% 3.81% 1.06% 
Dier Al Balah    2.23% 0.11% 0.13%     
Khan Younis 1.50%          
Rafah 2.86%  1.11%    0.05%    
Gaza strip  32.43% 41.75% 39.78% 31.85% 27.31% 21.06% 17.35% 22.43% 16.88% 24.58% 
Total – GS  54.43% 61.50% 50.56% 35.00% 27.77% 22.63% 22.43% 24.50% 20.69% 25.64%
 Total Governorate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Total Region 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
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International Governmental Aid Distribution by Governorate (if known)  
and Region (1999-2008) According to the Location of Implementation 
 
 Gov/Reg 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Nablus       2.23%  1.02% 1.08% 
Tulkarm      1.95% 0.25% 0.41% 0.24% 0.34% 
Qalqilya     1.70%  0.25%  0.56% 0.32% 
Jenin      0.98% 0.25%  0.31% 0.45% 
Tubas       0.72%   0.41% 
Salfit      0.24% 0.25% 3.65%   
Northern WB    16.73% 16.00% 13.75% 16.72% 17.64% 15.63% 17.94% 
Total – N. WB    16.73% 17.70% 16.92% 20.65% 21.71% 17.76% 20.53% 
Ramallah - Bireh 50.00%  10.00% 5.22% 1.70% 0.65% 0.70% 3.54% 4.27% 2.83% 
Jerusalem  30.00% 20.00% 5.53% 0.80% 8.84% 1.35% 3.96% 4.85% 6.86% 
Jericho       0.25%  0.94% 0.64% 
Central WB    21.51% 33.80% 18.39% 19.24% 23.91% 24.82% 23.94% 
Total – C. WB 50.00% 30.00% 30.00% 32.26% 36.30% 27.88% 21.54% 31.41% 34.89% 34.27% 
Bethlehem   10.00% 5.00% 3.14% 3.30% 0.57% 4.56% 0.41% 3.25% 2.70% 
Hebron 25.00% 10.00% 5.00% 2.39% 0.30% 1.06% 0.72% 5.42% 0.57% 2.16% 
Southern WB    21.01% 18.50% 25.87% 15.93% 17.97% 15.24% 18.71% 
Total – S. WB 25.00% 20.00% 10.00% 26.54% 22.10% 27.50% 21.21% 23.80% 19.05% 23.57% 
North GS  20.00%    3.86% 0.25% 1.65% 1.00% 0.38% 
Gaza City  30.00%  4.72% 3.30% 6.40% 8.16% 1.15% 7.50% 0.38% 
Dier Al Balah      2.23% 1.20%  0.67% 0.38% 
Khan Younis 25.00%    1.40% 1.94% 2.01% 0.49% 1.13% 0.92% 
Rafah   10.00%    1.09% 0.00% 0.18% 0.38% 
Gaza strip    50.00% 19.75% 19.20% 13.26% 23.89% 19.79% 17.83% 19.17% 
Total – GS  25.00% 50.00% 60.00% 24.47% 23.90% 27.69% 36.59% 23.08% 28.30% 21.63% 
 Total Governorate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
 Total Region 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Source: MAS, 2009 – Donor Survey 
 
 
 
Location of PNGO Project Implementation  
by Region and Period 
 
2006-2008 2001-2005 1999 - 2000 Region 
12.4 14.8 12.6 North WB 
10.8 12.2 9.5 Central WB 
18.9 16.8 14.8 South WB 
42.1 43.8 36.9 Subtotal WB 
29.0 29.4 32.3 Gaza Strip 
28.9 26.9 30.8 All 
100% 100% 100% Total % 
Source: MAS, 2009 – PNGO Survey 
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International Donor and Agency Headquarters Distribution  
by Region and Percentage (1999 – 2008) 
 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Total # of 
Organizations 
103 105 110 109 118 121 128 134 144 130 
Governorate or Region Total (%) 
Nablus      0.8 0.6 0.7 1.3 2.4 
Tulkarm     1.0 0.8 0.6 0.7   
Qalqilya         0.6 0.8 
Jenin    1.9 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.4 
Tubas           
Salfit           
 Northern WB    1.9 3.5 3.1 2.7 2.4 3.9 5.6 
Ramallah-Bireh 23.3 23.8 24.5 21.1 21.2 20.5 23.0 23.0 29.8 31.5 
Jerusalem 61.2 59.0 59.0 62.3 61.9 62.6 63.0 62.6 55.5 53.0 
Jericho           
Central WB 84.5 82.8 83.5 83.4 83.1 83.1 86 85.6 85.3 84.5 
Bethlehem 3.9 3.8 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.4 3.0 2.9 4.1 3.8 
Hebron 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.6 2.4 2.3 2.2 2.0 1.5 
Southern WB 5.8 5.7 4.6 4.7 4.1 4.8 5.3 5.1 6.1 5.3 
Northern GS           
Gaza City           
Dier Al Balah           
Khan Younis           
Rafah           
Gaza Strip 9.7 11.5 11.9 10.0 9.3 9.0 6.0 6.7 4.7 4.6 
Total Governorate 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total Region  100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Total Field Offices 24 23 27 33 37 40 39 38 35 41 
% Orgs with Field 
Offices 
23.3 21.9 24.5 30.2 31.4 33.0 30.4 28.3 24.3 31.5 
Source: PASSIA Organizations Directory, 2000 – 2009  
Note: Governorate level HQs were not recorded in the case of Gaza, and only offered as a regional 
whole. % of organizations with field offices is a measure of those headquartered in the West 
Bank with a branch or field office in Gaza. 
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Distribution of PNGOs Based on Geographical  
Location and Type of Residence, 2007 
 
Number of 
organizations 
Camp(%)Rural(%) Urban(%)Governorate 
116 1.7 64.7 33.6 Jenin 
25 24.0 52.0 24.0 Tubas 
66 9.1 47.0 43.9 Tulkarem 
138 9.4 51.4 39.1 Nablus 
33  36.4 63.6 Qalqylia 
27  81.5 18.5 Salfeet 
405 6.7 55.3 38.0 North West Bank 
166 7.2 37.3 55.4 Ramallah and Al-Bireh 
20 20.0 15.0 65.0 Jericho 
81 9.9 29.6 60.5 Jerusalem 
267 9.0 33.3 57.7 Central West Bank 
128 9.4 32.8 57.8 Bethlehem 
151 6.6 33.1 60.3 Hebron 
279 7.9 33.0 59.1 South West Bank 
951 7.7 42.6 49.7 Total West Bank 
58 24.1 5.2 70.7 North Gaza 
170 2.9 2.4 94.7 Gaza 
80 73.8 2.5 23.8 Deir Al-Balah 
71 2.8 8.5 88.7 Khan Younis 
58 36.2  63.8 Rafah 
437 23.1 3.4 73.5 Total Gaza Strip 
1388 12.5 30.3 57.2 WB&GS 
Source: MAS, 2007 
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Distribution of PNGOs in the West Bank (2001 – 2009-MoI) 
 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Gov/Reg # # # # # # # # # 
Salfeet Tulkarm 
Qalqilya 
 
35 
 
43 
 
45 
 
139 
 
175 
 
191 
 
217 
 
233 
 
249 
Jenin 16 21 30 76 100 125 145 169 186 
Nablus 26 33 50 123 152 176 194 213 225 
N. West Bank 
77 
20.8 
97 
21.3 
125 
19.6 
338 
27.5 
427 
29.5 
492 
30.5 
556 
30.7 
615 
30.7 
660 
31.1 
Ramallah 125 162 233 354 421 470 532 587 623 
Jerusalem 63 72 104 186 186 200 222 260 281 
Jericho 17 18 22 24 30 34 39 44 47 
C. West Bank 
205 
55.4 
252 
55.4 
359 
56.3 
564 
45.9 
637 
44.0 
704 
43.4 
793 
43.8 
891 
44.5 
951 
44.7 
Bethlehem 35 41 70 180 213 238 248 278 284 
N. Hebron       14 16 19 
C. Hebron 43 51 67 112 128 140 149 150 154 
S. Hebron 10 14 17 35 43 45 51 54 58 
S. West Bank 
88 
23.8 
106 
23.3 
154 
24.1 
327 
26.6 
384 
26.5 
423 
26.1 
462 
25.5 
498 
24.8 
515 
24.2 
Total 370 455 638 1229 1448 1615 1811 2004 2126 
Source: Palestinian Ministry of Interior. 
Note: The second number given in the shaded regional boxes refers to the total 
percentage of PNGOs in that region per year. Percentages are rounded to the 
nearest tenth. 
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Distribution of PNGOs by Governorate  
and Region (2000 & 2006) 
 
Year 2000 2006 
Governorate / Region  No. of 
PNGOs 
% of 
PNGOs 
No. of 
PNGOs 
% of 
PNGOs 
Jenin  52 5.9 116 8.4 
Tubas  8 .9 25 1.8 
Tulkarm  39 4.4 66 4.8 
Nablus 90 10.2 138 9.9 
Qalqilya 27 3.1 33 2.4 
Salfit 15 1.7 27 1.9 
North WB 231 26.2 405 29.2 
Ramallah-Bireh 114 12.9 166 12.0 
Jericho 20 2.3 20 1.4 
Jerusalem 98 11.1 81 5.8 
Central WB 232 26.3 267 19.2 
Bethlehem 93 10.6 128 9.2 
Hebron 119 13.5 151 10.9 
South WB 212 24.1 279 20.1 
All WB 675 76.6 951 68.5 
Northern GS 20 2.3 58 4.2 
Gaza City 90 10.2 170 12.2 
Dier Al Balah 38 4.3 80 5.8 
Khan Younis 42 4.8 71 5.1 
Rafah 16 1.8 58 4.2 
All GS 206 23.4 437 31.5 
Total  881 100% 1388 100% 
Source: MAS, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
